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G r e e n  S p e c u l at i o n S  attends to the intersections between trans-formative environmentalism and science fiction literature. Trans-formative environmentalism comprises a number of movements 
that have emerged since Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring initiated modern 
environmentalism in 1962. These movements offer theories about the 
ideological origins of and solutions to environmental degradation. They 
interpret environmental problems not as “problems of the environment,” 
to apply language from educator Noel Gough, “but, rather, [as] prob-
lems of modern scientific, industrial, and predominately Western society’s 
transactions with the earth” (“Neuromancing” 5). Nor are transforma-
tive environmentalism’s efforts directed toward “‘end-of-the-pipe’ out-
puts of environmentally destructive behavior,” efforts that law professor 
Lisa Heinzerling notes characterize environmental policy today (1446). 
Informed by the life sciences, which remind us of our dependencies and 
effects upon nonhuman nature and ecosystemic processes, as well as by 
various schools of philosophical thought, transformative movements 
instead work to change the inputs of such destruction, “the individual atti-
tudes, habits, and behavior that lead us all to want and demand things 
that necessitate environmental damage” (Heinzerling 1446).
1
i n t r o d u c t i o n
2  i n t r o d u c t i o n
 And no doubt, the environment is damaged. Writing in a 2009 issue 
of Nature with twenty-eight colleagues representing a range of scien-
tific disciplines, global sustainability expert Johan Rockström points to 
“Earth-system processes and associated thresholds which, if crossed, could 
generate unacceptable environmental change” (472). Rockström and his 
colleagues determine that the thresholds or boundaries for carbon diox-
ide emissions, species extinction, and nitrogen pollution have already been 
crossed, threatening the global environmental stability of the last ten thou-
sand years. Recent measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide show the 
level of the greenhouse gas to be eleven percent higher than science indi-
cates is the highest acceptable amount to avoid sea-level rise, more wide-
spread drought, and other climatic consequences. The rate of species loss 
is currently at one hundred to one thousand times “what could be consid-
ered natural,” a rate that science tells us is leading to drastic and extensive 
ecological damage (Rockström 474). The agricultural use of nitrogen—
which along with the use of other “nutrient-associated pollutants” such as 
phosphorus and sulfur “has emerged as one of the most important drivers 
of ecosystem change in terrestrial, freshwater, and coastal ecosystems”—
now exceeds safe levels by almost two hundred fifty percent (Duraiap-
pah et al. 8). In addition to these crises, others on the horizon include the 
effects of phosphorus pollution and ocean acidification, as well as the eco-
systemic alterations brought on by excessive freshwater and land use.
 That science fiction offers an important literary contribution to dis-
cussions of such environmental degradations and their sources has been 
previously recognized. I would like to insert this book into a family of 
commentary that collectively seeks to locate within the genre those texts 
and generic characteristics most valuable for environmentalist thinking. 
Gough, for example, highlights the merits of science fiction as environmen-
tal literature against critics who undervalue its environmentalist commit-
ments or who find the genre’s conventional tropes (e.g., “the assumption 
that virtually all problems are amenable to technical solutions”) to out-
weigh these commitments (“Playing” 409). He calls science fiction “an 
environmental literature par excellence” for its frequent attention to the 
ways in which environments, or “externalities,” affect its characters, in 
contrast to realist fictions that put such externalities in the background to 
favor character-driven action (“Playing” 411). Another advocate of the 
genre, Ursula K. Heise writes in a 1999 letter to Publications of the Mod-
ern Language Association of America, “science fiction is one of the genres 
that have most persistently and most daringly engaged environmental 
questions and their challenge to our vision of the future” (1097). Support-
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ing this assertion in her recent book Sense of Place and Sense of Planet, 
Heise highlights several works of science fiction (esp., John Brunner’s 
Stand on Zanzibar [1968] and David Brin’s Earth [1990]) in making the 
case for a shift in American environmentalism from its historical attraction 
to localism toward a globalism that would ground questions of local sense 
of place in a cosmopolitan ecological awareness.
 Patrick D. Murphy, who consistently pursues new frontiers for ecocrit-
ical analysis, has been at the forefront of fleshing out science fiction’s envi-
ronmentalist potential. He finds in the genre “several varieties of nature 
and environmental engagement”: there are science fiction novels that (1) 
“provide factual information about nature and human–nature interactions 
as well as provide thematically environmentalist extrapolations of conflict 
and crisis based on such information,” (2) “provide analogous depictions 
of ecosystems and human interaction with such systems,” and (3) “dem-
onstrate the disastrous consequences of exploitive relationships between 
humans and other humans, humans and other sentient beings, and humans 
and ecosystems in which they are an exotic” (Farther 41). Moreover, in 
The Cross, the Plow and the Skyline political scientist Ernest J. Yanarella 
articulates the ways in which science fiction appropriates the Judeo-Chris-
tian apocalyptic tradition, the Jeffersonian pastoral tradition, and the 
technocentric, urban tradition to reflect on the viability of current socio-
political formations as well as to imagine new ones. About science fiction 
Yanarella writes, “as critical political theory [science fiction] often issues 
in a powerful critique of existing social institutions, cultural norms, and 
prevailing structures of power. In the process, it opens up alternative ways 
of socially constructing the lived world and disclosing utopian possibilities 
latent in the present and emergent in that different possible future” (6). 
With this general observation and his subsequent and more specific politi-
cal and ecocritical analyses of a range of science fiction texts, Yanarella 
attests to the value of the genre as a “surprisingly sophisticated intellec-
tual guide” for addressing important sociopolitical and cultural questions, 
especially those of environment (304). Finally, Lawrence Buell notes in his 
2005 study of environmental literary criticism, “For half a century science 
fiction has taken a keen, if not consistent interest in ecology, in planetary 
endangerment, in environmental ethics, in humankind’s relation to the 
nonhuman world” (56). Buell sees as particularly important those science 
fiction works that defy the genre’s technocentric hubris, works that suggest 
“we’re probably stuck, whether we like it or not, with the world we’ve 
got” (e.g., Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Lathe of Heaven [1971] and Karen Tei 
Yamashita’s Through the Arc of the Rain Forest [1990]) (58).
4  i n t r o d u c t i o n
 Anticipating these more recent scholarly treatments of science fiction’s 
environmentalist promise, Kim Stanley Robinson writes in his introduc-
tion to the 1994 anthology Future Primitive,
the process of rethinking the future, of inventing a new consensus vision 
of what it might be . . . is happening all across contemporary culture, 
in a great variety of forms, with names like the environmental move-
ment, green political parties, deep ecology, the land ethic, landscape 
restoration, sociobiology, sustainable agriculture, ecofeminism, social 
ecology, bioregionalism, animal liberation, steady-state economics. All 
these movements contain efforts to reimagine a sustainable human soci-
ety. (10–11)
The range of groups expressing environmental concern today is indeed 
broad, comprising political parties, philosophers, natural scientists, 
and economists who are increasingly understanding, experiencing, and 
responding to anthropogenic environmental degradation and its costs. 
Adding to this range, Robinson declares, “Science fiction is part of this 
work” (11). Taking seriously Robinson’s assertion, as well as the claims of 
the aforementioned scholars, Green Speculations highlights science fiction 
works that can be read as constituting a subgeneric category of science fic-
tion—an environmental science fiction—and that share with transforma-
tive movements an interest in environmental degradation and its origins. 
Among these works are future histories, postapocalyptic fictions, utopias, 
and more. This book communicates the environmentalist possibilities of 
science fiction to students, teachers, and scholars of the genre, of envi-
ronmental literature, of environmental studies, and of other (inter)disci-
plines interested in the value of aesthetic and imaginative representations 
of and for the planetary present and future. It is my effort to affirm envi-
ronmental writer Christopher Cokinos’s recent argument that “readers of 
environmental literature concerned with the future of the planet”—and I 
will add, with the present of the planet—“might do well to put down [the 
works of the naturalist John] Muir and pick up some science fiction” (par. 
16).
 Subsequent to an exploration in the second part of this introduction 
of key points of intersection between the literary strategies of science fic-
tion and those of more conventional environmentalist discourse, the fol-
lowing chapters take up the issue of environmental science fiction’s place 
as a body of literature that reflects, sometimes prefigures, and in its fin-
est moments theorizes transformative environmentalism and its assorted 
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targets of criticism. The representative texts I examine provide narrative 
accounts of environmental issues and various schools of environmental 
thought, in several cases doing so before such matters made it into the 
consciousness of a larger group of activists and scholars. They can thus 
serve environmentalism as educational instruments to inform readers 
about environmental issues and criticisms of anthropocentrism, techno-
centric patriarchy, and growth-centered capitalism in transformative envi-
ronmentalism’s deep ecology, ecofeminist, and ecosocialist movements. 
But beyond this pedagogic quality, environmental science fiction some-
times theorizes these criticisms of dominant Western ideology (again, 
even prefiguratively), creating transformative environmentalism in addi-
tion to reflecting it. My first chapter addresses instances when (proto)envi-
ronmental science fiction exhibits clear engagements with the idea that 
humans are “part of nature,” which is expected given that Darwinian 
biology was the prevailing scientific paradigm of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. It then examines Frank Herbert’s Dune (1965) 
as a literary moment when this idea reaches its full maturity. Among other 
problems that Dune raises about part-of-nature thinking, the novel ques-
tions whether underscoring the biological verdict that humans are part of 
nature—something that transformative environmentalism, following espe-
cially Rachel Carson, frequently does—will have any sort of transforma-
tive effect on human-centered colonialist cultures, for such cultures have 
interpreted this verdict to justify their oppression of indigenous peoples.
 In chapter 2, I borrow language from utopian studies and the deep 
ecology movement to examine the value of ecotopia and ecodystopia for 
catalyzing sweeping changes to a number of modern trends that according 
to deep ecology are rooted in an entrenched anthropocentric value sys-
tem. Representing ecotopian fiction, Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1975) 
and Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) criticize human 
population and economic growth, monoculture agriculture, hyperindivid-
ualism, and producer-driven consumer culture by measuring their effects 
against more deliberate and ecologically conscious manners of existence. 
As ecodystopias, Brunner’s Stand on Zanzibar and The Sheep Look Up 
(1972) call for similar cultural analysis by using a literary strategy dif-
ferent from that employed in the ecotopias; their dystopian obligation to 
envision nightmarish worlds enables them to assert a warning regarding 
what we do to the environment today and to think about the unintended 
consequences of deep ecological, ecotopian dreaming, such as encourag-
ing a disproportionate focus on overpopulation as well as inciting physical 
ecoterror.
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 Tracing various genres of environmental feminism as they are repre-
sented and theorized in Sally Miller Gearhart’s The Wanderground (1979), 
Le Guin’s Always Coming Home (1985), and Joan Slonczewski’s A Door 
Into Ocean (1986), chapter 3 engages ecofeminism as a rich critical dis-
course that offers a number of important perspectives on gender and 
human–nonhuman relationships. Gearhart’s novel illustrates cultural eco-
feminism, arguing that an innate woman–nature link must be embraced as 
a way of confronting the social and environmental problems of patriarchal 
culture. Rational feminists object to such essentialism. To say women are 
more connected to nature than men is to perpetuate dominant stereotypes 
of women that have been used to oppress them in cultures where nature is 
devalued. Le Guin and Slonczewski seem deeply aware of this issue, both 
asserting the artifactual nature of gender categories and their relative lev-
els of socially constructed naturalness. But while Always Coming Home 
and A Door Into Ocean challenge the cultural ecofeminist stance about 
women and nonhuman nature, as dialectical ecofeminist texts they also 
declare the critical possibility of socially constructed “feminine” ways of 
knowing and being in the world.
 Finally, chapter 4 briefly reaches back to several of the works exam-
ined in the previous chapters and highlights additional ones in the study of 
what I believe is the most powerful and urgent collective interest of envi-
ronmental science fiction and the previously discussed schools of trans-
formative thought: the capitalist mode of economic production. While 
George R. Stewart’s Earth Abides (1949) and Herbert’s Dune—both dis-
cussed in chapter 1—do not participate in the types of environmentalist 
appraisals of capitalism prevalent since their publications, their attention 
to the myth of human supremacy and the dynamics of consolidated politi-
cal power, respectively, foreshadow such critiques. More openly critical of 
capital, Callenbach’s imaginary Ecotopians practice a stable-state econ-
omy that counters the capitalist exploitation of nature, and the citizens 
of Piercy’s Mattapoisett realize a rustic and healthy society that defies the 
capitalist myth of economic progress. Brunner’s dystopian works highlight 
the dangers of capitalist supremacy, exposing the growth economy and 
its consumerist ethos, and the corrupt, masculine spaces of Gearhart’s, Le 
Guin’s, and Slonczewski’s ecofeminist novels are likewise capitalist spaces. 
Further, although philosophies such as deep ecology and cultural eco-
feminism locate the cause of environmental degradation not in patterns 
of economic production but instead in nonmaterial value systems, it can 
be argued that the environmental degradation they respond to in their 
unique ways is driven by the dominant economic paradigm. Ecosocialism 
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takes on this paradigm, and chapter 4’s specific analytical focus is on the 
nascent ecosocialist critique of capital’s symbolic and material activities as 
presented in Frederik Pohl and C. M. Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants 
(1952), the critique of capitalist imperialist expansion in Le Guin’s The 
Word for World Is Forest (1972), and Kim Stanley Robinson’s ecosocialist 
vision in the Mars trilogy (1993, 1994, 1996).
At the level of literary strategy the writing and reading of science fiction 
is guided by certain assumptions and tendencies that also guide the writ-
ing and reading of much environmental nonfiction, the mode of environ-
mentalist discourse that dominates the canon of works that engage with 
issues of environmental degradation, community activism, wilderness 
defense, environmental ethics, inhabitation, and more.1 First, both science 
fiction and environmental nonfiction often employ a rhetoric of estrange-
ment and extrapolation that compels readers toward critical reflection 
on seemingly invisible everyday attitudes and habits. Lauded by the For-
malist literary critic Viktor Shklovsky as ostranenie, estrangement in one 
sense is the creative effort to isolate our perceptions of objects from our 
prior knowledge of objects and thus to revivify these objects as having 
aesthetic value beyond our routine, practical experiences of them.2 In this 
regard, estrangement-as-defamiliarization leads us to the poetic experience 
of real and imagined marvels that I review below as having also an ethical 
effect. But estrangement is a varied narrative strategy with other practiced 
applications in both environmental nonfiction and environmental science 
fiction.
 For example, very early in his 1948 (proto)environmentalist treatise 
Our Plundered Planet, which has been called “one of the first—perhaps 
the very first—of what would later grow into a minor industry, namely, 
popular environmental books,” conservationist Fairfield Osborn specu-
lates about whether Earth’s human civilization is existing as successfully 
as another human civilization living elsewhere in the universe (Jamison 
and Eyerman 64). Of course he cannot know the answer to this question; 
he promptly leaves behind “the difficulties of attempting to find specific 
clues regarding man’s existence and future destiny from the perspective 
of the universe as a whole” and shifts instead to known science, to clues 
regarding humanity’s viability from the evidence provided in then current 
scientific literature (Osborn 10). But Osborn’s thought experiment is an 
estranging one that enables his subsequent appraisals of modern human-
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ity.3 By initially asking his questions about humanity from the distanced 
“perspective of the universe,” rather than from our immediate perspective 
as embedded participants in the very things we need to evaluate, he invites 
a resituating of our point of view to compel more open and objective 
observation. Osborn invites us to consider ourselves as a faraway observer 
might consider us. This effort to estrange thus approaches the “cognitive 
estrangement” famously coined by Darko Suvin in his Metamorphoses of 
Science Fiction, in which whatever is made strange—in Osborn’s case, our 
observational perspective—is made so to enable an appraisal of our actual 
world.
 Suvin’s basic argument, as Carl Freedman aptly sums it up, is that for 
fiction to estrange cognitively it must first create “an alternative fictional 
world that . . . [refuses] to take our mundane environment for granted” 
(16–17). To estrange in this sense is for the narrative to break the rules for 
what we understand as normal daily life by introducing “a strange new-
ness,” or a “novum” (Suvin, Metamorphoses 4). But in science fiction it is 
this estrangement in dialectical relationship with cognition that defines the 
genre and is indispensable to it. Cognition “enables the science-fictional 
text to account rationally for its imagined world and for the connections 
as well as disconnections of the latter to our own empirical world” (Freed-
man 17). Pure estrangement severs us entirely from our experienced reality 
and we are left in fantasy. Pure cognition, if not directed toward contem-
plating the presence of the novum in the narrative, severs us entirely from 
imagined possibility and we are left in a reality indistinguishable from our 
own. When estrangement and cognition interact, however, we are encour-
aged to assess the novum and consider its origins or conditions of exis-
tence. What is it? Why is it there? How did it come to be?
 Rachel Carson’s science-fiction-like effort to estrange her readers in the 
opening chapter of Silent Spring, “A Fable for Tomorrow,” is one with 
a cognitive dimension. Although the dystopian imaginings in the chapter 
perhaps operated too much in 1962 within an apocalyptic master narra-
tive to convince especially dismissive readers about Silent Spring’s legiti-
macy, it nonetheless represents a significant rhetorical move on Carson’s 
part—one which, given the historical consequences of the book, must not 
have been excessively offensive.4 Into a pastoral Anytown, USA, Carson 
introduces “a strange blight,” the result of “Some evil spell” that kills 
everything in its path (2). But the evil spell is not the treachery of, say, 
mythological imps; nor does its resultant affliction presage a supernatural 
and inescapable doomsday event. Such fantasies would discourage the cog-
nitive operation that for Carson ultimately connects the anomalous calam-
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ity, the novum, of her imagined town to everyday procedure in real towns 
across the country. Making the connection obvious she writes, “No witch-
craft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of new life in this stricken 
world. The people had done it themselves” (3). To paraphrase science fic-
tion scholarship on cognitive estrangement, in “A Fable for Tomorrow” 
the familiar state of affairs in the small-town American story is narratively 
interrupted to expose the danger of an otherwise unnoticed custom: the 
indiscriminate, seemingly obligatory use of insecticides.5
 As these examples show, two founding writers of environmental non-
fiction embraced one of science fiction’s most effective and fundamen-
tal narrative strategies. Given Suvin’s position as a Marxist scholar who 
therefore theorized cognitive estrangement within the critical tradition 
most attentive to science fiction’s utopian subgenre, it is fitting that works 
of environmental utopian and dystopian science fiction—or ecotopian 
and ecodystopian fiction—employ cognitive estrangement prominently 
toward an environmentalist end. In Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time 
the ecotopian future town of Mattapoisett exhibits some estranging char-
acteristics, if viewed from the perspective of mainstream modern society: 
cooperative technological planning, organic public gardens, compostable 
diapers for infants. Every one of these estrangements in the author’s imagi-
nary ecotopian community provokes cognitive reflection on the viability of 
what they are replacing, because contemplating them requires us to recall 
our own society’s models. Precisely by not embracing a cooperative tech-
nological planning that assures a more mindful, sustainable, and ethical 
use of technology, today’s dominant ideology supports technological plan-
ning centralized in absentee corporate headquarters and realized in perpet-
ually obsolete and disposable consumer objects, as well as in increasingly 
more powerful weapons of war. Precisely by not embracing organic meth-
ods and public ownership, prevailing ideology supports the private own-
ership of food that provides sustenance not to local communities but to 
people shopping in grocery stores hundreds or thousands of miles away 
from mechanized farms. Mattapoisett’s ecotopian nova enable the critical 
interrogation of the social reality undergirded by dominant ideology.
 The estrangements discussed so far (e.g., Carson’s “strange blight,” 
Mattapoisett’s cooperative planning, organic gardens, etc.) are strange to 
us as readers who read within particular modern and Western social and 
historical contexts, and in our efforts to make sense of them we are lead 
toward critical scrutiny of these contexts. But as film scholar Simon Spie-
gel observes, often in science fiction the estrangement effect happens when 
something we fully comprehend as readers turns out to be strange for those 
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in the fictional world of the narrative. Discussing this “diegetic estrange-
ment,” Spiegel cites the scene in the 1973 film Soylent Green when the 
protagonist, Detective Thorn, responds with “ecstatic joy” to the water 
running from the bathroom faucet of a luxury apartment (375). Running 
water is not a novum to an audience who uses such faucets every day; 
but we experience the working faucet as strange, because Thorn’s reaction 
contradicts the normal response to running water that we expect. Contem-
plating the scene, we realize that the story must take place in world where 
water is scarce or its access tightly controlled. Another example of this 
type of estrangement takes place in Paolo Bacigalupi’s “The Calorie Man” 
(2005). With its “megadonts,” “IP men,” and “Cheshires,” the story is 
loaded with the kinds of strange nova that demand our comprehension 
and in every case encourage our reflection on the implications of genetic 
engineering. Suburbs and gas station signs, however, are not new to our 
experience, yet they are presented in the narrative as strange to its charac-
ters and setting. The implication of these diegetic estrangements, then, is 
that suburbs and gas stations are artifacts of a previous time, a time when 
oil flowed freely and its use structured the possibilities of economic and 
social life.
 Soylent Green and “The Calorie Man” are ecodystopias; whatever the 
strategy of estrangement they exercise, they imagine future consequences 
of present-day activities, provoking critical reflection on these activities. 
The cognitive dimensions of ecodystopian estrangements often result from 
another strategic intersection between environmental nonfiction and envi-
ronmental science fiction: extrapolation. In a 2008 interview by environ-
mental journalist Michelle Nijhuis, Bacigalupi defines his role as a science 
fiction writer in contrast to the role of his interviewer:
The speculative process, the process of going two or three steps down 
the road beyond what you can actually report, oftentimes [gives us] 
the information we really need to know. And it seems like scientists 
are inherently conservative, and science journalists are inherently con-
servative, because you don’t want to be wrong. But that’s where I can 
get involved as a science fiction writer. I don’t have to be right, exactly, 
[but] I need to illustrate. I need to illustrate a feeling or experience so 
that people can say, “Does that seem like something we want to be 
going toward?”
Patrick D. Murphy makes a similar observation about extrapolation in 
science fiction that, like Bacigalupi’s, can be read also as an observation 
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about its use in environmental nonfiction: “extrapolation emphasizes 
that the present and the future are interconnected—what we do now 
will be reflected in the future, and, therefore, we have no alibi for avoid-
ing addressing the results of our actions today” (“The Non-Alibi” 263). 
Extrapolation is one of environmentalism’s favored critical strategies. Con-
necting the present now to a possible then, Osborn studied the practices 
of his contemporary society and projected these practices into the future. 
Carson did the same, as did the Club of Rome in its 1972 report The Lim-
its to Growth, an influential scientific effort to model the long-term conse-
quences of population and economic growth. Certainly, to “meet the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs,” sustainability movements require prefigurative, 
extrapolative thinking (World Commission 43).6
 In The Sheep Look Up John Brunner shares the effort of environmen-
tal nonfiction to project from present trends an image of possible things 
to come, and the ensuing ecodystopia exhibits estrangements opposite 
those of Piercy’s Mattapoisett: food scarcity, high population, contami-
nated beaches. The book’s extrapolations lead to critical reflections on 
“our actions today.” But we cannot stop at the idea that extrapolative nar-
ratives are valuable only because they imagine the future consequences 
of these actions. They are also valuable because they confront us with 
descriptions of the present, even if imaginatively rendered. To read extrap-
olative work as envisioning the possible future is to overlook the fact that 
the social and ecological discord referenced in such fiction and nonfiction 
is in many places already a reality, though perhaps not immediately appar-
ent to certain readers. To read extrapolative work as instead descriptive is 
to recognize the fiction and nonfiction as representing this already exist-
ing though spatially distant reality. So while on the one hand Bacigalupi is 
right in raising the speculative question “‘Does that seem like something 
we want to be going toward?’” it is also important to ask of science fic-
tion and environmentalism’s extrapolative moments, “Does that seem like 
something we should do something about right now?” This spatial version 
of extrapolation could be called global awareness, and it is one of environ-
mental science fiction’s primary cultural functions.
 Finally, in addition to estrangement and extrapolation, an attention 
to the sense of wonder, to the affective experience of the marvelous, is 
another intersecting convention between environmental science fiction and 
environmental nonfiction, though one that is not without complexities and 
complications. Writers of environmental nonfiction often underscore expe-
riences of natural wonder as life-affirming, transformational experiences. 
12  i n t r o d u c t i o n
In her July 1956 Woman’s Home Companion article, “Help Your Child 
to Wonder,” for example, Carson reflects on her and her young nephew’s 
“spine-tingling response” to “elemental things”—to the night, the ocean, 
the ghost crabs roaming the beach (25). She concludes, “Those who con-
template the beauty of the earth find reserves of strength that will endure 
as long as life lasts” (48). Similarly, Edward Abbey notes of Utah’s Deli-
cate Arch, its significance lies
in the power of the odd and unexpected to startle the senses and sur-
prise the mind out of their ruts of habit, to compel us into a reawakened 
awareness of the wonderful—that which is full of wonder.
 A weird, lovely, fantastic object out of nature like Delicate Arch has 
the curious ability to remind us—like rock and sunlight and wind and 
wilderness—that out there is a different world, older and greater and 
deeper by far than ours, a world which surrounds and sustains the little 
world of men as sea and sky surround and sustain a ship. The shock of 
the real. For a little while we are again able to see, as the child sees, a 
world of marvels. (45)
Environmental philosopher Kathleen Dean Moore believes that for us to 
experience wonder at the sight of crabs or geological features, to find in 
them strength or reawakening surprise, we must be receptive to the stories 
they tell, and thus be willing to listen and perceive without human egotism 
or possessiveness. Wonder thus leads to what might be called an ethics 
of ecological difference, analogous to feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray’s 
“ethics of sexual difference,” in which wonder is the quality that “beholds 
what it sees always as if for the first time, never taking hold of the other as 
its object. It does not try to seize, possess, or reduce this object, but leaves 
it subjective, still free” (14).
 Against many critics who are skeptical of the literary merit of won-
der in science fiction, largely because it classifies the genre as one geared 
toward provoking indeterminate emotion, David Sandner offers a similar 
and convincing argument for the presence of the marvelous in science fic-
tion.7 In his article “‘Habituated to the Vast’” Sandner, a fantasy author 
and scholar, recalls Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s endorsement of fantastic 
literature as a way to furnish the intellect with a comprehension of and 
affection for the whole. Engaged by the fictional wonders of science fic-
tion—a genre in the fantastic mode—the imagination is trained to encoun-
ter this total, sensual world; for, wonders such as alien landscapes, the 
species who occupy these landscapes, or even Earth landscapes made 
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strange through a science-fictional plot device represent a beyond-human 
that we must welcome, first to comprehend the fiction, then ultimately, as 
a result of our receptiveness, to be in an actual world comprising much 
more than the human species. Importantly, Sandner underscores the indis-
soluble relationship between the human imagination and the actual world, 
between suspending disbelief while encountering fictional representation 
and living out a real respect for the ecosystems we inhabit. Wonders in sci-
ence fiction do provoke emotion, which, as Sandner says of imagination 
in general, is “a ‘natural’ process, embodied and so inseparable from the 
physical” (286).
 Nevertheless, the resistance that sense of wonder has received as a defi-
nitional concept for science fiction is useful, especially if we consider it 
alongside environmentalist interpretations of the phenomenon. On the one 
hand many environmental writers share the conviction that experiencing 
the awe-inspiring beyond, whether real or imagined in fiction, results in 
a more ethical perception of and behavior toward nonhuman nature. On 
the other hand the science fiction scholars who remain skeptical about the 
validity of using the sense of wonder to define the genre do so because they 
are rightly unsure about what produces wonder in the first place. Depend-
ing on a number of anecdotal factors a reader of science fiction might find 
a work’s technological marvels as breathtaking as—or more breathtaking 
than—its representations of the nonhuman marvelous.
 For example, through the character Frank Vanderwal in Kim Stanley 
Robinson’s second installment of the Science in the Capital trilogy, Fifty 
Degrees Below (2005), we experience the park-turned-wilderness that 
Frank willingly calls home: “Out in the park proper the forest now seemed 
wilderness, with most human sign snowed over or overgrown or flooded 
away. It was a whole world. Firelight in the distance the only touch of 
humanity. A kind of Mirkwood or primeval forest, every tree Yggdrasil, 
and Frank the Green Man” (356). The tableau here is sublime, recalling 
the woods of Norse mythology, and in these woods Frank achieves “a 
kind of ecstatic state, a new realm of joy” appropriately supported in the 
novel with a quotation from the journals of transcendentalist Ralph Waldo 
Emerson (404). Frank feels Abbey’s “odd” and Carson’s wonder. And as 
readers of Frank’s experience we feel the beyond-oneself of the wild world. 
But later in the novel Frank witnesses another wonder, the “grand exer-
cise in planetary engineering” that is the dumping of five hundred million 
tons of salt into the North Atlantic in an effort to restart a Gulf Stream 
stalled as a result of glacial melting (456–57). Rising up in a helicopter as 
his visit to the dumping site ends, Frank observes “the astonishing sight of 
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a thousand tankers on the huge burnished plate spreading below them, an 
astonishing sight, instantly grasped as unprecedented: the first major act of 
planetary engineering ever attempted, and by God it looked like it” (562, 
emphasis added). As Moore reminds us, astonish comes “from the Latin 
tonus, thunder, to be struck, as by lightning; the sudden flash that startles 
us and, just for a moment, lights the world with uncommon clarity” (269). 
Here, the human creation, too, provokes Abbey’s “shock of the real.”
 This contradictory coexistence of nonhuman and artifactual won-
ders in a work of science fiction—or in our actual experiences—should 
not deter a deeper evaluation of the implications of the phenomenon. In a 
book about environmental justice, Brian Baxter makes a useful historical 
observation:
the objects of wonder are no longer what they once were, because the 
objects themselves are no longer so easily available in a world of arti-
facts, and wonder has been increasingly redirected to human beings and 
their works to the exclusion of the non-human. . . . [I]t is not a deficit of 
wonder from which we suffer, but a deficit of experiences of the objects 
which are the appropriate recipients of our sense of wonder, and of the 
ethical dimension to our responses. (37)
At the same time that Baxter recognizes the “appropriate” objects of our 
wonder, objects that from the perspective of an environmental ethic of eco-
logical difference are necessarily the welcomed subjects of ecological sys-
tems or the systems themselves, he also acknowledges the power of human 
artifacts to evoke comparable wonder. Both nonhuman phenomena and 
human artifacts are often remarkable. But the ethical legitimacy of respect-
ing as beyond-human the technologies we create to manipulate nonhuman 
nature is questionable, especially when examined against the environmen-
tal ethic of respecting that which is not us or ours. Are we to wonder at 
the Glen Canyon Dam so as to include a place in our ethics for honoring 
its interests or its flourishing? As Moore notes of the affective experience 
of human artifacts, “it’s not wonder they evoke, so much as fascination 
perhaps, or appreciation” (269). By juxtaposing human-created and non-
human wonders, environmental science fiction such as Robinson’s asks us 
to consider our experiences of both, and if those experiences are indistin-
guishable, to consider then the ethical dimensions of a modern world in 
which we deem the evidence of our human presence as marvelous as the 
wonders that make us contemplate this presence on a deeper, more eco-
logically conscious level.
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 A complication arises with this reasoning, however. If in Robinson’s 
Red Mars the human artifact that fascinates us is the space elevator, the 
twenty-three-thousand-mile-high traversable cable that facilities the effi-
cient shipment of ores from Mars to Earth, then the nonhuman wonder is 
the planet Mars itself—“weird, lovely, fantastic,” to borrow Abbey’s lan-
guage. The former perhaps provokes the highest appreciation owed to a 
feat of industrial engineering; the latter, perhaps a more meaningful reflec-
tion on humanity’s cosmological place. But as Robinson’s Mars trilogy 
demonstrates, we do not live in a world where such a simple opposition 
between human and nonhuman exists, an opposition that can easily indi-
cate the ethical value of competing affective experiences. In the trilogy’s 
conclusion, the character Ann walks along a Martian beach with a two-
year-old child who looks up at seagulls and remarks, “Ooh! . . . Pretty! 
Pretty!” (760). Ann looks closely at “dark grains of basalt, mixed with 
minute seashell fragments, and a variety of colorful pebbles” (761). The 
scene is right out of Carson’s magazine article, but the presence of the 
gulls and shells is the result of an engineering project far larger than the 
space elevator: the terraforming of Mars. Here, the nonhuman wonder is a 
human artifact.
 This implicit narrative commentary on the artifactual aspects of non-
human wonder does not characterize all environmental science fiction; 
Slonczewski’s A Door Into Ocean and Bacigalupi’s “The People of Sand 
and Slag” (2004), for example, make use of wonder in ways that are 
akin to the ways Carson, Abbey, and Moore use it. Initially reluctant to 
embrace his new home on the strange planet Shora, the character Spi-
nel in Slonczewski’s book begins to accept the world after witnessing its 
marvels:
Now he had time to absorb the silent drama that pulsed below the 
waves. Hungry eels hid in wait beneath raft seedlings, which now dot-
ted the sea like copper medals. A fanwing’s egg stretched and strained 
until a tadpole burst out and flittered away, to swim and grow until it 
sprouted wings. At the coral forest, a beakfish crunched the hard stalks 
with enormous jaws that never tired. After some minutes of this calcif-
erous grazing, a puff of sand would spout from its tail. Spinel wondered 
how long a beach a beakfish could fill, were the sand not destined to fall 
several kilometers below.
 Spinel was now more than simply curious about Shora. Something 
compelled him to come to grips with this place that was inexorably 
becoming a part of him. (100, emphasis added)
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In Bacigalupi’s short story, an ecodystopian piece set on a future Earth so 
polluted that humans have adapted using a technology that allows them 
to eat the byproducts of heavy industry, the first-person narrator admits 
a mysterious connection with a rare animal: a dog. Contemplating his 
friend’s suggestion that they cook and eat the dog, the narrator says, “I 
don’t know. That dog’s different from a bio-job. It looks at us, and there’s 
something there, and it’s not us. I mean, take any bio-job out there, and it’s 
basically us, poured into another shape, but not that dog. . . .” (64, empha-
sis added). In both cases, nonhuman wonder, expressed as an inexplicable 
“something,” has transformative effects on the characters. Interestingly, 
when Sandner defines wonder he also relies on the word something: “won-
der describes the affective moment when the individual is overwhelmed by 
the sense of something else, with the presence . . . of the other” (288).
 But when science fiction does feature human-created nonhuman won-
der—as in Robinson’s work, or in Herbert’s Dune, with its engineered 
biodiversity—it offers a telling insight, if indeed we comprehend envi-
ronmental science fiction as cultural criticism educating us to live more 
ethically as ecological citizens. As Bill McKibben argued in 1989, the 
postnatural world is one where we face the ever-diminishing likelihood of 
encountering something untouched by human activity (The End 60). But 
as the Mars trilogy makes clear, this information need not suggest that we 
face an ever-diminishing likelihood of experiencing wonder and its associ-
ated ethical possibilities. If we are to experience wonder at all on Earth 
today, and thus exercise the environmental ethic necessary for an ecologi-
cally just present and future, we must learn how to deem as wonderful 
our affective experiences of places and species already touched by human 
activity—second-growth forests, renourished beaches, national parks, 
reintroduced flora and fauna, our own backyards, or even the cracks in 
the sidewalk. In a postnatural era such places and species make up most 
of the world available to us for our reflection. With Mars’s beaches and 
Dune’s rich biodiversity, Robinson’s and Herbert’s works, respectively, 
suggest that despite the human origins of natural wonders in a postnatural 
world, such wonders are still nonhuman, elemental things.
The speculative and affective orientations of environmental nonfiction and 
science fiction allow both to perform effectively the philosophical work 
of transformative movements that question institutionalized behavior and 
try to effect change in ways beyond mainstream legalistic and bureau-
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cratic procedure. Put differently, estrangement, extrapolation, and sense 
of wonder constitute an ecorhetorical strategy for works of fiction and 
nonfiction whose interests lie in questioning deep-seated cultural para-
digms. None of this is to suggest that the concerns of environmentalism 
are feebly grounded in fictional speculation, but instead that science fiction 
offers valuable representations of and critical commentary on environmen-
tal issues. If environmentalism shares rhetorical strategies with science fic-
tion, it is because those strategies facilitate necessary critical perspective, 
not because the two are equally fabulated. It has become quite common 
for climate-science deniers, for example, to dismiss environmentalist con-
cerns about global warming as rooted in science fiction, or, presumably, 
in scientific research that is made up to serve conspiratorial purposes. To 
read what follows as lending support to this notion would be tantamount 
to reading a study of feminism and science fiction—and there are many 
fascinating and important ones—as lending support to the view that the 
social inequalities about which feminism is concerned are fabulations of 
sociological research. Such readings would indicate fundamental, if not 
ideologically motivated, misunderstandings and misrepresentations of 
environmentalism and feminism.
 Misgivings about science fiction, too, have certainly surfaced in work 
that would otherwise seem sympathetic to my argument in this book. In 
The Ecological Rift John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark, and Richard York 
critique market-driven technological solutions to environmental degra-
dation with these words: “The idea that technology can solve the global 
environmental problem, as a kind of deus ex machina without changes in 
social relations, belongs to the area of fantasy and science fiction” (116). 
This characterization of science fiction as technophilic is based on a popu-
lar understanding of the genre that does not seem to recognize the 1960s 
New Wave and its subsequent literary innovations. Prior to the 1960s the 
works of the genre’s pulp and Golden Age eras did celebrate technological 
achievement. With the New Wave, which coincides historically with the 
rise of various social movements, including environmentalism, science fic-
tion “generally adopted an anti-technocratic bent that put it at odds with 
the technophilic optimism of Campbellian hard [science fiction], openly 
questioning if not the core values of scientific inquiry, then the larger social 
processes to which they had been conjoined in the service of state and cor-
porate power” (Latham 107). In short, science fiction has evolved, and 
in this evolution it has obtained a more critical view not only of modern 
technophilia but also of any number of sociopolitical and cultural assump-
tions and practices.
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 In “Science Fiction and Ecology” Brian Stableford mentions at least 
one hundred forty works of science fiction that respond to the evolving 
Zeitgeist of environmentalist interest over the last century, the majority of 
which have appeared since the 1960s. Indeed, many science fiction books 
and stories worthy of ecocritical analysis are not examined in this study, 
and there are also environmental contexts besides transformative move-
ments within which to read these texts. Frans van der Bogert distinguishes 
fictions of “evolution,” “disaster,” “invasion,” and “human nature,” as 
well as “ecofiction” in his book chapter “Nature through Science Fiction.” 
Perhaps the environmental science fiction that in this study represents the 
scope of science fiction’s engagements with transformative environmen-
talism are closest to van der Bogert’s ecofiction: fictions cognizant that 
“sometimes human beings themselves accidentally set into motion events 
that take on the character of a disaster or an invasion as they develop” 
(62). Environmental science fiction, however, does much more than nar-
rate “human tampering” gone awry (van der Bogert 62). With its repre-
sentative examples, Green Speculations demonstrates that the subgenre, 
like the movements it supports, reflects more deeply on ideological struc-
tures that without accident require us to forget about nonhuman nature 
and our uncontestable embeddedness in it. Environmental science fiction 
collectively chips away at the foundations of these structures to prompt an 
effort to rebuild them with greater attention to environmental and social 
ethics.
En v i r o n m e n ta l  p h i l o s o p h e r  Val Plumwood succinctly argues, “To the extent that we hyper-separate ourselves from nature and reduce it conceptually in order to justify domination, we not only lose the 
ability to empathise and to see the non-human sphere in ethical terms, 
but also get a false sense of our own character and location that includes 
an illusory sense of autonomy” (Environmental 9). Plumwood’s concern 
about the conceptual human/nature divide is fundamental to transforma-
tive environmental movements, interested as they are in uncovering the 
core ideological justifications for environmentally destructive socioeco-
nomic and cultural formations. Surely, and simply put, deep ecology’s pri-
mary target of critique is anthropocentrism, ecofeminism’s primary target 
is androcentrism, and ecosocialism’s is global capitalism. But in each case 
the question of humanity’s location in nonhuman nature is centrally moti-
vating. Deep ecology, generally understood, “rejects the dualistic view of 
humans and nature as separate and different” (Pepper, Modern 17). Eco-
feminism uses feminist analyses of the unequal distribution of power that 
is sanctioned in the dualistic gender paradigm likewise to scrutinize the 
Western human/nonhuman split. And drawing on Karl Marx’s historical 
materialism, ecosocialism stresses the “‘metabolic interaction’ between 
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humans and the earth,” that “‘man lives on nature’ and that in this depen-
dent relationship ‘nature is his body, with which he must remain in con-
tinuous interchange if he is not to die’” (Foster, Clark, and York 123). A 
discussion of these movements, then, entails a look at the environmentalist 
maxim that humans are part of nature, a decidedly seditious claim given 
the reign of socioeconomic and cultural attitudes predicated upon notions 
of humanity’s exemption from nonhuman nature.
 Despite popular understandings of science fiction as a technophilic 
literature celebrating human achievement above all else, the genre, when 
environmental, can inform this discussion quite well and, as in the case of 
Frank Herbert’s Dune (1965), make the discussion more complex. Read 
collectively, Olaf Stapledon’s Last and First Men (1931) and George R. 
Stewart’s Earth Abides (1949) make the challenging case that despite 
human technological and intellectual capacities, we are still part of nature. 
These books perform their (proto)environmentalist work by affirming 
our embeddedness in nonhuman nature and identifying several of the key 
tributaries that supply what Plumwood coined the “Illusion of Disem-
beddedness,” including transcendental religious conviction and modern 
technological and economic trends, as well as the various symbolisms and 
infrastructures that grow out of and also inform this conviction and these 
trends. In both works a catastrophic event leads to the near extinction of 
humanity and a subsequent reflection on the reality of our embeddedness 
in nature and the problems inherent in whatever enables us to act out-
side of this reality. Stapledon’s book identifies at its outset two ideological 
loci of social fantasies of disembeddedness, religious and technological. It 
then traces these fantasies’ paths toward environmental and social disas-
ter, which, because we do not do well as a species afterward, illuminate 
our susceptibilities to ecological change, confirming our connection to 
nonhuman nature and exposing the dangers of ideological mystifications 
that disclaim this connection. Earth Abides, however, begins with disas-
ter. Unlike with Last and First Men we do not witness human recklessness 
lead to tragedy, nor is the tragedy—a plague—undeniably one of folly, 
though it is aided by airplane travel and presumed by many in the book 
to be an accident or intentional act of biological warfare. Instead we read 
about a newly primitive group of survivors who can no longer rely for 
their survival on infrastructures and symbolic conventions that previously 
allowed them to forget that they are fixed within nonhuman nature.
 This difference between the narrative movement of Last and First Men 
and Earth Abides is one of subgenre: Stapledon’s book is far-future history 
and Stewart’s is postapocalyptic. And indeed, with the key (proto)envi-
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ronmentalist features of both books being a spotlighting of some of the 
Illusion of Disembeddedness’s constitutive forces and of the fundamental 
embeddedness of humanity in nonhuman nature, their subgeneric differ-
ences are nominal—at least in the reading performed here. But they are 
worth at least this brief rehearsal, if only because the book with which 
this chapter concludes, Dune, departs from the specific extrapolative and 
estranging strategies of the others to favor a more historico-political nar-
rative that begins neither with the ideological follies of modern humanity 
(Last and First Men) nor with the moment of the end of such a human-
ity (Earth Abides) but instead with a humanity not yet fully tricked, so to 
speak, out of practicing its more ecocentric being. Dune’s Fremen live their 
embeddedness as best as they can given their circumstances, and as we wit-
ness their coerced shift into power politics we come to appreciate a more 
complex and complicated understanding of the part-of-nature thinking 
that Last and First Men, Earth Abides, and transformative environmental-
ism uphold. It is to this part-of-nature thinking that I now turn.
The science of ecology, a subfield of biology that studies the relation-
ships between living organisms and their environment, esteems scrupulous 
experimentation, quantitative reasoning, “rigorous logic in deducing con-
clusions, and an ever-critical attitude to both evidence and logic” (Westoby 
166). As Mark Westoby argues, ecology, like all sciences, remains outside 
the realm of values, operating with the scientific understanding that “it is 
illogical to deduce ‘ought’ from ‘is,’ the normative from the substantive” 
(166). But in its radical mode—which since the 1960s has unfolded into 
a number of movements working “to break down the dualism that iso-
lates [humans] from the rest of nature” (Worster 333)—ecology reflects on 
human projects and their impacts on Earth’s biological and physical sys-
tems as well as overtly implicating certain values for instigating the most 
environmentally destructive of these projects. To better indicate its goal to 
define and make real more conscious and responsible material and psy-
chological relationships with nonhuman nature, I am calling this radical 
ecology transformative environmentalism. Transformative environmental-
ism borrows insights from science to challenge explicitly and change those 
governing worldviews that to the detriment of global health fail to gener-
ate knowledge about Earth and its interconnected species.
 As David W. Orr notes, “To see things in their wholeness,” to possess 
this knowledge and the ability to ask “‘What then?’” about these gov-
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erning worldviews, “is politically threatening” (85, 88). “Real ecological 
literacy,” he writes, “is radicalizing in that it forces us to reckon with the 
roots of our ailments, not just with their symptoms” (88). Orr’s interest 
in his book Ecological Literacy is in developing pedagogies for the age 
of ecology and its food, water, energy, and climate crises, pedagogies that 
would provoke deep challenges to dominant, domineering ways of being. 
His project to disengage our inclinations toward disciplinary specializa-
tion, our confidence in traditional education, and most importantly for my 
focus in this chapter our clear acceptance of “disharmony between people 
and between people and the land” grows out of a culturally critical brand 
of ecology that became very conscious of its rebellious, radicalizing ten-
dencies in the 1960s (88).
 Recognizing the science of ecology’s potential to activate normative 
modes of critical engagement, ecologist Paul B. Sears famously deemed 
the discipline subversive in his 1964 essay “Ecology—A Subversive Sub-
ject,” both acknowledging the cultural need for its “continuing critique of 
man’s operations within the ecosystem” and pointing out its threat to “the 
assumptions and practices accepted by modern societies” (12). Similarly, 
while introducing his influential 1969 co-edited essay collection The Sub-
versive Science Paul Shepard declares, “The ideological status of ecology is 
that of a resistance movement” (9). About some of ecology’s key figures he 
writes,
[they] challenge the public or private right to pollute the environment, to 
systematically destroy predatory animals, to spread chemical pesticides 
indiscriminately, to meddle chemically with food and water, to appropri-
ate without hindrance space and surface for technological and military 
ends; they oppose the uninhibited growth of human populations, some 
forms of “aid” to “underdeveloped” peoples, the needless addition of 
radioactivity to the landscape, the extinction of species of plants and 
animals, the domestication of all wild places, large-scale manipulation 
of the atmosphere or the sea, and most other purely engineering solu-
tions to problems of and intrusions into the organic world. (9)
 Decades have passed since Sears and Shepard articulated the latent 
social critique present within ecological science. However, as demonstrated 
in ecocritic Glen A. Love’s more recent Sears- and Shepard-like assertion, 
the life sciences continue to serve key roles in our thinking about what is 
wrong with the way modern societies relate to nonhuman nature, why 
it is wrong, and how we might fix it. Love writes, “The social implica-
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tions of biological thinking and research offer one of the great intellectual 
engagements of our time, sufficient to draw the attention and interest of 
all who are concerned with the place of humankind on the planet” (64). 
Here is an important caveat: the ecocritical literary scholar Dana Phillips 
observes that while today “Ecology sparks debates about environmental 
issues,” ecologists themselves are accountable to objective scientific stan-
dards and are thus “less available and less pliable as spokespersons for the 
environmental movement” (45, 50). Ecological science produces research 
such as “Detection of Density-Dependent Growth at Two Spatial Scales 
in Marble Trout (Salmo Marmoratus) Populations” (Vincenzi et al.) and 
“Insect Diversity and Trophic Structure Differ on Native and Non-Indig-
enous Congeneric Rushes in Coastal Salt Marshes” (Harvey, Britton, and 
Minchinton). The social, political, economic, and ethical concerns about 
which Shepard writes in the above passage, and the “place of humankind” 
about which Love writes, are not the provinces of this ecology. While the 
authors of these scientific papers might express environmentalist senti-
ments outside their research, their research itself, as with most scientific 
research, does not constitute the socioeconomic or cultural criticism that 
environmentalist interpreters of the research might underscore.
 But for Shepard, who writes at the historical moment of environmen-
talism’s popular emergence, figures such as Aldo Leopold and Rachel Car-
son exemplify “the subversive science,” the mode of ecological study that 
does engage directly with anthropogenic influences on nonhuman nature 
and then also draws a line from substantive scientific findings to normative 
cultural judgments. With her work specifically, not only did Carson desta-
bilize widespread social and economic assumptions of her time—writing 
against a cultural paradigm that considered female thought, especially 
in the male-dominated sciences, to be inferior to male intellect, as well 
as calling for tough regulations on the insecticide industry and for elimi-
nating several of that industry’s staple products—she also threatened the 
very idea of human being that the modern world’s most coveted attitudes 
resolutely protect. Implicitly invoking Charles Darwin’s groundbreaking 
scientific thesis, which against Victorian conceptualizations thrust human-
ity into nonhuman nature, Carson asserts in Silent Spring, “Man, how-
ever much he may like to pretend the contrary, is part of nature” (188, 
emphasis added). Later, in her final speech Carson similarly declared the 
controversial Darwinian position that “man is affected by the same envi-
ronmental influences that control the lives of all the many thousands of 
other species to which he is related by evolutionary ties” (Carson, “The 
Pollution” 245).1
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 As Al Gore notes, Carson worked “against the grain of an orthodoxy 
rooted in the earliest days of the scientific revolution: that man (and of 
course this meant the male of our species) was properly the center and the 
master of all things” (xvi–xvii). The dominant worldview against which 
Carson wrote—and to which ecology, as understood by Sears, Shepard, 
and Orr is set in contrast, thus becoming subversive—holds, among addi-
tional contentions, that “People are fundamentally different from all other 
creatures on earth, over which they have dominion” (Catton and Dunlap 
17). Gore locates the origin of this human exemptionalism in the scien-
tific revolution, and the historian Lynn White, Jr. notoriously censured 
the Judeo-Christian theology of human dominion.2 But the preeminence 
of the domination mentality in modern culture suggests a more multifac-
eted heritage. The ideological tributaries that feed Plumwood’s Illusion of 
Disembeddedness are indeed numerous. In addition to its origins in Baco-
nian science and Biblical doctrine, the modern denial of human ecologi-
cal embeddedness and the associated belief in humanity’s right to exploit 
nonhuman nature is also buttressed by notions about the limitless possi-
bilities of human enterprise in a world of perceived abundance, especially 
as codified in North America by the continent’s European settlers, whose 
experience of the land’s bounty contrasted sharply with their experience 
of Old World scarcity. The apparent differences between the intellectual 
capabilities of humans and animals also support human exemptionalism, 
as does the degree to which technology has permitted modern humanity’s 
flight from and subjugation of nature.3 Nourished by some combination 
of the abovementioned influencing factors, the dominant Western world-
view asserts that humans exist apart from and superior to everything else 
on Earth, and that we can disavow our embeddedness even in the face 
of what the life sciences have taught us. To declare the inseverable inte-
gration and regulation of the human species within and by a nonhuman 
world of physical and biological processes and cycles is to participate in 
what has become a minority tradition of thinking that fights an uphill bat-
tle against rigid majority traditions pronouncing and living out an apart-
from-nature mentality.
 Given the fervor with which human exemptionalism has been sup-
ported in both secular and religious culture, to assert humanity’s full 
embeddedness in and dependence on nonhuman nature is to subvert con-
ceptions of the world that are foundational to the prevailing theological, 
social, cultural, political, and economic constellation. When transforma-
tive movements announce that humanity is part of nature, they do so to 
question ways of being that refuse to take ecological principles into con-
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sideration. Biodiversity in an ecosystem helps maintain ecosystemic health 
against normal environmental stressors such as fire, flood, and drought. 
To say that we are part of nature is a first step in positing ways of liv-
ing with this nature that do not threaten biodiversity and undercut the 
ability of ecosystems to stay vital in the face of stress. To say that we are 
part of nature is to challenge especially the capitalist mode of economic 
production, whose extractive activities hustle along normal environmen-
tal change far more quickly than one would find such change to happen 
absent industrial processes, barring of course major tectonic or meteoric 
episodes. For a species to achieve tectonic or meteoric weight is for that 
species—or more accurately, for those of the species who are driving the 
severe change—to behave as if it is not part of nature. To say that we are 
part of nature, in the end, is to respond to socioeconomic and cultural 
forms in which nonanthropogenic ecological processes no longer structure 
the possibilities of human life.
 Part-of-nature thinking has indeed been ill used to back objectionable 
ideological agendas.4 But in the transformative environmental movements 
discussed throughout this study, part-of-nature thinking serves to check 
modes of being that, in their ignorance or denial of humanity’s material 
grounding, threaten the processes and cycles necessary for nonhuman and 
human life. Even when deep ecology’s part-of-nature thinking takes on a 
tone of spiritual kinship, it does so to root spirituality and kinship in the 
material world, as immanent instead of transcendent. Writing in the book 
Deep Ecology and World Religions, David Landis Barnhill and Roger S. 
Gottlieb note,
When a deep ecologist makes the metaphysical or psychological claim 
that to be human is to be part of nature, he is opposing . . . anthro-
pocentrism and individualism. That is, the anthropocentric view that 
human beings are (because of intelligence, technology, science, political 
life, language, the soul, etc.) categorically different from their surround-
ings; or the individualist view that sees people essentially as individu-
als, who form relationships with other beings but are not constituted 
by those relationships. Thus, for deep ecology our kinship with nature 
penetrates deeply into the essences of who we are. If as individuals and 
communities, we fail to realize and celebrate this fact, we will be neither 
truly happy nor truly sane. (7)
More strictly materialist, ecosocialism theorizes that “a large part of the 
answer as to why contemporary society refuses to recognize the full human 
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dependence on nature undoubtedly has to do with the expansionist logic 
of a capitalist system that makes the accumulation of wealth in the form of 
capital the supreme end of society” (Foster, Ecology 9). Ecosocialism pri-
oritizes the “full human dependence on nature” in its response to capital’s 
restructuring of nonhuman life for the purposes of production and human 
consumption, which has resulted in marked ecological and social stress. 
Finally, while ecofeminism has one of its many roots in deep ecological 
conceptions of human embeddedness and one in more materialist, histori-
cal conceptions, as chapter 3 will show, the movement as a whole regards 
the conceptual human/nature dualism as widely problematic and of a piece 
with similarly problematic gender assumptions.
The two examples of (proto)environmentalist science fiction I am about 
to discuss—Last and First Men and Earth Abides—make humanity’s 
embeddedness in nonhuman nature explicitly visible. I choose them for 
this section of chapter 1, because they reflect the interest in the nature of 
humankind that characterizes some of the earliest works in the subgenre. 
For this reason they represent the subgenre’s anticipation of specifically 
environmentalist questions and assertions about human place that only 
later would prompt the birth of modern environmentalism in the 1960s. 
It is little wonder that many science fiction works of the late nineteenth 
and early to mid-twentieth century display an interest in humanity’s place 
in nonhuman nature. Darwin’s 1859 The Origin of Species and 1871 The 
Descent of Man forced upon nineteenth-century Victorian culture a view 
of humanity’s relationship to nonhuman nature that radically countered 
conventional wisdom. In Victorian Science Fiction in the UK Darko Suvin 
analyzes Victorian science fiction as reflecting an emerging crisis of confi-
dence in Victorian values, and Victorian scholar Herbert Sussman argues 
that in this analysis Suvin neglects to reveal why antihegemonic writers 
turned to science fiction instead of secular sermon or literary realism. 
Putting Suvin in conversation with Sussman, film scholar Barbara Creed 
writes,
There was a crisis of confidence, and this arose in response to the way 
in which evolutionary theory—and its consequences, such as secular-
ization and new ways of perceiving time—challenged Victorian beliefs 
and values. Of the science fiction texts published in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century, a significant number drew on Darwin’s theory of 
evolution, particularly in the period after 1870. (43–44)
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Creed upholds Suvin’s position—that science fiction did grow out of anti-
hegemonic attitudes—while also answering Sussman’s call for a historical 
justification for the authorial choice of science fiction as the literary mode 
for the expression of these attitudes. The crisis of confidence in Victorian 
values grew largely out of what Darwin’s science revealed about nature 
and the human species.
 Thinking about the implications of what Darwin was teaching the 
Western world became a central focus for some of science fiction’s early 
writers. These writers found in Darwin’s thinking a starting point for a 
range of critical commentary regarding the contemporary illusion about 
humanity’s place outside nonhuman nature, as well as the consequences 
of experimental efforts to make this illusion real. In A Crystal Age (1887), 
for example, naturalist William Henry Hudson imagines the end of much 
of humanity as the outcome of scientific attempts to control nature: “Thus 
did they thirst [for knowledge], and drink again, and were crazed; being 
inflamed with the desire to learn the secrets of nature, hesitating not to dip 
their hands in blood, seeking in the living tissues of animals for the hid-
den springs of life. For in their madness they hoped by knowledge to gain 
absolute dominion over nature” (79). The reference here to vivisection as 
a way for scientists to learn the mysteries of life and therefore to harness 
these mysteries in the interest of transcending nature as its managers leads 
us also to H. G. Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896). A student and 
admirer of the Darwinian biologist T. H. Huxley, Wells comprehended 
evolutionary biology and used it to think about the brand of experimental 
science that in this new Darwinian light could be implicated in breaking 
fundamental biological principles. If “As a part of nature, man was an 
animal—a being constituted of material structures and processes”—a find-
ing that historian Hamilton Cravens argues is “The most important con-
cept Darwin put forward”—then attempting to command these structures 
and processes might have unforeseeable costs, costs that The Island of Dr. 
Moreau vividly renders (xi).
 Olaf Stapledon, as Suvin notes, is of these originators of a science fic-
tion that has ideological and formal affinities with Darwinism (Victorian 
407). In his Last and First Men a member of a civilization existing two bil-
lion years in the future narrates a history of the rise and fall of each evolu-
tionary stage of humanity, from the First Men, through the telepathic Fifth 
Men and the Ninth Men of Neptune, and ultimately to the Eighteenth 
Men, doomed to be the Last Men when a nearby supernova threatens to 
destroy their planet. The civilization of the First Men, modern Homo sapi-
ens, causes severe social crisis with its exhaustion of coal, which is brought 
about by an exuberant religious devotion to coal-intensive flying machines 
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in the global World State. As the narrator notes while recounting the 
State’s discovery that coal has run out, “The sane policy would have been 
to abolish the huge expense of power on ritual flying, which used more of 
the community’s resources than the whole of productive industry” (70). 
But the First Men are unwilling to question their rituals despite worldwide 
raggedness and starvation created by “a world engaged, devotedly and 
even heroically, on squandering its resources in vast aeronautical displays” 
(72). When those in authority do suggest a reduction in religious flying, 
war breaks out and the ensuing diminished population is left to scrape a 
living from whatever fertile land is left.
 Later in the chronicle of the First Men’s fall a new Patagonian civiliza-
tion moves in a direction just as unsustainable. Had they sacrificed devel-
oping an energy-intensive culture similar to that of the recently destroyed 
World State and instead pursued a less profligate way of life based on wind 
and water power, which the narrator of Stapledon’s tale admits they could 
have done, the Patagonians “might well have achieved something like Uto-
pia” (86). But instead this civilization opts to acquire atomic energy. Even 
with the possibilities of using such a “limitless source of energy” in rela-
tively harmless ways, the Patagonians use it both as a tool for excavating 
from Earth materials previously made inaccessible by the World State’s 
exhaustive mining, and as a weapon for policing the working class (89). 
Proletariat anger leads to the seizing of a power unit and ultimately to 
global atomic destruction, ending the reign of modern humanity.
 Supported by religious dogma and an econocentric techno-scientific 
ability, respectively, the World State and the Patagonian civilization prac-
tice high-consumption ways of life, which motivate widespread ecologi-
cal disaster and social unrest. Last and First Men’s critical commentary is 
clear, offering one of science fiction’s earliest contributions to a culturally 
attentive environmentalism that was still years away from gaining traction 
in other modes of cultural production and public discourse. As a future 
history of modern humanity, the book didactically attends to the exploi-
tive madness of the so-called rational species.
 The novel’s most subversive observation, though, comes in its com-
mentary, more subtly voiced than its look at overconsumption, about the 
place of humans on Earth. After the Patagonians’ atomic ruin, much like 
every other nonpolar species “the human organism had not yet succeeded 
in adapting itself” to the newly toxic atmosphere (92). Except for fish, 
some plants, and a few species of mammals and birds, every other living 
thing on the planet is severely affected, including humans. “[F]org[ing] 
ahead” despite the obstacles of this harsh, postdisaster environment, the 
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nonhuman life that does reemerge is represented as persistent and deter-
mined to carry on, as healthy and strong (92). But the global environmen-
tal change to which other plants and animals acclimate is one that the 
First Men cannot tolerate, even though they caused it. Like the other frag-
ile species, Homo sapiens cannot adapt to drastic ecological change—that 
is, unless the species becomes something else entirely, a “new species” 
that after ten million years emerges in Last and First Men as the “Second 
Men,” no longer human as we know it (100). Stapledon makes the case 
for the validity of human embeddedness stronger by employing Darwinian 
biology in his narrative of natural selection and its implications for human-
ity. As the First Men, we are of the weaker animals despite our advanced 
capabilities. Our susceptibility to ecological change lays bare our undeni-
able and ineradicable embeddedness in the material world. Our imagined 
position outside of nonhuman nature—our “illusory sense of autonomy,” 
to borrow again from Plumwood—feeds and is fed by flawed ideologi-
cal commitments. The existence of these flawed commitments against 
clear evidence of our embeddedness further challenges the legitimacy of 
exemptionalist reasoning based in a Cartesian sense of human intellectual 
superiority, a reasoning that historically broke away from pre-Cartesian 
conceptions of the human subject as existing not “inside the cranium” but 
instead “in a continuum with the rest of the biosphere” (Borlik 44).
 Stewart’s effort in Earth Abides to underline humanity as part of nature 
is not unlike Stapledon’s, and it also exposes some of the specific cultural 
locations where the Illusion of Disembeddedness resides. A tale of plague 
and the near extinction of humanity, the novel uses a large-scale disaster 
to emphasize our embeddedness in nonhuman nature and to highlight the 
ideological trends that make this embeddedness dangerously invisible. In 
the book a “super-measles” plague eliminates much of the world’s human 
population, forcing survivors to realign themselves materially, socially, 
and symbolically with natural systems previously hidden beneath modern 
convenience and modern symbolism (13). The novel’s main character is 
Isherwood Williams (Ish), a survivor of the plague and former graduate 
student whose thesis, “The Ecology of the Black Creek Area,” explores 
“the relationships, past and present, of men and plants and animals” in a 
region near San Francisco (4–5). For a student of ecology, a world without 
humans as the dominant species provides an interesting opportunity for 
research:
Even though the curtain had been rung down on man, here was the 
opening of the greatest of all dramas for a student such as he. During 
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thousands of years man had impressed himself upon the world. Now 
man was gone, certainly for a while, perhaps forever. Even if some sur-
vivors were left, they would be a long time in again obtaining suprem-
acy. What would happen to the world and its creatures? That he was 
left to see! (24–25)
 While Earth Abides is also about Ish’s project to navigate his existen-
tial predicament and, as critic David G. Byrd notes, “to keep the light of 
civilization burning,” its most important characteristics as a foundational 
work of environmental science fiction are its affirmation that humans are 
indeed part of natural processes and cycles and its interrogation of a mod-
ern society that is built upon epistemological and ontological foundations 
that declare otherwise (par. 5). The apocalyptic and estranging end of tech-
nology and human dominance—the end of the postnatural—coupled with 
the concomitant estranging return of unmediated nonhuman nature insti-
gates enormous shifts in the characters’ perspectives and life ways. Ish’s 
experiences and reflections on these new and necessarily more ecocentric 
ways of thinking and being force our “reckon[ing] with the roots of our 
ailments,” as Orr puts it, by opening up a subversive critique of our own 
modern social and symbolic practices that the post-plague environment of 
Earth Abides renders absurd.
 Although published twenty years after Earth Abides, wildlife biolo-
gist Paul L. Errington’s entry in Shepard and McKinley’s The Subversive 
Science helps set up contexts for reading Stewart’s book from the perspec-
tive of a normative ecology. In “Of Man and the Lower Animals” Err-
ington calls attention to the similarity between human populations and 
nonhuman animal populations, arguing against any notion that humans 
are “exempt from natural laws or well on the way toward becoming so” 
(180). He writes, “If twentieth-century society really values the things that 
it proclaims essential—peace, human dignity, intellectual activity, a rea-
sonable degree of freedom and security, and a reasonable standard of liv-
ing—it cannot afford to ignore the natural laws by which life continues to 
be bound” (180). As with many of the essays in Shepard and McKinley’s 
book, Errington’s focuses on overpopulation, specifically highlighting the 
trend of bobwhite quail and muskrats to develop “social evils” as their 
populations skyrocket (188). For Errington these animal communities are 
not simply metaphors for human communities. Instead, they provide a 
mirror image of human society, and to turn away from the reflection is to 
deny valuable cultural lessons.
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 In Earth Abides, speculating on the fate of humanity given the bio-
logical law “that the number of individuals in a species never remains con-
stant, but always rises and falls,” Stewart’s Universal Narrator concludes,
there is little reason to think that [man] can in the long run escape the 
fate of other creatures, and if there is a biological law of flux and reflux, 
his situation is now a highly perilous one. During ten thousand years 
his numbers have been on the upgrade in spite of wars, pestilences, and 
famines. This increase in population has become more and more rapid. 
Biologically, man has for too long a time been rolling an uninterrupted 
run of sevens. (8)5
This passage anticipates Errington’s thesis by linking “man” to “other 
creatures” in a specific observation about overpopulation. But its subver-
sive character comes above all from the linking itself, which challenges 
theology and modern secular humanist philosophy alike, opening room 
for urgent deliberation. The Universal Narrator likens humans to Captain 
Maclear’s rat of Christmas Island, the victim of “some new disease” that, 
“Because of their crowding and also probably because of the softened con-
dition of the individuals, . . . proved universally susceptible, and soon were 
dying by thousands” (10). Later, Ish’s own reflections on ant and rat popu-
lations inform his fear for the fate of an already diminished humanity: 
“‘When anything gets too numerous it’s likely to get hit by some plague—I 
mean—’ (Something had suddenly exploded in his mind at the word.) He 
coughed to cover up his hesitation, and then went on, without making 
a point of it. ‘Yes, some plague is likely to hit them’” (114). Ish’s hesita-
tion is his, and the reader’s, moment of realization: we are in the world as 
much as anything else.
 Earth Abides thus affirms human embeddedness. But lest we let this 
affirmation press us to contemplate (natural) overpopulation and (natural) 
pandemic disease as the (natural) looming fate of humanity, it is important 
to read the apocalyptic scenario as the narrative’s estrangement strategy, 
its effort to remove from modern humans the elements that reinforce our 
sense of disembeddedness and thus to draw our attention to the ubiquity 
and influence of these elements in our actual world. The global catastrophe 
in Earth Abides highlights what these things are (e.g., the grocery store, 
the water faucet, Abrahamic and national holidays) and therefore enables 
their interrogation. Stewart’s book is not necessarily about the challenges 
of reconciling growth rates in population with much smaller growth rates 
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in food supply. Nor is it about what disease might do to an overpopulated 
and underprepared human society. Surely these concerns figure into the 
novel, especially early on. But later, as the small group of survivors tries 
to establish some functional community in the absence of modernity, the 
novel turns our attention to what it is in this modernity that pulls us away 
physically and ideologically from nonhuman nature and thus feeds our 
imaginary sense of separation from it.
 The story of Ish’s emerging Californian community is largely an explo-
ration of how modern humans lived prior to the super-measles outbreak, 
when complex technologies and institutions mediated individual and 
social relationships with nonhuman nature. The community’s disconnec-
tion from this nature is confirmed when one character asks, “‘Where did 
all this water come from anyway?’” about the San Francisco water supply, 
prompting the narrator to reflect, “It was curious. Here they had been for 
twenty-one years merely using water that continued to flow, and yet they 
had never given any real consideration to where the water came from. It 
had been a gift from the past, as free as air, like the cans of beans and 
bottles of catsup that could be had just by walking into a store and tak-
ing them from the shelves” (171). Modern convenience has instigated a 
kind of psychosocial end of nature in which the faucet and grocery store 
have cancelled out both the imperative to know the biosphere and to ask 
“What then?” about our technological implements.
 The specialized knowledge required to maintain modern infrastructure 
dies out with the plague in Earth Abides, and with its death comes the 
slow decay of that infrastructure. Ish’s community eventually adapts to 
life without electricity, plumbing, and the like, situating itself firmly within 
the ecological dictates of which its members were once unaware. With this 
adaptation comes also a cultural change and another set of questions: do 
modern language and symbols have the same power as modern technolog-
ical infrastructure to lead humans toward outward and inward denials of 
our ecological embeddedness? If human material life is physically shaped 
by the same laws that shape all species populations, then what about our 
symbolic life—the very thing that many exemptionalists, following Des-
cartes, say make us not part of nature? The arguments made in Stewart’s 
book on these points anticipate recent theories linking place and discourse. 
As ecocompositionists Sidney I. Dobrin and Christian R. Weisser note, for 
example, “While discourse does indeed shape our human conceptions of 
the world around us, discourse itself arises from a biosphere that sustains 
life. That is, while discourse ‘creates’ the world in the human mind, the 
biospheric physical environment is the origin of life (and consequently, the 
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human mind) itself” (12). So language—and by extension, all symbolic 
activity—both forms and is informed by nonhuman nature. The apocalyp-
tic end of modernity in Earth Abides again works to underline the sources 
of our disconnection.
 Given the reemerging primacy of wildness in Earth Abides, certain 
human symbolic constructs must disappear, especially those driven by 
what ultimately seem to be arbitrary aesthetic and emotional judgments. 
Dogs will win “Best-of-Breed” for physically being able to survive, not 
for their “stance, and shape of head, and markings” (27). Indigenous flora 
once called “weeds” and beaten back with a host of chemical technologies 
will outcompete “the pampered nurslings of man” (43). Automobiles will 
no longer be “the pride and the symbol of civilization” as entropic pro-
cesses make them and their roads unusable (107). These things and more 
will take on different meanings as their previous meanings pass away with 
the disappearance of modernity.
 In addition to these shifts in meaning, which are anticipated by the 
novel’s Universal Narrator and are not specific to the story of Ish’s com-
munity of survivors, the cultural adjustments of this community that do 
happen in the narrative also reflect a new, heightened sense of embed-
dedness. In her discussion of ritual, environmental philosopher Dolores 
LaChapelle notes, “Most native societies around the world . . . had an inti-
mate, conscious relationship with their place,” a relationship out of which 
their symbolisms grew (247). Ish’s new native community regains this rela-
tionship as wilderness returns as the governing force. With the modern 
dating system deemed illogical for their current situation, Ish’s commu-
nity starts over with a new dating system that better reflects the conditions 
of their newly primitive world. As in Christian mythology, the birth of a 
baby marks Year One in their society; however, the parallels end there. 
The group understands its dependence on the land and its fundamen-
tal obedience to natural processes, thus its symbolic tendencies develop 
away from the human/nature dualism that Lynn White, Jr. finds in much 
Christian theology. Instead, one year becomes “Year of the Fires,” another 
becomes “Year of the Bulls,” another becomes “Year of the Lions,” and 
still another becomes “Year of the Earthquake” (129, 132, 134, 143). In 
these cases and in several others the emerging society names its social his-
tory for events in natural history, explicitly recognizing the connection 
between human and nonhuman.
 This recognition also appears in the community’s holidays. As LaCha-
pelle comments, “all traditional cultures, even our own long-ago West-
ern European cultural ancestors, had seasonal festivals and rituals. The 
34  c h a p t e r  o n e
true origin of most of our modern major holidays dates back to these sea-
sonal festivals” (248). Ish’s society abandons patriotic holidays such as 
the Fourth of July but continues those holidays with roots in seasonal 
cycles: “Curiously,” the narrator writes, “or perhaps rather it was natu-
ral enough, the old folk-holidays survived better than those established 
by law” (295). So April Fool’s Day and Halloween, as celebrations of 
the vernal equinox and autumnal cross-quarter day, respectively, are car-
ried on. Continued also is the celebration of winter’s cross-quarter day, 
Groundhog Day, modified to Ground-Squirrel Day in an area with no 
groundhogs. And the “great holiday” for the group is what was “Christ-
mas and New Years of the Old Times”: the winter solstice (295). On this 
day, when for those in the northern hemisphere the sun is the farthest 
south, Ish’s community gets together to name the passing year and begin 
anew.
 In a 1968 collection of anthropology papers, Richard B. Lee and Irven 
DeVore conjecture that if humanity does meet an apocalyptic end, “inter-
planetary archeologists of the future will classify our planet as one in 
which a very long and stable period of small-scale hunting and gathering 
was followed by an apparently instantaneous efflorescence of technology 
and society leading rapidly to extinction. ‘Stratigraphically,’ the origin of 
agriculture and thermonuclear destruction will appear as essentially simul-
taneous” (3). Though not a story of nuclear catastrophe, or one of total 
human extinction, Earth Abides does much to stage Lee and DeVore’s sci-
ence-fictional speculation. The extended period of cultural stability ref-
erenced by Lee and DeVore is one made possible by premodern societies 
that did not possess the physical and symbolical tools that for us enable 
and reinforce the Illusion of Disembeddedness. Ish’s new San Francisco 
represents this stability reemerging after what deep ecologist George Ses-
sions calls human culture’s “anthropocentric detour,” the ten thousand 
years out of two hundred thousand that humanity has strayed from its 
traditionally sustainable course, inventing monocultural agriculture, anti-
ecological religions, growth-centered economies, and other constructs that 
require and encourage a human/nature disconnection (“Ecocentrism” 
156). Stewart’s book puts humanity back on track, so to speak. In its con-
clusion the narrator says, “In the times of civilization men had really felt 
themselves as the masters of creation. Everything had been good or bad in 
relation to man. So you killed rattlesnakes. But now nature had become so 
overwhelming that any attempt at its control was merely outside anyone’s 
circle of thought. You lived as part of it, not as its dominating power” 
(281). For Ish the apocalypse necessitates a revised understanding of the 
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human species; for us, its representation in Stewart’s book strategically 
brings to light the concepts and practices that demand such revision.
Last and First Men and Earth Abides confirm our inescapable embedded-
ness, and an environmentalist reading of these books leads us to identify 
the truth of this embeddedness as perhaps the silver bullet with which 
the pathological Illusion of Disembeddedness will be killed. Dune, how-
ever, steps in at the very moment of environmentalism’s birth in the West 
and says, “Not so fast.”6 If we actualize it in any sort of ecologically con-
scious individual or cultural practice, part-of-nature thinking will place us 
squarely in the crosshairs of the industrial modernity about whose mecha-
nisms of Illusion we have become critical. While all of these books direct 
us toward contemplating the technological and symbolic instruments that 
reinforce our sense of separation from nonhuman nature, it is only Dune 
that encourages us to think further about how economically driven, impe-
rialist modern ideology cannot easily be subverted by an appeal to human 
embeddedness. Part-of-nature thinking loses, or at least alone it cannot 
win, because (1) the Illusion of Disembeddedness is too deeply entangled 
within the ideological fabric of dominant institutions, to the point of being 
indistinguishable from them; (2) these institutional forms stigmatize and 
discourage embedded practice using effective classist and racist fantasy 
frames; and/or (3) these institutions appropriate and perpetuate a weak or 
feigned ecological embeddedness to contain subversion and then continue 
to forward their sociopolitical and cultural agendas. Dune even goes so far 
as to question whether embedded practice, or living deliberately as part of 
nature, is possible given both the difficulty of finding today the “nature” 
of which we are a part and of negotiating the imposed burdens we face 
in the shadow of a spatially and psychologically imperializing political 
economy.
 The overwhelming presence and necessity of the Illusion of Disembed-
dedness in and for dominant ideology and the construction of reactionary 
xenophobic attitudes toward more outwardly part-of-nature social and 
cultural forms go hand-in-hand. In Herbert’s novel this means that by their 
very natures the Imperium, the CHOAM Company, the Great Houses, and 
the Bene Gesserit—all of which have an interest in the spoils of Dune’s 
central setting, in the spice melange of the planet Arrakis—cannot not 
maintain a mystified, disconnected relationship to the material world that 
they want to exploit. They must for their very existence erect a cultural 
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framework that keeps at a safe distance the planet’s willfully and success-
fully ennatured indigenous people, the Fremen (Dune 22). The Fremen 
possess a “superb knowledge of their environment” and “a kind of earth-
wisdom” that allows them to survive in the dry climate and among the 
carnivorous sandworms of Arrakis (O’Reilly 42). Their “stillsuits,” as 
Noel Gough observes, “emphasize appropriate and environmentally sen-
sitive technology rather than high-tech gadgetry for its own sake” (“Play-
ing” 409). Explaining these suits, Liet-Kynes, Arrakis’s planetary ecologist, 
states, “‘It’s basically a micro-sandwich—a high-efficiency filter and heat-
exchange system. . . . The skin-contact layer’s porous. Perspiration passes 
through it, having cooled the body . . . near-normal evaporation process. 
The next two layers . . . include heat exchange filaments and salt precipita-
tors. Salt’s reclaimed’” (109). Stillsuits process urine and feces, reclaiming 
most of the body’s water for its Fremen wearer to drink again, all with 
the energy provided by body movement. “‘With a Fremen suit in good 
working order,’” Kynes insists, “‘you won’t lose more than a thimbleful of 
moisture a day’” (109).
 In the same way that the new wilderness reshapes the symbolic cus-
toms of Ish’s community in Earth Abides, Arrakis’s ecology also shapes 
the customs of the Fremen. In one tense scene, for example, the Fremen 
leader Stilgar spits on the table of Leto Atreides, the duke whose regime 
has recently moved to Arrakis from the water-rich planet Caladan and has 
been appointed as the desert planet’s administrative body:
The Fremen stared at the Duke, then slowly pulled aside his veil, reveal-
ing a thin nose and full-lipped mouth in a glistening black beard. Delib-
erately he bent over the end of the table, spat on its polished surface.
 As the men around the table started to surge to their feet, Idaho’s 
voice boomed across the room: “Hold!” Into the sudden charged still-
ness, Idaho said: “We thank you, Stilgar, for the gift of your body’s 
moisture. We accept it in the spirit with which it is given.” And Idaho 
spat on the table in front of the Duke. (92)
Duncan Idaho, one of the Duke’s men, must then remind the Duke 
of the value of water, and thus of saliva, on Arrakis: “‘Remember how 
precious water is here, Sire. That was a token of respect’” (92). Indeed, 
just as the Fremen veneration of saliva finds its origin in Arrakis’s thirst-
inspiring environment, the Atreides’s disgust finds its origin in Caladan’s 
thirst-quenching environment. Water is not in short supply on Caladan, 
so bodily fluids take on a different meaning there than on Arrakis, where 
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one finds a whole new reverence for spit and tears.7 This scene suggests 
that nonhuman nature is part of human culture always and through and 
through, Arrakian or Caladanian. But more than demonstrating that the 
Atreides regime has a distinctive cultural understanding of water that dis-
plays their embeddedness in nonhuman nature, this scene is of a piece with 
Dune’s thorough historico-political examination of power’s strategic col-
lision with whatever threatens it. The Atreides’s respectful acceptance of 
Fremen custom is an insincere nod to an “indigenous realism,” as Ameri-
can Indian Studies scholar Daniel R. Wildcat names it, that must ulti-
mately be contained or eradicated if the material exploitation of Arrakis 
is to continue.8
 The reality of humanity’s embeddedness in nonhuman nature disrupts 
the ideology of those who see this nature through a distorting economic 
lens, or, in the case of Dune, through the promise of the power that the 
spice melange brings to those who control its harvesting and distribution. 
One strategy to contain or eradicate lived, practiced embeddedness and 
prevent its influence on modern culture is for those in power to belittle its 
practitioners. The Fremen are “marked down on no census of the Imperial 
Regate”; the Imperium does not recognize their existence (5). The Emperor 
describes the Fremen as “‘barbarians whose dearest dream is to live out-
side the ordered security of the faufreluches,’” “the rigid rule of class dis-
tinction enforced by the Imperium” (78, 501). Duke Leto Atreides’s son 
and heir, Paul, takes an early interest in Arrakis’s distinctive ecology and in 
the Fremen as the planet’s indigenous culture, but the ideological appara-
tuses of the power structure prevent him from forming a consciousness so 
divergent from the classist and racist form that consciousness must take if 
power over people and their places is to be maintained. Before the Atreides 
leave Caladan for Arrakis, one of Paul’s teachers, Thufir Hawat, perpetu-
ates contempt for the Fremen: “‘There’s little to tell them from the folk of 
the graben and sink. They all wear those great flowing robes. And they 
stink to heaven in any closed space. It’s from those suits they wear—call 
them ‘stillsuits’—that reclaim the body’s own water’” (29). By insisting 
that “‘A place is only a place. . . . And Arrakis is just another place,’” 
Hawat symbolically erases the Fremen from the land, which as “just 
another place” is reduced to the chance address of an exploitable resource, 
a location void of any meaningful human culture or intrinsic ecological 
value.9
 While Hawat instills in Paul the ideological posture necessary for a 
future colonial leader, the Reverend Mother of the Bene Gesserit—a reli-
gious order that has its own political motives in championing the young 
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Duke’s rise to power—makes Paul very aware of Arrakis’s native culture 
and ecology in order to make him a good ruler who can feign embedded-
ness while exploiting the Fremen. It is thus with the Bene Gesserit that 
another one of power’s defensive moves against the threat of part-of-
nature thinking and being is mobilized. The Reverend Mother tells Paul, 
“‘a good ruler has to learn his world’s language, . . . the language of the 
rocks and growing things, the language you don’t just hear with your 
ears’” (30). As Susan Stratton notes, Paul “solve[s] the mysteries of Arra-
kis ecology and learn[s] to fit into the corresponding culture of its indig-
enous people,” though he does so not to become a careful inhabitant of 
the planet but instead to “accomplish his goal, which is to reclaim the 
planet for the Atreides” after the rival House Harkonnen wrests power 
from Paul’s father—and to do so using an army of Fremen (“The Mes-
siah” 307).
 Before the arrival of the Atreides regime and the ensuing political 
power struggle that makes up Dune’s narrative, the Fremen are involved 
in a project that complicates even further the environmentalist utility of 
part-of-nature thinking: the terraforming of Arrakis. The issue that this 
project raises is not about whether humans, with our abilities to manipu-
late nonhuman nature almost in its entirety, really are a fundamentally 
ennatured species, but instead whether we can live as part of nature given 
modern historical circumstances that compel the management of this 
nature in the name of social, scientific, technological, and/or economic 
development. To put this issue in the form of a question, What would liv-
ing as part of nature look like in today’s world? Read as environmental 
science fiction, Dune asks this question. To understand the novel’s answer 
we must grapple with its image of the Fremen as at once consciously liv-
ing their embeddedness and consciously manipulating the nature within 
which they are embedded. This seemingly problematical image ultimately 
proves to be a good starting point for reflecting on contemporary part-
of-nature thinking and being in productive ways. But ahead of exploring 
this image, we must examine what can only be our assumptions about 
what Fremen culture looked like before the initiation of their terraforming 
effort, and in the course of this examination complicate in several ways 
the “nature” of which the life sciences and transformative environmental-
ism insist that humans are a part.
 We never witness the Fremen prior to Arrakis’s subsumption into the 
Imperium. Outside of reading about their ancient technologies and cus-
toms, about the stillsuits and rituals that they continue to use and practice 
during the time frame of the novel, we never witness the “first” Arrakian 
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Fremen. However, these first Fremen seem to have once been good ecologi-
cal citizens living as part of the desert planet upon which they settled as 
religious outcasts; their stillsuit technology and water-saving customs sug-
gest as much, as do their methods for avoiding confrontation with Arra-
kis’s dominant fauna, the sandworms.10 But this presumption about the 
ecocentrism of the first Fremen faces an obstacle: if technology and custom 
mediated their relationship with nonhuman nature, making their life on 
the arid, storm- and sandworm-ridden planet at least bearable, then might 
we say that they lived some version of the Illusion of Disembeddedness, 
that they didn’t really live as part of nature? I am not prepared to answer 
this question in the affirmative, because clearly the technologies and cus-
toms of the first Fremen emerged out of their lived experience in nonhu-
man nature and were not applied toward manipulating this nature in a 
way that threatened its fitness. Stillsuits and large-scale suburban water-
distribution infrastructures are not equivalent technologies; revering saliva 
and revering the incorporeal supranatural are not equivalent customs. 
Stillsuits and water-saving and water-revering traditions are human arti-
facts, indeed, but this detail does not preclude them from constituting a 
part-of-nature, ecological integrity-preserving way of life. On the other 
hand, as Earth Abides demonstrates, urban plumbing and Abrahamic reli-
gious tradition can contribute to the Illusion of Disembeddedness, which 
does have environmental consequences.
 So the first Fremen lived their embeddedness, maintaining a culture 
that trod lightly upon the world. But to complicate things more, the idea 
that the first Fremen lived as part of nature entails an examination of what 
this nature is in the first place. Until now the focus of this chapter has been 
largely on the “part of” component of part-of-nature thinking and being; 
as the life sciences, transformative environmentalism, Last and First Men, 
and Earth Abides stress, we are not apart from the other-than-human 
world. For the first Fremen the nature of Arrakis is desiccation, desert, 
sand, sandstorms, sandworms—in short, all of the interrelated ecosystemic 
elements from which Fremen technology and custom emerge. This arid, 
sandworm-populated Arrakis is the nonhuman nature to which the first 
Fremen migrated and within which they lived their embeddedness for mil-
lennia. But as we later find out in the Dune series, Arrakis is not in any 
sort of primordial form. It was transformed into desert by the sandworms, 
which are themselves not native to the planet, having been introduced in 
their larval phase “‘from some other place,’” as Paul’s heir Leto II says in 
Children of Dune (1981) (32). As such, this “second” Arrakis acts as a 
metaphor for an Earth that today is not in any sort of first form.
40  c h a p t e r  o n e
 When we talk about “nature,” in other words, we cannot mean “some 
thing that is single, independent, and lasting” or “a balanced order of 
self-reproduction whose homeostasis is disturbed, nudged off course, by 
unbalanced human interventions” (Morton 20; Žižek, In Defense 442). 
With this second Arrakis, Herbert prefigures by decades the recent trend 
in thinking about “ecology without nature” by implicitly defining nature 
not as a “thing” or a “balanced order,” but instead as the interdependent 
processes of biological and physical phenomena that constitute and com-
prise all life forms and make their existence possible, processes that can no 
longer be said to carry on fully outside a history of human influence. Read 
in the light of this conception of nature first as active process rather than 
a static entity out there, Rachel Carson’s declaration that “Man, how-
ever much he may like to pretend the contrary, is part of nature” loses the 
romantic hues about which ecocritic Timothy Morton and philosopher 
Slavoj Žižek are so critical. And if we are not apart from this active, other-
than-human nature, nor are we apart from the humanized nature that has 
emerged since humans began to abandon hunting and gathering ten thou-
sand years ago in the Neolithic Revolution. Something we learn by think-
ing about the second, postnatural Arrakis of Dune, then, is that regardless 
of our individual or social ecocentric commitments we cannot live more 
consciously as part of a prelapsarian Earth, because such an Earth does 
not exist. Right now, in the modern world, we live as part of a Ciceronian 
“second” nature, which at once consists of pollination, decomposition, 
and nutrient cycling and agriculture and plumbing.11
 Given that most of our food today originates in patented industrial 
monocultures and most of our irrigation and drinking water originates 
in depleted underground aquifers and dammed rivers, I would be remiss 
not to acknowledge again the variations of scale within the technologies 
that give rise to this second nature. If we cannot return to a first nature, 
can we—perhaps in an effort to safeguard Earth’s still-functioning life-
support systems—return to living as ecocentric first Fremen, so to speak, 
whose technologies are not of a scale that brings about drastic alterations 
in fit ecosystems? Environmental science fiction has ecotopian visions of 
such a humanity, as the next chapter will demonstrate. But before Ernest 
Callenbach and Marge Piercy developed compasses for more consciously 
part-of-nature ways of life in Ecotopia and Woman on the Edge of Time, 
respectively, Dune underscored the enormous historical challenges of 
realizing such a way of life in the face of scientific and political moder-
nity. The first, ecologically literate Fremen become “second” Fremen at 
the moment when they are influenced by an externally imposed, mod-
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ern scientific vision of terraforming Arrakis into a water-rich planet. 
When living, Liet-Kynes’s father, Pardot—the First Imperial Planetolo-
gist of Arrakis—used the Fremen as “the tools with which he intended to 
remake the planet,” as the means to realize his mental picture of ecologi-
cal “order” (478, 477). The resulting second, managerial Fremen engage 
willingly in a large-scale manipulation of planetary ecology that in no 
way safeguards the current Arrakian ecosystem. In fact, the sandworms 
face certain extinction in the face of the planned planetary alterations, for 
their biology is such that they cannot tolerate contact with large volumes 
of water.
 But in a sympathetic, more historically responsive reading of this proj-
ect, we can say that while it is still haunted by Pardot Kynes’s human-cen-
tered “Specter of Terra (Terror)Forming,” the Fremen’s managerial ecology 
is less a manifestation of an Enlightenment will-to-dominate nature and 
more a way of setting up an intentional, ecologically aware culture whose 
millennia-old respect for and knowledge of ecosystemic processes work 
alongside their political needs as an oppressed people (Yanarella 225). As 
descendants of a nomadic religious sect that has a long history of being 
driven from planet to planet, the Fremen have a compelling motivation 
for creating a more hospitable landscape on the planet they are forced to 
inhabit. We might also notice that the Fremen terraforming effort involves 
three to five centuries of collecting water and educating generations of 
future Fremen about the ecological system being created: “‘We change 
[Arrakis] . . . slowly but with certainty . . . to make it fit for human life,’” 
Stilgar says, “‘Our generation will not see it, nor our children nor our 
children’s children nor the grandchildren of their children . . . but it will 
come’” (283).
 Are these second Fremen living as part of nature? They have main-
tained the ecological literacy, technologies, and customs of their preter-
raforming years, and they have a profound sense of intergenerational 
responsibility. Or does their entrenchment also in the history of the Dune 
universe and their desire to do the best they can with what they (are forced 
to) have negate any judgment that they are living their ecological embed-
dedness? Again, Herbert complicates part-of-nature thinking, this time 
by making us aware that opportunities for living consciously as embed-
ded ecological citizens, for asking “What then?” about our actions, are 
limited by the realities of the human history and the human institutions 
we inherit. The goal for transformative environmentalism, of course, is 
to change these institutions so that ecological integrity does not have to 
be sacrificed in the name of economy, culture, politics, justice, and so 
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on. With all of its complicating factors, Dune’s most important lesson is 
that such transformation will not happen with a simple jolt of scientific 
truth administered to a modern humanity that has gotten over nonhuman 
nature, and more and more has gotten over science, if it does not sup-
port the hegemonic economic and cultural trajectory. It is rather the jolt of 
economic and political expediency that always seems to win out in the 
modern world, and Dune is fully aware of this, too.
 We never get to see the planned Fremen project come to fruition in the 
course of the novel and therefore to make the difficult ethical judgment 
about whether the Fremen’s use of managerial science in the name of their 
own social justice was worth the ultimate sacrifice of the sandworms. Per-
haps we are freed from making such a judgment, because in the place of a 
very deliberate planetary engineering project is slammed down a promise 
of quick political gains necessarily emptied of any ecologically responsive 
content. Paul Atreides plays into the legend of the messiah who will lead 
the Fremen to paradise, a legend that was instilled long ago in the Fre-
men culture by the Bene Gesserit’s Missionaria Protectiva, “the arm of 
the Bene Gesserit order charged with sowing infectious superstitions on 
primitive worlds, thus opening those regions to exploitation by the Bene 
Gesserit” (507). Paul promises the Fremen a more rapid path toward their 
terraforming goals—one not tied to the geological time constraints of the 
original effort—if they take up arms against the Atreides’s enemies. As 
Paul’s mother, an Atreides and a Bene Gesserit, reflects, “Gathering water, 
planting the dunes, changing their world slowly but surely—these are no 
longer enough. . . . The little raids, the certain raids—these are no longer 
enough now that Paul and I have trained them. They feel their power. 
They want to fight” (388).
 Leonard M. Scigaj observes of Dune Messiah (1975), the second book 
in the Dune series, that the Fremen Farok’s “only personal motive for 
enlisting in the war . . . is to realize his fantasy of immersing himself in a 
real sea” (342). The reason Farok believes he will see Arrakian seas in his 
lifetime, as opposed to expecting the change to come in three to five cen-
turies, is Paul’s rousing speech in Dune: “‘What’s our goal?’ Paul asked. 
‘To unseat Rabban, the Harkonnen beast, and remake our world into a 
place where we may raise our families in happiness amidst an abundance 
of water’” (414). That Paul convinces the living Fremen—“we” rather 
than “our future generations”—that they will raise their families in such 
a paradise demonstrates the danger of modernity’s drive toward expedi-
ency, and indeed, the lure of expediency is another key complicating fac-
tor when thinking about modern humans as part of nature. Paul Atreides 
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pulls the Fremen from their deliberate ways as a culture fighting political 
oppression in a way compatible with their long-established, consciously 
part-of-nature ways of life. Paul’s war does not free the Fremen from colo-
nial subjugation and immediately lift their everyday toil. Instead, it denies 
them the total independence that the terraforming plan would have per-
mitted and forces them further into the hands of the ruling class. In Dune 
Messiah, Farok admits in retrospect that Fremen participation in the war 
was fueled by a desire for “‘experiences, adventure, wealth,’” and indeed 
the seas (58). And as Paul observes in that book, the Fremen had “become 
a civilization of . . . people who solved all problems with power . . . and 
more power . . . and still more power” (225). Paul’s revolution acts as a 
social trap for the Fremen, in which “players,” in this case the Fremen, 
“are lured into behavior that eventually undermines the health and stabil-
ity of the system” (Orr 5). The second Fremen become the “third,” and 
the second nature of Arrakis is subsumed into a political scheme that ulti-
mately drives away the sandworms and undermines both the Fremen’s 
sovereignty and their ecological intelligence.
Dune offers a complicating theorization about part-of-nature thinking 
and being. Rather than displaying assertions of human embeddedness as 
too narrow or romantic to matter in our complex contemporary moment, 
though, this discourse instead prompts a deeper investigation of what 
such embeddedness means in a world where we cannot easily put away 
modernity and then find a definitively natural place to settle and live more 
consciously as part of nature. Perhaps to acknowledge and live today our 
ecological embeddedness is to acknowledge and live Dune’s implicit, more 
sobering lesson: we are a part of the bee and the gmo crop, the water cycle 
and the faucet, the forest and the lumber, the ocean and the oil. The prior-
ity for what might be qualified as “traditional” part-of-nature thinking is 
to advocate for the bee over the crop and the ocean over the oil—in short, 
for the preservation of nonhuman nature over the proliferation of technol-
ogies that use this nature toward purely anthropo- and econocentric ends. 
Dune asserts that we cannot live this priority in the modern world with-
out major shifts in our values and practices, at all levels of society. 
 As Žižek argues, “One should . . . become aware not only of the limita-
tion of the ideology of progress, but also of the limitation of the . . . notion 
of the revolution as applying the emergency brake on the runaway train of 
progress” (In Defense 442). Read for their environmentalist contributions, 
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Last and First Men and Earth Abides make us aware of the limitations of 
a progress that requires our illusory separation from nonhuman nature. 
And Dune teaches us that the brake cannot simply be pulled. But Her-
bert’s message is not to give in hopelessly to the driving forces of social 
and economic modernity; for, when the Fremen do exactly this, it under-
mines their ecological and political existence as Arrakian Fremen. Dune 
shows us that there is a “third” nature on the horizon—not a prehistorical 
“domain of balanced reproduction,” not a regrowth of once wild places 
or an artifactual re-creation of natural processes, but finally an ecodysto-
pian world unable to support human and nonhuman flourishing (Žižek, 
In Defense 442).12
th e  u t o p i a n  s o c i e t i e s  imagined in Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1975) and Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) res-onate with the transformative environmentalist perspective called 
deep ecology, which identifies anthropocentric instrumental rationality as 
the driver of dominant, anti-ecological socioeconomic and cultural ways 
of thinking and being.1 Summarizing the philosophy of Arne Naess, the 
environmental philosopher who coined the term deep ecology in the early 
1970s, David E. Cooper writes, “Among the policies advocated by Naess 
are radical reduction of the world’s population, abandonment of the goal 
of economic growth in the developed world, conservation of biotic diver-
sity, living in small, simple, and self-reliant communities, and—less specifi-
cally—a commitment ‘to touch the Earth lightly’” (213). Callenbach’s and 
Piercy’s utopias display almost programmatic commitments to such ideals, 
advocating in the mid-1970s a way of conceiving and being in the world 
that is still widely influential among environmentalist scholars and activ-
ists. These novels think deep ecology with their mutually supportive ideas 
on population reduction, alternative modes of economic production, bio-
diversity (as a material and spiritual-psychological imperative), communal 
life ways, and reducing human impact on Earth.
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 It would be anachronistic to claim that Ecotopia and Woman on the 
Edge of Time grew out of their respective authors’ direct engagements 
with the deep ecology movement, because in 1975 and 1976 deep ecology 
was not yet a codified philosophical perspective. But finding a direction in 
the relationship between deep ecology and the utopian fictions discussed 
here is of lesser value, in my view, than recognizing the set of interests and 
concerns that gave rise both to deep ecology and these books at proximate 
moments in Western history. As deep ecologist Bill Devall notes, the 1960s 
and 1970s saw the development of environmentalism in response to “the 
effects of the explosive growth of human population; the effects of toxic 
wastes and pollution on air, water, and soil as well as on human health 
and well-being; and deforestation and human-caused extinction of other 
species” (“Deep Ecology” 51). But by the mid-1970s this environmental-
ism became an institution, with many of its already existing and new mem-
bership organizations (e.g., the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council) bureaucratically advocating for policy changes but not leading a 
charge for fundamental transformations in “our society’s basic culture” 
(Devall, “Deep Ecology” 52).2 The deep in deep ecology thus countered 
what many grassroots environmentalists deemed to be an ultimately shal-
low reformist environmental movement. Growing ecological degradation 
coupled with an ineffectual effort to address this degradation’s core ideo-
logical inputs motivated deep ecology to take a different route to meaning-
ful environmental activism. Callenbach’s and Piercy’s books are literary 
utopian embraces of this deep environmentalist commitment. They ques-
tion and repudiate socioeconomic institutions and cultural attitudes that 
continue to dominate modern life today, disagreeing with the ideolo-
gies that inform modern being and positing substitute social and cultural 
arrangements.
 By virtue of the precision with which Ecotopia’s and Woman on the 
Edge of Time’s utopian communities align with deep ecology’s ideals, 
the books can serve a pedagogical function for the movement as well as 
a critical function for uncovering the movement’s limitations. Reflecting 
the neo-Malthusian worries that constituted 1960s and 1970s environ-
mentalism, Ecotopia and Woman on the Edge of Time, like deep ecology, 
posit a declining human population as essential for ecological and social 
vitality. While the books, again like deep ecology, are also critical of eco-
nomic growth as a major influence on ecological and social degradation, 
they do little to presage the virtual disappearance of reactionary, apocalyp-
tic overpopulation myths against recent criticisms of capitalist production 
and other origins of this degradation.3 Both books also raise the specter of 
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violence as a necessary liberatory strategy, something not endemic to deep 
ecology but indeed a lurking possibility given especially the combination 
of deep ecology’s antithetical orientation and the Western political estab-
lishment’s efforts to reject the kinds of alternative socioeconomic and cul-
tural possibilities that deep ecology sponsors.
 This chapter thus ends with a look at John Brunner’s dystopian nov-
els Stand on Zanzibar (1968) and The Sheep Look Up (1972), which can 
be interpreted to theorize prefiguratively a reconstruction of deep ecol-
ogy by thinking more explicitly than the ecotopias do about demographic 
challenges and problems of radical environmentalist praxis. In addition 
to motivating deep ecology with their harrowing, dystopian images of 
ecological and social breakdown, Brunner’s books make it clear that (1) 
within our contemporary moment human overpopulation demands less of 
our attention than does the dominating mode of globalized economic pro-
duction and (2) violent engagement in the interest of ecological or social 
liberation might appear as activists embrace a deep ecological ideologi-
cal orientation, and thus the fundamentally nonviolent movement must 
contend with such a possibility. Again, it would be anachronistic to sup-
pose that Brunner’s dystopias, which predate deep ecology and the utopias 
discussed here, responded directly either to deep ecology’s shortcomings 
or to Callenbach and Piercy. But reading Ecotopia, Woman on the Edge 
of Time, Stand on Zanzibar, and The Sheep Look Up as manifesting and/
or challenging the visions of deep ecology is more an exercise in highlight-
ing the value of mingling these works in a dialogical interplay ultimately 
to synthesize an ecological, activist perspective that each book alone—and 
deep ecology alone—cannot provide.
As Devall and Sessions note in their deep ecology manifesto, Deep Ecology, 
the movement finds its philosophical influences in many places: the Pythag-
orean, Platonic, Spinozan, and Huxlian “metaphysics of interrelatedness,” 
which places “humans in the wider scheme of things” (80); the literature 
of the British and American Romantic periods, as well as more recent lit-
erature that reflects comparable suspicions about modern, industrial life; 
ecological science and newer models of physics that reject the notion of 
scientific objectivity; Franciscan Christianity and Eastern spiritual tradi-
tions; feminism; and the knowledges and experiences of indigenous peo-
ples (83–108). Deep ecology “recognizes the fundamental interdependence 
of all phenomena and the fact that, as individuals and societies, we are 
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all embedded in (and ultimately dependent on) the cyclical processes of 
nature” (Capra 6). To its understanding of human being deep ecology 
adds a spirituality not confined to top-down, institutional religiosity, but 
expanded to practice “the mode of consciousness in which the individual 
feels a sense of belonging, of connectedness, to the cosmos as a whole” 
(Capra 7). As a transformative environmental movement, deep ecology 
encourages significant ethical, epistemological, and ontological reorienta-
tions in a modern world where scientific quantification and manipulation, 
economic expansion, and human domination persist as central creeds.
 Telling influences on deep ecology exist not only in canonical Romantic 
or spiritual writing, Huxlian philosophy, or indigenous epistemology, but 
also in utopian science fiction literature that attends to the illusory divide 
between humans and other-than-human nature. The societies imagined in 
these ecotopias avow both the intrinsic value of nonhuman nature—its 
value apart from its utility for humans—and the importance for humans to 
act within, not outside of, natural dictates. The value of ecotopian vision 
has not gone unnoticed by Devall and Sessions; they discuss the impor-
tance of ecotopian narrative in their book: “Creating ecotopian futures 
has practical value. It helps us articulate our goals and presents an ideal 
which may never be completely realized but which keeps us focused on 
the ideal. We can also compare our personal actions and collective public 
decisions on specific issues with this goal” (162). Though not scholars of 
utopia, Devall and Sessions echo academics who assert the importance of 
the utopian imagination in modern culture. They do for ecotopian fiction 
what utopian literary scholars do for utopian fiction—that is, declare the 
significance of what one such scholar, Lyman Tower Sargent, calls “social 
dreaming” for the realization of an alternative, more just or ethical, soci-
ety (1). As Tom Moylan writes, by producing images “that radically break 
with prevailing social systems . . . utopian discourse articulates the possi-
bility of other ways of living in the world” (Demand 26). And extending 
Moylan’s analysis, Phillip E. Wegner demonstrates the ways in which the 
imaginary communities of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), Edward Bel-
lamy’s Looking Backward (1888), Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed 
(1974), and other texts have transcended imaginary possibility and have 
figured into modern nation-building:
in the narrative utopia, the presentation of an “ideal world” operates as 
a kind of lure, a play on deep desires, both immediately historical and 
otherwise, to draw its readers in and thereby enable the form’s educa-
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tional machinery to go to work—a machinery that enables its readers to 
perceive the world they occupy in a new way, providing them with some 
of the skills and dispositions necessary to inhabit an emerging social, 
political, and cultural environment. (2)
Utopian fiction is fiction of possibility; it envisions optional cultural paths, 
“catalyzes desire” for these paths, and instructs cultural and political prog-
ress with its “visionary glimpses of how our real world could be changed” 
(Mohr 278).
 Deep ecology’s endorsement of ecotopian fiction stems from the ideal 
worlds that ecotopias imagine. A movement grounded in a critique of 
what it sees as the outmoded, unsustainable Western worldview and in 
a combination of scientific and spiritual notions of embeddedness, deep 
ecology finds in ecotopian texts the narration of its appraisals and desires. 
Unlike the space of the modern developed world, ecotopian space intrudes 
little on other species and their habitats. Its human inhabitants participate 
in communal governments and promote economic systems that are not 
growth-centered and resource-intensive. Ecotopian fiction portrays worlds 
far different from the originary world that it contests, articulating ecologi-
cally conscientious life ways hitherto contained or eradicated by modern 
social, political, economic, educational, and religious life. Ecotopian fic-
tion is an instructive “educational machinery,” a cognitively estranging 
lens through which readers can compare their world with that proposed 
in fiction and as a result better perceive the inadequacies of current world-
views and practices. Devall and Sessions’s confidence in ecotopian fiction 
stems from their understanding of the genre’s possibilities for narrowing 
“the distance between what ought to be and what is now reality in our 
technocratic-industrial society” (162).
 While ecotopian fiction occupies an important place in deep ecol-
ogy, ecodystopian fiction holds similar and potentially greater value as an 
instructional literature of deep ecology. According to Sargent, dystopian 
narrative describes in detail nonexistent societies “that the author intended 
a contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society 
in which the reader lived” (9). Despite its dreadful extrapolations, dysto-
pian narrative maintains the utopian impulse: as Moylan notes, “a dys-
topian text can be seen as utopian in tendency if in its portrayal of the 
‘bad place’ it suggests (even if indirectly) or at least stimulates the potential 
for an effective challenge and possibly change by virtue of human efforts” 
(Scraps 156). And as Dunja M. Mohr observes,
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Where utopia uplifts the reader, dystopia holds up a hellish mirror and 
describes the worst of all possible futures. Although both utopian and 
dystopian imaginings of the future refer readers to the present and seek 
to implant a desire for societal transformation, they evoke different 
effects: the utopian defamiliarization takes the avenue of arousing read-
ers’ desire for utopia, whilst the defamiliarized dystopian society appalls 
readers. 
 Where utopia compares social vision and reality by creating differ-
ence, dystopia presupposes and thrives on the correlation and similarity 
of the present social order and the near-future scenario. Using opposed 
strategies, both utopia and dystopia, however, share the same objective: 
sociopolitical change by means of the aesthetic representation of a para-
digm shift. (27–28)
Dystopia fuels opposition to unethical systems of domination and oppres-
sion by portraying worlds where readers might live if steps are not taken 
to change these systems, and, I will add, by imaginatively rendering cur-
rent global situations that demand immediate attention.
 Ecodystopia, as a version of dystopia functioning under the same defi-
nitional rubric, offers something ecotopia cannot, because of the latter’s 
generic constraints: extended reflections on the issues that give rise to deep 
ecological sentiments, including overpopulation, species extinction, and 
air and water pollution. Ecodystopian science fiction stages dystopian 
presents and futures, frightening worlds not disengaged from the now but 
instead very much extrapolated out of some current and real, anti-ecolog-
ical trend—whether that trend is social, scientific, economic, religious, or 
a combination of these and others rehearsed daily in the contemporary 
order of things. Significant, too, is that ecodystopia’s generic imperative to 
represent consequences also initiates important reflections on the viability 
and ethics of solutions that deep ecological philosophy can be interpreted 
to support, such as population controls or acts of violent ecotage against 
inflexible social and cultural institutions. This characteristic aligns eco-
dystopia with what Sargent, Moylan, and others have deemed the “criti-
cal” trend in dystopian narrative, though not in the same sense of being 
like more recent dystopias that are “self-reflexively ‘critical’” of traditional 
dystopian tendencies (Moylan, Scraps 188). The works by John Brunner 
examined below indeed move ecodystopian science fiction in such a direc-
tion, but critical ecodystopia reflects more so on ecotopian (im)possibil-
ity given the sociopolitical realities of the spaces upon which ecotopian 
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thinkers want to layer their dreams. Thus, much like Dune, this type of fic-
tion is a powerful tool for stimulating new, more ecologically and socially 
conscious ways of thinking and being in the world.
Ecotopia chronicles the visit of the New York Times-Post reporter William 
Weston to Ecotopia, geographically the area once comprising Washing-
ton, Oregon, and northern California. Ecotopia seceded from the United 
States twenty years prior to William’s visit, and William’s purpose there 
is to write a series of articles documenting the unusual practices of the 
nation’s people. These practices include, among other things, maintaining 
an antigrowth economy and fulfilling a national goal to reduce popula-
tion. Early in the book, William’s newspaper articles—which along with 
an italicized private notebook make up the book—are openly critical of 
Ecotopian ways: their lack of traffic and billboards is drab and isolating; 
their recycling requires too much personal effort; and their elimination of 
processed foods and putting certain foods on “‘Bad Practice lists’” is “a 
loophole that might house a large and rather totalitarian rat” (19). Despite 
the reporter’s early judgments, later he admits a change in attitude toward 
the nation: “the more closely I look at the fabric of Ecotopian life, the 
more I am forced to admit its strength and its beauty” (95). Though Wil-
liam’s visit to Ecotopia is supposed to last just six weeks, in the end he 
stays there. In a farewell letter to his editor he writes, “I’ve decided not to 
come back, Max. You’ll understand why from the notebook. But thank 
you for sending me on this assignment, when neither you nor I knew 
where it might lead. It led me home” (167).
 A similar reevaluation of ecotopian life occurs in Piercy’s Woman on 
the Edge of Time as the book’s main character, Connie Ramos, admits 
she wishes her young daughter could grow up in Mattapoisett, the novel’s 
near-future ecotopia to which she travels:
She will be strange, but she will be glad and strong and she will not be 
afraid. She will have enough. She will have pride. She will love her own 
brown skin and be loved for her strength and her good work. She will 
walk in strength like a man and never sell her body and she will nurse 
her babies like a woman and live in love like a garden, like that chil-
dren’s house of many colors. People of the rainbow with its end fixed in 
earth, I give her to you! (133)
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Connie has reasons to want such a future for her daughter, because Con-
nie has grown up in fast-paced New York City, has lived on the streets, 
has been abused physically and mentally by men, has had the one man 
she ever loved taken away from her by the prison system and killed in a 
medical experiment, and during the course of the novel is forced into a 
medical experiment while living in a mental health facility. Despite the 
aversion Connie should have toward existing institutions, similar to Wil-
liam in Callenbach’s book, she is reluctant to accept the promises of eco-
topia. Her friend from Mattapoisett in the year 2137, Luciente, informs 
her of the fundamental social changes that have occurred in the alterna-
tive future; living under modernity’s ideological supremacy, Connie can 
only doubt the viability of these changes. She questions the city’s lack of 
social hierarchy, of patriarchy, and of centralized government. But the rev-
olutionary thinkers living in the ecotopian future ultimately assist Connie 
on a journey to free herself from the forces that have dominated her life 
for so long. In the end, while she does not get to live in the future ecoto-
pia, she thinks of Mattapoisett as she revolts against her oppressors at the 
hospital.
 One of the concerns shared by these ecotopias and deep ecology is 
human demographics. Following a host of writers who in the 1960s and 
1970s attended to the potential consequences of human overpopulation, 
both Naess and the deep ecologist, poet, and essayist Gary Snyder agree 
that taking steps to reduce world population is necessary for the realiza-
tion not only of deep ecology’s ecocentric ideals but also of general ecosys-
temic health.4 In his 1973 essay “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range 
Ecology Movements,” Naess sketches his deep ecological concept of bio-
spherical egalitarianism, which to him is fundamental to environmental 
movements wanting to do more than institute shallow legislative efforts 
to cut pollution and resource depletion, efforts really aimed at preserv-
ing natural resources for the people of affluent nations. Biospherical egali-
tarianism requires “a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways 
and forms of life” (151–52). It eschews anthropocentric hierarchies of 
being, instead observing the equal right to flourish for all species. Impor-
tantly, biospherical egalitarianism “implies the reinterpretation of the 
future-research variable, ‘level of crowding,’ so that general mammalian 
crowding and loss of life-equality is taken seriously” (152). Life-equality 
necessitates the protection of appropriate life-space requirements (physical 
space and resource availability) for all organisms. And since life space for 
any one species is reduced as another species overcrowds and infiltrates, 
human overpopulation violates such egalitarian principles.
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 Because human crowding threatens the abilities of other species to 
flourish, Snyder, in his essay “Four Changes,” suggests cutting world pop-
ulation—about 3.6 billion at the time of the essay’s publication in 1969—
in half. His reasoning is similar to Naess’s:
Position: Man is but a part of the fabric of life—dependent on the whole 
fabric for his very existence. As the most highly developed tool-using 
animal, he must recognize that the unknown evolutionary destinies of 
other life forms are to be respected, and act as gentle stewards of the 
earth’s community of being.
Situation: There are now too many human beings, and the problem 
is growing rapidly worse. It is potentially disastrous not only for the 
human race but for most other life forms. (141–42)
The population problem can be addressed on the social and political lev-
els worldwide, Snyder believes, by convincing governments that human 
overpopulation is a serious problem, by legalizing abortion and promoting 
sterilization, by questioning and correcting cultural ways of thinking that 
press women to have children, and by refusing to see a nation’s growing 
population as a sign of a good economy. Advocating changes in commu-
nity structure, Snyder endorses alternative marriage arrangements, shar-
ing “the pleasures of raising children widely, so that all need not directly 
reproduce to enter into this basic human experience,” limiting family size, 
adopting children, and as Naess also encourages, developing kinship with 
nonhuman species (142).
 In Callenbach’s book, after seceding from the United States, Ecotopia 
engages in a national effort to reduce its population. Ecotopians want to 
decrease population to minimize pressure on resources and on other spe-
cies, and to improve the quality of life for their nation’s people. They begin 
their efforts by legalizing and lowering the cost of abortion, as well as 
universalizing female contraceptives. Both prove effective, as deaths begin 
to outnumber births. The Ecotopian population declines during one mea-
sured period by seventeen thousand, while in that same period American 
society gains three million. The national goal to reduce population is cou-
pled with a move away from centralized, metropolitan social organization 
and toward more deliberate living in dispersed small communities. As a 
result, and to give only one example from the book, “instead of massive 
hospitals in the city centers, besieged by huge lines of waiting patients, 
there were small hospitals and clinics everywhere” (62). Finally, Ecoto-
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pians rethink the concept of family, disintegrating the nuclear ideal that 
obligates as a moral, if even economic, responsibility the replacement of 
oneself with single, or more often multiple, consuming progeny. Instead, 
Ecotopians value family as “a group of between five and 20 people, some 
of them actually related and some not, who live together” (64).
 The efforts to reduce population in Woman on the Edge of Time, and 
to value family structures not dependent on one’s own reproduction, also 
mirror the ideas of deep ecology. Though Mattapoisett’s use of “brood-
ers,” tanks in which human fetuses are grown, is more formulaically 
science fictional than Ecotopia’s political and social mechanisms, it never-
theless stages deep ecology’s position on population reduction and control. 
The brooder becomes not a real option, but instead an estranging novum 
that provokes environmentalist, and feminist, reflection on the possibili-
ties of reproductive technology. For feminism, the brooders free women 
and men from biological enchainment, indicating Piercy’s “faith in the lib-
eratory potential of reproductive technologies” (Sandilands 9)—women, 
liberated from “the power to give birth,” and men, from never being 
“humanized to be loving and tender” (Piercy 98). For deep ecology, such 
technology also liberates nonhuman nature from human overpopulation, 
a liberation that is central to the movement’s platform.5 Further, similar 
to the communal groups of Ecotopia, and to the community childrearing 
Snyder proposes, Mattapoisett’s children are assigned three “mothers,” 
or nurturers, who can be male or female.6 This restructuring of family life 
to extend and value nurturance beyond genetic relations, coupled with 
the deliberate move to shrink population, grows out of a conscious social 
effort to minimize the effects of material culture on Mattapoisett’s material 
base, its ecology.
 For deep ecology, maniacal economic growth and consumerist trends 
have likewise distressed the world’s ecosystems, this time by encouraging 
an excessive mining of natural material. As Sessions notes in his preface to 
Deep Ecology for the 21st Century,
Government leaders and economic elites in Industrial Growth Soci-
eties continue to push for endless economic growth and develop-
ment. . . . Third World countries are now entering global markets and 
trying to become First World countries by destroying their ecosystems 
and wild species as they emulate the industrial and consumer patterns of 
the ecologically destructive unsustainable First World. (xx)
Earth Policy Institute president Lester R. Brown speaks also to this point: 
“Over the last half-century, the sevenfold expansion of the global econ-
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omy has pushed the demand on local ecosystems beyond the sustainable 
yield in country after country” (79). Brown’s specific concern is with the 
growth economy’s more recent injurious effects on oceanic fisheries, for-
ests, and rangelands. But even the deep ecologists of the 1970s recognized 
economic growth as responsible for overtaxing vital ecosystemic processes 
and damaging the systems necessary for human and nonhuman life. They 
advocated, then as now, for fundamental changes in the ways developing 
and industrial societies view such growth. Rather than valuing economic 
expansion and consumerism, deep ecologists and the ecotopian writers 
discussed here look toward more ecologically and socially conscientious 
economic paradigms.
 Naess, for example, outlines several requisite lifestyle changes for 
transforming modernity’s growth-centered economy into an ecologically 
viable system: “Anticonsumerism and minimization of personal property”; 
“Endeavor to maintain and increase sensitivity and appreciation of goods 
of which there is enough for all to enjoy”; “Absence or low degree of 
‘novophilia’—the love of what is new merely because it is new. Cherishing 
old and well-worn things”; “the attempt to avoid a material standard of 
living too much different from and higher than the needy”; and “Appreci-
ation of lifestyles which are universalizable, which are not blatantly impos-
sible to sustain without injustice toward fellow humans or other species” 
(“Deep Ecology” 260). Also writing against the grain of production-driven 
consumerist ideology, Snyder offers a Thoreauvian maxim: “True affluence 
is not needing anything” (146). With an assertion about the cancerous 
nature of economic growth, Snyder suggests that rather than promoting 
such growth without considering its deleterious effects on ecosystems, the 
economy should handle production, distribution, and consumption “with 
the same elegance and spareness one sees in nature” (146). For Snyder, 
hoarding personal possessions must be surrendered to communal sharing, 
and the modern fascination with new technologies must be surrendered 
to a high esteem for old ways: “handicrafts, gardening, home skills, mid-
wifery, herbs—all the things that can make us independent, beautiful and 
whole” (146).
 In his first newspaper article on the subject of Ecotopian society Wil-
liam displays his growth-centered culture’s fear of the utopian nation’s 
antigrowth economy: “Ecotopia still poses a nagging challenge to the 
underlying national philosophy of America: ever-continuing progress, the 
fruits of industrialization for all, a rising Gross National Product” (4). Wil-
liam perceives Ecotopia’s stable-state system in this way because “it means 
giving up any notions of progress. You just want to get to that stable point 
and stay there, like a lump” (31). With his censuring of economic systems 
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that see industrialization and a rising GNP as unnecessary and unhealthy, 
William exhibits his U.S. culture’s marriage to the growth model. What 
William cannot see in Ecotopia’s economy—rather, what his upbringing 
prevents him from seeing—is its agents’ primary motivation to preserve 
ecological integrity and to fulfill an ecological ethic of species equality. He 
can at least communicate the Ecotopian point of view, a fact that fore-
shadows his ultimate acceptance of it: “humans were meant to take their 
modest place in a seamless, stable-state web of living organisms, disturb-
ing that web as little as possible” and “People were to be happy not to the 
extent they dominated their fellow creatures on the earth, but to the extent 
they lived in balance with them” (43–44). But William’s defense of “the 
underlying national philosophy of America” reflects more the attitudes 
of the system from which he comes. He analyzes Ecotopia’s stable-state 
economy using capitalist language, inevitably condemning any contrary 
economic possibilities. If William’s American readers believe that Ecoto-
pia cannot maintain a decent standard of living with its twenty-hour work 
week, that Ecotopia’s system cannot attract capital, and that the nation 
will suffer financial collapse, then they are too deeply fixed in the language 
and rationalizations of capital to see or admit the triumph of Ecotopia’s 
divergent economy, which does not subscribe to capital’s exact notions of 
standard of living, investment, and financial success (48). Interpreted with 
the language of capital, the stable-state system will always fail; but inter-
preted with its own ecocentric logic, the Ecotopian economy realizes Sny-
der’s “true affluence.”
 In Piercy’s book, Connie’s expectations when she first arrives in Mat-
tapoisett demonstrate her faith in a booming economic future: “Rocket 
ships, skyscrapers into the stratosphere, an underground mole world 
miles deep, glass domes over everything” (62). But opening her eyes she 
sees instead the village of a bucolic past, prompting her to ask Luciente, 
“‘You sure we went in the right direction? Into the future?’” (62). Luciente 
assents and Connie replies questioningly, “‘Forward, into the past? Okay, 
it’s better to live in a green meadow than on 111th Street. But all this striv-
ing and struggling to end up in the same old bind’” (64). This sentiment 
repeats William’s initial attitude about Ecotopia’s seemingly backward sys-
tem. Both protagonists reflect the capitalist tendency to view as economi-
cally and socially regressive any alternative mode of economic production 
that does not depend on, and thus relentlessly provide, a constant flow of 
commodities through markets and a constant reinvestment of capital into 
new, marketable stuff and exploitable places and cultures.
 In addition to its concerns about overpopulation and growth-centered 
economics, deep ecology advocates a “relational, total-field image,” a per-
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ception of “Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrin-
sic relations” that at once reflects the materialist, part-of-nature thinking 
reviewed in chapter 1 and a related ecospirituality that is central to deep 
ecology and, as chapter 3 will demonstrate, cultural ecofeminism (Naess, 
“The Shallow” 151). Snyder, who derives his ecophilosophy from Bud-
dhist concepts of organic unity and Animist ideas about the spiritual 
matrix that connects all life and material (Taylor, “Snyder”), writes, “Man 
is but a part of the fabric of life—dependent on the whole fabric for his 
very existence” (141). While this is true scientifically, for deep ecology the 
properly ecocentric attitude is also one that makes spiritual the ecologi-
cal connections among nature’s varied, and often instrumentally valueless, 
elemental parts. As Bron Taylor and Michael Zimmerman write,
Naess and most deep ecologists . . . trace their perspective to personal 
experiences of connection to and wholeness in wild nature, experi-
ences which are the ground of their intuitive, affective perception of the 
sacredness and interconnection of all life. Those who have experienced 
such a transformation of consciousness (experiencing what is sometimes 
called one’s “ecological self” in these movements) view the self not as 
separate from and superior to all else, but rather as a small part of the 
entire cosmos. (456)
Deep ecologists apprehend the human self by identifying the ecological 
and cosmological totality within which this self exists.
 In Callenbach’s book, Ecotopians educate their children in a manner 
consistent with deep ecology’s scientific total-field image, and they worship 
in a way consistent with the movement’s ecospirituality. About Ecotopian 
schoolchildren, William writes, their experiences
are closely tied in with studies of plants, animals and landscape. I have 
been impressed with the knowledge that even young children have 
of such matters—a six-year-old can tell you all about the “ecological 
niches” of the creatures and plants he encounters in his daily life. He 
will also know what roots and berries are edible, how to use soap plant, 
how to carve a pot holder from a branch. (35–36)
An Ecotopian ten-year-old knows “how hundreds of species of plants 
and animals live, both around their schools and in the areas they explore 
on backpacking expeditions” (120). Such knowledge, even in young 
children, would be taken for granted in an ecologically literate soci-
ety. But traditional education instead practices conservative pedagogical 
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models, which according to environmental educator C. A. Bowers empha-
size not ecological literacy but rather human achievements of the past, 
social engagement, and job training (37–38). Just as ignorant of ecology 
are liberal models of education, which focus on social development, indi-
vidualism, and rational, linear thinking (Bowers 74–76). Whatever their 
merits, these pedagogical trends become harmful in their neglect of ecol-
ogy and of understanding human achievement, social engagement, the 
individual, and so forth within the context of ecological relationships. Per-
haps William writes “‘ecological niches’” within quotation marks because 
of his Times-Post readers’ unfamiliarity with the term. Their education 
presumably has not accounted for ecology in the same way the Ecotopi-
ans’ has. Ecotopian adults can be heard saying, “‘Knowing yourself as an 
animal creature on the earth, as we do. It can feel more comfortable than 
[William’s] kind of life’” (80–81) and “‘We don’t think in terms of ‘things,’ 
there’s no such thing as a thing—there are only systems’” (81).
 Rooted also in a cosmology that, as critic Jim Dwyer notes, “inspires 
people to consider themselves intrinsic parts of nature and act accord-
ingly,” Ecotopian spiritual life reflects the ecocentric tenets of its educa-
tional system (565). This correspondence makes sense from the perspective 
of deep ecology, which connects pedagogy with spiritual growth: “Educa-
tion should have as its goal encouraging the spiritual development and 
personhood development of the members of a community” (Devall, “The 
Deep” 134). Never in Ecotopia does William submit to his Times-Post edi-
tor an extended reflection on Ecotopian religion; he mentions spirituality 
peripherally in his discussions of economy, population, and health care. 
And when he does touch on the issue, either in an article or in his personal 
journal, he does so with an Abrahamic discomfort with nature-based spiri-
tuality. Ecotopians hold pagan charms, eschew the clear-cutting of forests 
for their apparent worship of trees, build shrines to various spirits, and 
embrace death as a part of the cycle of life. Similarly, in Piercy’s book, 
the people of Mattapoisett live their cosmology “as partners with water, 
air, birds, fish, trees,” professing nothing of an institutional religion but 
instead deeply integrating themselves in ceremonies “to heal the world we 
live in with so many others” (118, 269). Aligned in Ecotopia and Woman 
on the Edge of Time with an overall superior quality of social and ecologi-
cal life, such ecospirituality—and indeed its educational complement—is 
contrasted with those religious and pedagogical systems of modern life 
that deny human embeddedness in other-than-human nature.7
 Deep ecologists hope to engender a new notion of community. For 
them, community goes beyond human social interaction. A community 
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is instead a total ecological field, a life system, and even a form of life. 
And because “The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to 
the weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which 
that form has obtained an ecological equilibrium,” our current tendency 
to import commodities and consumer ways of life into established human–
nonhuman ecological fields disturbs the evolutionary self-sufficiency of 
these fields (Naess, “The Shallow” 153).8 The result is a social degrada-
tion that is both a symptom and a source of ecological degradation. To 
solve this problem Naess advocates strengthening local self-government 
and community self-sufficiency. Snyder supports similar moves: “Division 
by natural and cultural boundaries rather than arbitrary political boundar-
ies” and “land-use being sensitive to the properties of each region” (147).9 
Such bioregional thought pervades contemporary environmentalist discus-
sions, which often advocate using locally available resources, rebuilding 
local economies, and establishing participatory democratic communities.
 Callenbach reflects on the strengths of community and bioregional 
autonomy in three ways in his book. First, all Ecotopian food, energy, 
and building materials are locally harvested, and the nature of this prac-
tice is such that local systems remain healthy and distant systems remain 
untouched—at least by Ecotopians. Second, attesting to the importance of 
self-in-community, William eventually becomes aware of his and his cul-
ture’s unfulfilling disconnectedness from what could be called Stegnerian 
place.10 He writes, “I’m beginning to see that to an Ecotopian, who always 
has a strong collective base to return to, a place and the people of that 
place, my existence must seem pathetically insecure” (127). When Wil-
liam admits “I have never cried about it. But maybe I should,” Callenbach 
issues a compelling request for readers to evaluate their own disconnected-
ness and to envision life in community, with a strong sense of belonging 
(127). Finally, Ecotopia decentralizes the operations of local regions, get-
ting rid of national spending and putting control of “basic life systems” 
into the hands of local communities (62). As a result of these changes, 
communities arrange their lives more deliberately, population density 
drops, medical services improve, and previously threatened ecosystems 
flourish.
 Mattapoisett is also community- and bioregionally-oriented. As Jack-
rabbit, one of the town’s dwellers, says, “‘A sense of land, of village and 
base and family. We’re strongly rooted’” (116); and the village is “‘Own-
fed,’” “‘Self-sufficient as possible in proteins’” (64). In their recognition 
of themselves as part of community, as part of (deep ecological) nature, 
Mattapoisett’s people fulfill a central goal of deep ecology: self-realization 
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in other-than-human nature. As Sessions notes, “human individuals attain 
personal self-realization and psychological-emotional maturity when they 
progress from an identification with narrow ego, through identification 
with other humans, to a more all-encompassing identification of their ‘self’ 
with nonhuman individuals, species, ecosystems, and with the ecosphere 
itself” (“Deep Ecology” 211). Connie’s desire for her daughter to grow up 
in Mattapoisett and William’s choice to stay in Ecotopia are largely func-
tions of the psychological completeness each experiences in their respec-
tive new communities. This completeness results from the conscious social, 
political, economic, educational, and spiritual policies and practices of 
ecotopia, all of which lead to the most general but materially significant 
consequence of ecotopian deep ecology: the small human footprint.
 With its appraisals of overpopulation and growth and consumer ten-
dencies, as well as its ecological-ecospiritual practices and redefinition of 
community, deep ecology hopes ultimately to lessen human influence on 
the nature within which a particular kind of (utopian or whole) human, 
and even nonhuman, identity emerges. With ecological integrity comes 
social and individual integrity; any utopian hope for the latter necessar-
ily entails the former as the result of a practiced ecocentric ethic, which, 
following Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, argues for the protection of “the 
long-term flourishing of all ecosystems and each of their constituent 
parts” (Taylor and Zimmerman 456). What matters most to Ecotopians, 
according to William, “is the aspiration to live in balance with nature, 
‘walk lightly on the land,’ treat the earth as a mother” (29). And sum-
ming up the critical stance of ecotopian deep ecology in general, Bolivar, 
a key spokesperson for social opinion in Mattapoisett, states, “‘I guess I 
see the original division of labor, that first dichotomy, as enabling later 
divvies into haves and have-nots, powerful and powerless, enjoyers and 
workers, rapists and victims. The patriarchal mind/body split turned the 
body to machine and the rest of the universe into booty on which the will 
could run rampant, using, discarding, destroying’” (203).11 The collective 
story written by Ecotopia and Woman on the Edge of Time narrates deep 
ecology’s stance on these dominant conceptual dualisms. It is a story that 
always reveals the disparity between a “balanced” ecotopian society and a 
disembedded, displaced modern society. With William contrasting his lived 
experiences in Ecotopia against his lived experiences in the United States, 
and Connie living two experiences as she bounces back and forth between 
polarized worlds, these ecotopias transport us back and forth between our 
known world and the world of possibility. Indeed and as such, ecotopia 
offers another dualism, but it is one that strategically privileges subordi-
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nated sociopolitical and ecologically conscious options. Callenbach’s and 
Piercy’s books demonstrate the value of ecotopian fiction for communicat-
ing and exploring the changes advocated by a transformative environmen-
tal philosophy that will have nothing less than comprehensive change to 
dominant socioeconomic and cultural practices.
Following the previous discussion of ecotopian fiction, this section of 
chapter 2 highlights what is precisely deep ecological in ecodystopian fic-
tion, the question being, “How does such fiction also motivate deep eco-
logical dreaming?” Dystopia always contains an implicit utopian drive, as 
Moylan and Mohr argue, but while this feature of John Brunner’s Stand 
on Zanzibar and The Sheep Look Up leads them to go together with eco-
topia and deep ecology, the books cannot be read in complete alignment 
with deep ecology’s espoused principles. Even if we read utopia as a com-
pass rather than a blueprint, as political scientist Marius de Geus argues 
we must, we still need to be critical about the direction in which the com-
pass points us.12 Brunner’s ecodystopias enable this corrective. Extrapolat-
ing atrocious global futures from some very present and real situations, 
they not only concentrate our attention on the most critical matters but 
also question the viability of the ways we choose to act going forward.
 As demonstrated earlier, population reduction is a key interest in Eco-
topia, Woman on the Edge of Time, and deep ecology, emerging as they do 
out of a cultural moment that also produced Paul Ehrlich’s The Population 
Bomb (1968) and other demographic studies, fictional and nonfictional. 
Ecotopians make it a national goal to decrease population; Mattapoisett 
controls population scientifically, growing its future generations in brood-
ers; and deep ecology holds as one of its eight basic principles that “The 
flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially 
smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a 
smaller human population” (Naess, “The Deep” 68). Stand on Zanzibar’s 
insights into overpopulation soften deep ecology’s and ecotopia’s strong, if 
not dogmatic, attention to population controls by highlighting the growth 
economy and modern consumption habits as much more detrimental than 
overpopulation to ecological health and by drawing attention to the ethi-
cal problems inherent in controlling population. The book challenges the 
emphasis on population reduction that characterized many early works of 
environmental fiction and nonfiction, encouraging critical readers not to 
deemphasize the global harm of overpopulation—to be sure, the book’s 
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title is a direct reference to overpopulation—but to recognize modern eco-
nomic doctrine as demanding greater attention.13 Human overcrowding 
jeopardizes appropriate life space requirements for other species, but it is 
certainly feasible and in fact historically accurate to find that more damag-
ing consequences arise from the encroachment of economic systems that 
liquidate human and nonhuman life space in the name of economic policy, 
even using demographic trends to justify increased production.
 In the novel, the multinational corporation General Technics (GT) 
wants to transform a small, peaceful, and economically disadvantaged 
African nation named Beninia into a processing center for an offshore min-
ing project. GT and its enterprise represent the economic trend that deep 
ecology does indeed target: elite nations pushing third world countries to 
participate in their market interests and fantasies of a global consumer 
society while erasing any chance of developing alternative economic forms 
that are more ecologically sustainable and socially just. As critic Neal 
Bukeavich notes, “the Beninian enterprise enacts a kind of economic impe-
rialism that renders it unlikely to initiate any revolutionary shift in global 
environmental politics” (59). With the initiation of GT’s scheme, Beninia 
will be swept into an economic system that not only gobbles up existing 
social relations—and in Beninia’s case, peaceful social relations—but also 
exhausts material nature. Nowhere in GT’s plan is there a discussion about 
developing an economy that will lift Beninia out of poverty without sac-
rificing its already limited resource base. But it is predominantly such an 
exhausting economic system and the culture it creates and then feeds that 
wreaks the ecological havoc, and this insight is the specific contribution of 
Stand on Zanzibar to deep ecology’s population concerns.
 Throughout Stand on Zanzibar Brunner gives readers fragments of the 
consumer culture that economic projects such as General Technics’s Beni nia 
plan support. It is a culture deep ecology would find harrowing in contrast 
to its ecotopian images of strong communities and ecologically sustain-
able ways of living. Certainly it is the kind of culture against which Ecoto-
pia and Mattapoisett define themselves, but as a dystopia Brunner’s work 
fully explores this culture, rendering many of its terrifyingly feasible pos-
sibilities. Communities as dynamic collections of participating individuals 
with senses of ecologically inspired self do not exist in the mass culture of 
Stand on Zanzibar. Instead, the dominant culture is an actualized capital-
ist fantasy of a world unified in its consumption habits. Images of Mr. and 
Mrs. Everywhere, “construct identities, the new century’s equivalent of the 
Joneses,” fill television screens sold by the media giant Engrelay Satel serv, 
allowing viewers to see themselves in a variety of more desirable places 
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(Stand 9). And a “Colliderscope” “turns your drab daily environment into 
a marvelous mystery” (172). These simulation technologies demonstrate a 
point made in the novel by Chad Mulligan, one of the characters who is 
critical of the society: “‘the whole of modern so-called civilized existence is 
an attempt to deny reality insofar as it exists’” (251). The apparatuses of 
this “so-called civilized existence” allow two obfuscations: material real-
ity, as in humanity’s necessary embeddedness in nature, is forgotten; and 
social reality, as in the lived consequences of this amnesia, is masked.
 The latter obfuscation occurs with a technology that ubiquitously pro-
motes cultural and individual homogeneity. Song lyrics in Brunner’s novel 
show this:
Like the good Lord God in the Valley of Bones
Engrelay Satelserv made some people called Jones.
They were not alive and they were not dead—
They were ee-magi-nary but always ahead.
What was remarkably and uniquely new—
A gadget on the set made them look like you!
Watching their sets in a kind of a trance
Were people in Mexico, people in France.
They don’t chase Jones but the dreams are the same—
Mr. and Mrs. Everywhere, that’s the right name!
Herr und Frau Uberall or les Partout,
A gadget on the set makes them look like you. (309)
Mr. and Mrs. Everywhere provide the society of Stand on Zanzibar with 
capitalist utopian experiences, Disneyesque escapes to the Moon, Mount 
Everest, or Martinique, all conveniently liberated from despoiled material 
reality. For Tom Moylan, in the mid-twentieth-century, utopian visions—
which originally opposed “the affirmative culture maintained by domi-
nant ideology”—dissolved into the corporate-driven utopias of shopping 
malls and the Disney empire (Demand 1). Co-opted by capital, utopia was 
diluted with images of “pleasurable weekends, Christmas dreams, and 
goods purchased weekly in the pleasure-dome shopping malls of subur-
bia,” all visions compatible with growth-centered, capitalist ideology and, 
incidentally, as Brunner shows, redirecting social attention away from the 
degradation required for this ideology’s upkeep (8).
 As simulated culture in Brunner’s dystopia has replaced genuine 
social relations and effectively canceled political critique among the now 
tuned-out masses, simulated nature (third nature?) has replaced nonhu-
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man nature. Synthetic grass carpets General Technics’ headquarters, and a 
clinic in London has a floor “covered by tiles with a design of dead leaves 
embedded under a clear plastic surface” (158). Interestingly, this “only 
touch in the place which suggested nature” is trampled, “a failure,” the 
leaves disappearing “behind a mist of scratches and scrapes, the legacy of 
uncountable feet that had crossed the room” (159). Given that this clinic 
is one that pregnant women must visit to be eugenically tested, the results 
dictating whether they must terminate their pregnancies, it and its tram-
pled floor of faux fallen leaves symbolize all at once human population 
pressure (there are a lot of scratches and scrapes), the ecological harm such 
pressure induces (nature is now only a tiled image), and most importantly 
the ethical quandary of population control (a central authority is deciding 
who can and cannot have children).
 Stand on Zanzibar considers the growth economy and modern con-
sumer culture to be the most detrimental pressures on global ecological 
and social health, and it makes this claim stronger by emphasizing popula-
tion control as a directive far more unethical to institute than deep ecology 
and ecotopia appear to recognize. Deep ecology seems to treat overpopula-
tion and excessive production and consumption as equally worthy of sus-
tained critical attention, but Brunner’s work argues otherwise. Alongside 
the consumerist ideology broadcasted globally in Brunner’s ecodystopia is 
a praise of eugenic legislation. A “Greater New York Times editorial slot” 
hails Puerto Rico for cracking down on population growth and “for join-
ing the majority of us who have seen the danger [of overpopulation] com-
ing and resolved to put up with the minor inconveniences it entails when 
we decide to control the human elements of the big scene we inhabit” 
(15–16). Such “minor inconveniences” include a cultural stigma on fertil-
ity, mandatory abortion, and other top-down methods of enforcing obedi-
ence to government-mandated controls. Perhaps, then, Stand on Zanzibar 
issues a needed reality check for readers impressed with deep ecological 
utopia.
 Stand on Zanzibar does not discount the importance of a declining 
population for social and ecological health, but it does imagine the dan-
ger of treating overpopulation and modern economic doctrine as equally 
accountable for environmental despoliation. The book stages the dysto-
pian upshot of such an evenly distributed critique: governments end up 
working to cut population growth while allowing economic growth to 
continue unimpeded. Given the hegemony of an economic system that fun-
damentally cannot be shifted away from the imperative to exploit people 
and material nature, popular attention to drastic and global social and 
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ecological degradation—an attention driven by this economy’s media com-
plex—will turn toward overpopulation as the primary threat, thus absolv-
ing the capitalist economy from its hazardous global expansion. Brunner’s 
implicit take on the implications of what has since become deep ecology’s 
neo-Malthusianism anticipates that of deep ecology’s staunchest critic, 
Murray Bookchin, who asks,
would the grow-or-die economy called capitalism really cease to plun-
der the planet even if the world’s population were reduced to a tenth 
of its present numbers? Would lumber companies, mining concerns, oil 
cartels, and agribusiness render redwood and Douglas fir forests safer 
for grizzly bears if—given capitalism’s need to accumulate and produce 
for their own sake—California’s population were reduced to one million 
people? (“The Population” par. 38)14
His answer: no. Whales are extinct in Stand on Zanzibar, and Manhattan is 
under a dome. One character reflects on “when he last saw the stars” and 
“got wet in the rain,” and with this we are left to contemplate the death 
of human experiences of nonhuman wonder, and thus of the ethical possi-
bilities of such wonder, as a consequence of industrial pollutants (262). A 
cosmetics manufacturer brags, “‘we have taken control of our entire envi-
ronment, and what we choose by way of fashion and cosmetics matches 
that achievement’” (60). The world of the novel represents Bill McKibben’s 
“end of nature,” in which the modern way of life “now blows its smoke 
over every inch of the globe” (The End 60). McKibben, like Brunner, sees 
modern economic doctrine as the biggest threat to global social and eco-
logical integrity. “There is no place on the planet now,” he writes, “that 
does not fall under the enchantment of our images of the good life” (The 
End xxii). The “good life” is a life of production-driven consumption, and 
ultimately the life that makes overpopulation the serious threat that it is.
 If Stand on Zanzibar is Brunner’s indictment of the growth economy 
and production-driven consumer culture as sources of extreme social and 
ecological despoliation, then The Sheep Look Up is his most thorough 
exploration of the extent and effects of this despoliation. As in Stand on 
Zanzibar, The Sheep Look Up imagines a world in which modern ideo-
logical commitments to economic growth, its requisite mass consumption, 
and human/nature disconnect play out fully, despite (or, because of) dev-
astating environmental and social injustices. But while Stand on Zanzibar 
can be read as an effort to upset the myth that human overpopulation is 
more responsible for ecological and social breakdown than modern eco-
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nomic doctrine, The Sheep Look Up is less focused on overpopulation and 
instead surveys what is harmful in contemporary socioeconomic and cul-
tural paradigms. It expresses anxieties about loss of community, the effects 
of unchecked economic growth, and the lack of ecological knowledge in 
modern society, as it also explores contrasting strategies for environmen-
talist action. While these concerns demonstrate the novel’s alignment with 
deep ecology’s concerns, and thus ecodystopia’s pedagogical function for 
the movement, it is the latter exploration of environmentalist action that 
allows Brunner’s book to operate also as a corrective or warning for deep 
ecology.
 The Sheep Look Up details the effects of a U.S. military hallucinogen 
leakage. Countries whose citizens consume a synthetic food produced in 
the area of the leak have mass rioting. The military’s cover up of the chem-
ical spill is one of several attempts by the U.S. government and the corpo-
rations it supports to deny their roles in bringing on ecological and social 
disasters. Insecticide-resistant worms devastate crops worldwide, and 
nearly all Americans suffer from ailments caused by environmental con-
taminants. Fighting to expose the misdeeds of corporations and the com-
plicit government is the environmentalist and cult figure Austin Train, who 
also condemns emerging environmentalist violence. For the former activi-
ties Austin is labeled a subversive by the right-wing U.S. president, Prexy. 
Falsely accused of kidnapping the son of Roland Bamberley—a business-
man whose company manufactures water filters and whose brother, Jacob, 
manufactured the contaminated food—Austin is put on trial publicly and 
uses the opportunity to address his television audience with a plea: “‘at 
all costs, to me, to anyone, at all costs if the human race is to survive, 
the forcible exportation of the way of life invented by these stupid men 
must . . . be . . . stopped’” (353). Shortly after this declaration Prexy orders 
the broadcast to be cut off and the courthouse crumbles from a bomb 
built by one of the real kidnappers. The novel’s ending begins in a fury of 
American civil disorder, chaos one character claims fulfills his computer- 
generated forecast of “the best thing we can do to ensure a long, happy, 
healthy future for mankind” (363). “We can just about restore the bal-
ance of the ecology, the biosphere, and so on—in other words, we can live 
within our means instead of on an unrepayable overdraft, as we’ve been 
doing for the past half century,” says Dr. Thomas Grey in the novel, “if 
we exterminate the two hundred million most extravagant and wasteful of 
our species” (363).
 Implicitly through its dystopian strategy and explicitly through Austin 
Train, The Sheep Look Up offers sympathetic deep ecological critiques 
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of a range of modern ideologies and practices. One of its key critiques is 
of the type of thinking that, against the ecological imperative to maintain 
biodiversity, declares the expendability of certain nonhuman animal spe-
cies. The novel opens with a poem that announces,
The day shall dawn when never child but may
Go forth upon the sward secure to play.
No cruel wolves shall trespass in their nooks,
Their lore of lions shall come from picture-books. (2)
The domestication of wilderness celebrated here is an ideal central to 
Western modernization. As Jessica Wilkinson, Sara Vickerman, and Jeff 
Lerner write,
Taming wilderness to suit human needs was part of the value system 
European settlers brought to [North America]. The new nation’s vast 
natural resources were valued, but early settlers were concerned primar-
ily with exercising control over the landscape, its indigenous human 
inhabitants, and its natural resources. . . . Wild animals and plants were 
more often seen as threats or competitors than as objects worthy of pro-
tection. (285)
This taming has been called one of the “hallmarks of modernization,” 
and we can see it confronted in Callenbach’s and Piercy’s ecotopias, which 
like deep ecology imagine economic, demographic, and spiritual models 
that encourage knowledge of and respect for biodiversity regardless of the 
instrumental value of species (Baker 2). In The Sheep Look Up, Austin 
calls himself a “commensalist,” building his environmentalist philosophy 
on the idea that “you and your dog, and the flea on the dog’s back, and 
the cow and the horse and the jackrabbit and the gopher and the nema-
tode and the paramecium and the spirohete all sit down to the same table 
in the end” (18–19).
 After the celebratory poem that begins Brunner’s novel is a scene criti-
cal of the antiwilderness vision to which the poem rejoices. In a dislocat-
ing incident that would initially reinforce the fear of carnivorous nature 
in any reader of the novel’s opening poem, a man finds himself hunted by 
wild animals “In broad daylight on the Santa Monica freeway” (3). Petri-
fied and with “monstrous menacing beasts edging closer,” the man hides 
from cougars, jaguars, cobras, falcons, and barracudas—the beasts that 
the writer of the opening poem wants to relegate to children’s fairy tales 
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(3). Trying to run, the man is killed by a stingray. Is this a scene of some 
science-fictional, fantastical California now taken over by the savage crea-
tures that the poem demonizes? No. The beasts are cars: Mercury’s Cou-
gar, the Jaguar, AC’s Cobra, and so forth. The predation often associated 
with wild nature is given a different look, an ecocritical reevaluation dem-
onstrating that automotive, industrial society, not wilderness, is the threat 
to life.
 The Sheep Look Up links global ecological degradation to modern 
habits that have grown out of an ideology of man as conqueror, to bor-
row Aldo Leopold’s concept, instead of man as biotic citizen. This lack of 
ecological intelligence enables economic progress in Brunner’s imagined 
future, but as Brunner shows, it also leads to a disabling of ecological sys-
tems and creates an atmosphere conducive only to perpetual corporate 
profiteering. Lead, chemical byproducts of various industries, and DDT 
have brought about the poisoned world imagined by Rachel Carson in 
Silent Spring. As a result clean air, water, and filtermasks are commodities 
in The Sheep Look Up, purchased from vending machines. And a food 
producer, Puritan Foods, uses the public’s growing fear of pollution to 
market falsely its brand of “uncontaminated” food. These examples reveal 
a central capitalist phenomenon: the omnipresent (il)logic of capitalism 
permits big industry to profit from its own poor environmental record, but 
in no way are the resulting cleanup industries altering their profit motive 
or developing an ecologically and socially conscious economy, despite the 
obvious necessity to do so. As one character states, “‘they shit in the water 
until it’s dangerous to drink, then make a fucking fortune out of selling us 
gadgets to purify it again’” (187).
 Similar to Stand on Zanzibar, corporate offices in The Sheep Look Up 
boast of modernity’s containment of nonhuman nature: “cosmoramic pro-
jections,” simulated views of the outside world “Superior to the natural 
article,” “prevent the intrusion of untasteful exterior reality” (133). Again, 
this exterior reality is McKibben’s postnatural world at its dystopian 
extreme, in its third nature. Deep ecology finds intimate, spiritual con-
nections between all forms of life, connections that allow for human self-
realization. Callenbach’s Ecotopia and Piercy’s Mattapoisett nurture these 
connections. Fields and natural gardens serve as places for reflection and 
identity-building. In Brunner’s world, however, exterior space is poisoned, 
lifeless but for “rodent” species whose extreme populations are due to the 
loss of biodiversity. A child in Brunner’s novel cuts her foot while playing 
in an old garbage dump; a woman dies from exposure to pollutants at the 
beach. In such an atmosphere, fostering a recognized human–nature con-
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nection and an ecocentric consciousness of nonhuman wonder becomes 
improbable, if not impossible.
 Influenced by Austin, the “Trainites” of The Sheep Look Up mount a 
genuine ecotopian response to the custodians of the disastrous economic 
and political policies. A loosely organized group manifesting itself shortly 
after the Vietnam War, Trainites live out a number of environmentally sus-
tainable practices in small collectives called wats. As if taking a cue from 
Naess and Snyder, Decimus—the man killed in the opening scene—was a 
Trainite who promoted, as Naess would say, a “global solidarity of life-
style” (“Deep Ecology” 260): “His principle, at the Colorado wat, was 
third-world oriented; his community grew its own food, or tried to—crops 
had a nasty habit of failing because of wind-borne defoliants or industrial 
contaminants in the rain—and likewise wove its own cloth, while its chief 
source of income lay in handicrafts” (Sheep 34). The presence of Trainite 
wats gives Brunner’s novel a utopian quality. Wats are Brunner’s Ecotopias 
or Mattapoisetts, spaces apparently insulated from what is “Out There,” 
from “death and destruction” and “poison in the rain,” as one character 
thinks (171). But what makes The Sheep Look Up different from Eco-
topia and Woman on the Edge of Time—what makes the wats spaces of 
ecodystopian worry rather than of ecotopian hope—is that at the moment 
of optimism, the Out There breaks through the insulation and intrudes 
upon utopian space. Despite the Trainites’ ecological consciousness and 
foresight, the wats cannot keep acid rain at bay, nor can they prevent the 
intrusion of a crop-threatening worm imported into the United States by a 
careless company.
 Brunner uses the wats to insist on the potential for ecotopian enclaves 
and ecotopian ideas to stimulate cultural work in the world. His explora-
tion into this potential is not simplistic and unidirectional, though. Instead, 
The Sheep Look Up speculates about contrasting forms that environmen-
talist opposition, influenced by ecotopian social dreaming, might take. The 
first of these narrative explorations shows the journalist Peg Mankiewicz 
becoming discouraged with the polluted and corrupt state of modern life. 
Her extended investigation of Decimus’s death draws the ire of her editor, 
Mel Torrence, who is hostile to the Trainites. Mel views public resistance, 
the most violent of which he carelessly and wrongly associates with Aus-
tin’s supporters, as a nuisance. As he declares, “‘They block traffic, they 
foul up business, they commit sabotage, they’ve even gone as far as mur-
der’” (92). Seeing the merit in the Trainites’ actual methods of nonviolent 
dissent, the falsity of Mel’s allegations of murder, and the fact that the real 
killers “‘are the people who are ruining the world to line their pockets,’” 
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Peg quits the newspaper and heads to the Colorado wat (93). Encouraged 
by the undemanding and ecocentric way of life at the wat, but ultimately 
dissatisfied with its people’s lack of civic engagement with the world Out 
There, Peg leaves to carry on the fight started by Austin and Decimus. The 
Colorado wat is indeed an ecotopian space, but for Peg such a space is not 
enough for a world in need of sweeping change. In the end she channels 
her energies into critical journalism, researching and revealing the effects 
of rich nations on poor nations. With the public educative possibilities of 
such exposures she hopes to address the ecodystopian nightmare.
 Peg’s story is one in which an individual draws inspiration from an 
ecotopian ideal and moves into the world to instigate change through 
journalistic endeavor. Like Peg, Hugh Pettingill becomes disgruntled with 
the conditions of society. Speaking out against his adoptive father, the food 
producer Jacob Bamberley, Hugh voices the anger of many in the novel: 
“‘Because of you and people like you we sit here in the richest country in 
the world surrounded by sick kids—. . . . You and your ancestors treated 
the world like a fucking great toilet bowl. You shat in it and boasted about 
the mess you’d made. And now it’s full and overflowing, and you’re fat 
and happy and black kids are going crazy to keep you rich. Goodbye!’” 
(112). Hugh also flees to the Colorado wat, but instead of seeing the 
aggressive activism he falsely associates with the Trainites, he witnesses 
a community “rehearsing for tomorrow, devising a viable lifestyle by trial 
and error” (148). But Hugh wants direct action now; he wants an oppo-
sitional movement whose actions, we can say in retrospect, go beyond the 
sabotage that Edward Abbey later dramatized in The Monkey Wrench 
Gang (1975) and that has since been associated with groups such as the 
deep-ecology-inspired Earth First! and Earth Liberation Front.15 He leaves 
the wat and joins a small group of activists who employ the violent resis-
tance he desires, including kidnapping Roland Bamberley’s son Hector 
and demanding for ransom that Roland freely distribute twenty thousand 
water filters to citizens.
 Peg and Hugh act upon an understanding that broader social trans-
formation entails crossing utopia’s spatial or intellectual boundaries and 
working in the world Out There to effect change. Tellingly, the ecodysto-
pian elements of acid rain and an imported invasive insect have already 
crossed into the utopian wat, essentially dissolving ecotopian space and 
making such direct engagement with the Out There the only viable option 
for such transformation. But this direct engagement takes on two appear-
ances in The Sheep Look Up. Peg’s tactic is journalistic disclosure, hop-
ing for change by educating people. Hugh’s tactic is direct action in the 
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extreme, physically confronting those responsible for environmental and 
social degradation. With its staging of both activist possibilities, The Sheep 
Look Up inserts an important question into environmentalist discourse: 
what liberatory strategies might activists engage in the interests of eco-
systemic and social liberation? Interestingly, all of the fictions discussed 
in this chapter raise this question in some way, but only The Sheep Look 
Up highlights its centrality. Ecotopia could not maintain its independence 
from the United States if not for the fear among citizens and leaders of the 
latter country that Ecotopians have mined major U.S. cities with atomic 
weapons. Callenbach’s book closes, though, with William vowing to shift 
his writing toward educating readers about Ecotopia, about “things [in] 
Ecotopia that the rest of the world needs badly to know” (166). The threat 
of violence maintains Ecotopian liberty, but William wants to educate the 
non-Ecotopian public about Ecotopian ways and, presumably, in so doing 
nonviolently enable the country’s existence and perhaps even its influence 
on the world. In Woman on the Edge of Time Connie engages a sort of 
personal revenge liberation by poisoning her doctors with an insecticide 
that she stole from her brother, thinking of Luciente and Mattapoisett as 
she does so. Billie Maciunas rightly sees Connie’s violent strategy as a poor 
course for implementing change, but the implicit reflection in the conclu-
sion of Piercy’s book is on the difficulty of realizing utopia-inspired change 
against hegemonic dominance and oppression (256). Brunner’s ecodysto-
pias also display this systemic, obdurate dominance and oppression, with 
The Sheep Look, of all the books, most clearly positing divergent activist 
directions to which the utopian compass might point.
 Perhaps the full question raised in these narratives is about more than 
what environmentalist activism might look like when its motivating atti-
tude reflects deep ecology’s disdain for the dominant Western worldview. 
Deep ecology provides an ideological orientation for activism against the 
agents of ecological destruction and a likewise socially destructive instru-
mental rationality. Whatever its specific critiques (e.g, demographics, eco-
nomics, disembeddedness), its core aim, as Naess writes, is “a substantial 
reorientation of our whole civilization” (Ecology 45). The Sheep Look Up 
makes it clear that such an orientation might take on physically aggressive 
shapes when confronted with the intractable pervasiveness of ecological 
and social domination and oppression in modern political and economic 
forms. Brunner’s ecodystopian strategy brings him to imagine dissent in its 
worst state of uncontrolled violence acted out by those who “wanted to 
wreck and burn and kill” (Sheep 123). As such, Brunner offers critical dys-
topian reflection on the possibility of violent rebellion arising from those 
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who, much like Connie in Piercy’s novel, ultimately discover the obstinacy 
of those in power toward utopian possibility or any sociopolitical alterna-
tives. The novel does not condemn all forms of active opposition. Austin 
supports demonstrators, whereas he denounces violence. But the mani-
festations of extremist pandemonium in Brunner’s work illustrate social 
disorder that is a symptom of both the failure of those in power to open a 
dialogue with activist groups whose concerns are about legitimate ecologi-
cal and social issues and of an activist perspective that, given this failure, 
has the potential to instigate misanthropic aggression.
As Wegner suggests, imaginary communities “are real . . . in that they have 
material, pedagogical, and ultimately political effects, shaping the ways 
people understand and, as a consequence, act in their worlds” (xvi). Eco-
topian fiction is a place where deep ecology can find a motivational imagi-
nary space for similarly shaping its theory and practice. In ecotopia human 
society does its best to exist unobtrusively as one part of a complex and 
necessary ecology. Doing this requires new patterns of being that reduce 
the human footprint and allow for the flourishing of all species. New ritu-
als and new pedagogical models emerge in ecotopia. More sustainable eco-
nomic practices prevail over the modern push for economic growth and 
consumption. Political decisions are localized and all people are encour-
aged to participate in democratic process. But as David Pepper writes, “To 
be truly transgressive, rather than lapsing into reactionary fantasy, ecoto-
pias . . . must be rooted in existing social and economic relations rather 
than being merely a form of abstraction unrelated to the processes and 
situations operating in today’s ‘real’ world” (“Utopianism” 18). This is 
where ecodystopia can help.
 While indeed “Deep ecological and bioregional literature . . . can seem 
regressively removed from today’s world” (Pepper, “Utopianism” 18), if 
read in dialogue with ecodystopia’s constructive insights, deep ecological 
utopia can become refined enough to transcend its remove—and even its 
suspected “eco-brutalism”—and then to play a role in prompting change 
Out There (Bookchin, “Social Ecology” par. 15). In “Social Ecology versus 
Deep Ecology,” Bookchin writes,
Deep ecologists see . . . humanity essentially as an ugly “anthropocen-
tric” thing—presumably a malignant product of natural evolution—that 
is “overpopulating” the planet, “devouring” its resources, and destroy-
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ing its wildlife and the biosphere—as though some vague domain of 
“nature” stands opposed to a constellation of nonnatural human beings, 
with their technology, minds, society, etc. (par. 14)
Such charges against deep ecology stem especially from the tendencies in 
the movement to posit an all-encompassing “humanity” and to overlook 
global challenges in favor of local, bioregional reform. The former ten-
dency blurs the complexities of human cultural difference and the various 
political structures and social hierarchies that sustain relations of socio-
economic power; some humans are more responsible for severe social 
and ecological degradation than others. The latter tendency can lead to 
a bioregional isolationism and a disregard for the plight of distant cul-
tures. Brunner’s novels shape our understanding of the dynamics of worlds 
opposite those of Callenbach’s and Piercy’s, and they even teach us that 
such worlds are out there and need to be attended to. But an extreme faith 
in the growth economy, an enforced cultural homogenization, and an 
authoritative government and corporate leadership inhibit the possibility 
of new patterns of being. Without ecotopian dreaming—or, in the case of 
The Sheep Look Up, with ecotopian dreaming present but dismissed and 
criminalized—damaging systems are allowed to flourish at the expense of 
sustainable ecological and social possibilities. Balanced against each other, 
ecotopia and ecodystopia provide deep ecology with a more complete 
sense of its visions and of the challenges it faces and must thoroughly con-
sider while pursuing these visions.
in  t h i s  c h a p t e r  I move from deep ecology to ecofeminism, a trans-formative environmentalist philosophy that likewise emerged within the post-Carson atmosphere of the 1970s, matured in the 1980s, and 
continues to thrive today. As philosopher Karen J. Warren argues, male-
centered thinking follows a “logic of domination” that promotes the 
oppositional pair male/female, places a higher value on males in this pair, 
and as a result justifies inequalities between men and women (47). The 
superiority granted to males under this logic excuses the use of social, 
political, and economic power to subordinate women, and it sanctions a 
privileged socioeconomic and political stance for men. For Warren and 
other ecofeminists, the projects of feminism and environmentalism must 
notice the similarities between this androcentric logic and the cultural logic 
that constructs a culture/nature opposition, places a higher value on cul-
ture, and as a result authorizes human domination over nonhuman nature. 
Because both feminism and environmentalism are fundamentally critical 
of domination, each one can find in the other one resources for expand-
ing its attentions and energizing its methods, ultimately to join hands in 
a coproductive ecofeminism that denounces oppressions of women and 
nonhuman nature as well as addresses these oppressions with theory and 
practice. In the words of Greta Gaard, “no attempt to liberate women (or 
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any other oppressed group) will be successful without an equal attempt to 
liberate nature” (“Living” 1).
 Ecofeminism is a diverse body of critical thought, though, in some 
modes aligning with deep ecology’s ecospirituality and critique of anthro-
pocentrism and in other modes proposing an emancipatory politics that 
rejects deep ecology’s normative principles. Ecofeminist theorists propose 
and contest contrary positions. As such, ecofeminism cannot be said to 
have linked feminism to environmentalism in any consistent or universal 
way. But this characteristic of ecofeminism does not harm its productive-
ness as a critical method. In feminist literary scholarship, efforts to nego-
tiate particularly the tension between “affinity” and “constructionist” 
ecofeminisms have produced some rich results. For example, Karla Arm-
bruster argues that whether our ecological politics is informed by a per-
ception of an affinity—a deep ecological kinship or continuity—between 
women and nature, or by a broader attention to the way differences in 
race, economic class, ethnicity, gender, and species construct our ideas 
about human–nonhuman relationships, we will still end up validating the 
conceptual dualisms and hierarchies that we are critiquing. In the former 
case the continuity perspective creates “yet another dualism: an uncom-
plicated opposition between women’s perceived unity with nature and 
male-associated culture’s alienation from it” (98). In the latter case the 
constructionist “emphasis on differences in gender, race, species, or other 
aspects of identity can deny the complexity of human and natural identi-
ties and lead to the hierarchical ranking of oppressions on the basis of 
importance or causality” (98).
 I want to follow Armbruster’s lead in discovering and fleshing out 
possibilities for thinking about this longstanding ecofeminist discussion. 
Methodologically, however, I want to travel down a different path, not 
because Armbruster’s is not clear and fruitful enough. To be sure, her 
call for ecofeminism to embrace poststructuralist theory in order to resist 
“recontainment” by dominant dualisms and hierarchies is an invaluable 
theoretical boundary crossing (99).1 And her reading of Ursula K. Le 
Guin’s “Buffalo Gals, Won’t You Come Out Tonight” (1987) is equally an 
invaluable and successful application of her poststructuralist ecofeminism 
to a work of literature. My effort in this chapter is to show how certain 
works of science fiction read alone or in combination have engaged with 
central ecofeminist issues at the same time as, and even before, such issues 
provoked theoretical deliberations in more academic settings.
 As ecofeminist works, Sally Miller Gearhart’s The Wanderground 
(1979), Le Guin’s Always Coming Home (1985), and Joan Slonczewski’s 
A Door Into Ocean (1986) envision healthy ecological spaces as the out-
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growths of the cultural valuing of the “feminine” and the containment and/
or absence of the “masculine”—a move characteristic of affinity ecofemi-
nism. These books narrate affinity, or as I will continue to call it, cultural 
ecofeminist possibility, all portraying women—and societies—who define 
themselves in ways encouraged by that branch of ecofeminism: against the 
dominant logic of patriarchy and through their own personal and local 
experiences, through collective histories, and/or through Earth-based spiri-
tual traditions. But these texts do not represent exclusive, uncontested cul-
tural ecofeminist positions. They balance and at times struggle with their 
cultural ecofeminist ideas and other ecofeminist positions. For this reason, 
Gearhart’s, Le Guin’s, and Slonczewski’s works perform within and among 
their narratives the critical dialogue important for ecofeminist theory then, 
in the formative years of ecofeminism, and even now, when such discus-
sions remain pedagogically and politically important. They stage within 
their fictions the very debate that ecofeminism grapples with as a trans-
formative environmentalist movement searching for ways to challenge the 
oppressions of women and nonhuman nature effectively, and to perform 
this challenge while maintaining the best theoretical and practical work of 
ecofeminism’s many iterations.
Sherry B. Ortner’s 1974 essay “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Cul-
ture?” helps set up contexts for discussing the differences between cul-
tural ecofeminism and more constructionist, rationalist ecofeminisms. An 
anthropologist, Ortner finds men’s subordination of women to be univer-
sal and asks what it is in every culture that leads to this subordination. 
She reasons that the pancultural oppression of women follows from the 
likewise pancultural tendency to identify women with nonhuman nature. 
Ortner borrows from Simone de Beauvoir to show that breasts, the uterus, 
menstruation, and pregnancy highlight humanity’s fundamental animal-
ity, our inescapable belonging to the class Mammalia. Since culture, by 
definition, values human engagement “in the process of generating and 
sustaining systems of meaningful forms (symbols, artifacts, etc.) by means 
of which humanity transcends the givens of natural existence,” patriarchy 
emerges as culture’s defense against whatever would remind civilization of 
humanity’s inability to fully realize this transcendence, including the men-
struating and lactating female (40). Women are thus forced to remain in 
the home, where they can exercise their “natural” roles as mothers to ani-
mal-like infants that are “utterly unsocialized,” “unable to walk upright,” 
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and unfamiliar with social language (45–46). “[W]oman’s body,” Ortner 
concludes, “seems to doom her to mere reproduction of life” (43). On the 
other hand, “the male . . . lacking natural creative functions, must (or has 
the opportunity to) assert his creativity externally, ‘artificially,’ through 
the medium of technology and symbols. In so doing, he creates relatively 
lasting, eternal, transcendent objects, while the woman creates only per-
ishables—human beings” (43). Under the logic of patriarchy, men are the 
agents of privileged, nonanimal culture; women are of a lower order.
 Anthropologist Melissa Leach is among those who have since critiqued 
Ortner’s argument, mainly because of its claims about the universality 
of patriarchally constructed woman–nature connections. And without a 
doubt Leach’s analysis of the Mende-speaking people of Western Africa, 
whose relationships with nonhuman nature disturb any simplified concep-
tion of culture as dependent upon oppressing women and nature, does 
much to dismantle such claims. But as a context for discussing the cul-
tural and rationalist threads of ecofeminist thought, Ortner’s research is 
still useful; for, by highlighting a perceived connection between women 
and nature, Ortner raises important questions about whether that con-
nection should be welcomed as valuable for social and ecological trans-
formation or challenged as falsely construed and in the end hazardous for 
feminist and environmentalist projects. Ortner favors the latter, character-
izing what Stacy Alaimo deems “feminist theory’s flight from nature” (4).
 Drawing from many of the same sources as deep ecology, cultural eco-
feminism posits an innate woman–nonhuman nature link and argues that 
this link should be embraced as a way of dealing with the social and envi-
ronmental problems inherent and evident in patriarchal culture.2 Develop-
ing in the late 1970s and early 1980s out of radical feminism’s repudiation 
of oppressive social systems and accentuation of ways of knowing and 
being that contest harsh masculinity, cultural ecofeminism dismantles 
patriarchy by prioritizing “feminine” values. Cultural ecofeminists “ele-
vate what they consider to be women’s virtues—caring, nurturing, interde-
pendence—and reject the individualist, rationalist, and destructive values 
typically associated with men” (Gruen 77). Lori Gruen, a critic of cultural 
ecofeminism, argues that the belief that women and nonhuman nature 
are connected works to devalue men as unconnected from nature and 
thus does nothing to restructure the hierarchal relation of privilege that 
feminism and other social movements have challenged for years. As Val 
Plumwood notes, ecofeminists of this “Cavern of Reversal” define their 
identities “by reversing the valuations of the dominant culture” (Feminism 
3). For cultural ecofeminists, though, the hierarchal relation of privilege is 
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not what is troubling. The direction of the privilege is. Judith Plant writes 
as a cultural ecofeminist: “Women’s values, centered around life-giving, 
must be revalued, elevated from their once subordinate role. What women 
know from experience needs recognition and respect. We have had genera-
tions of experience in conciliation, dealing with interpersonal conflicts in 
daily domestic life. We know how to feel for others because we have prac-
ticed it” (“Searching” 160).
 Plant does not challenge the validity of the presumption that strong 
interpersonal communication and empathy are innate in women, which 
other types of feminism and ecofeminism do challenge by labeling such 
characteristics as imposed upon women in patriarchal social systems. Her 
essay in Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein’s Reweaving the 
World is about what women, specifically, can bring to the bioregionalist 
project, a project advocating a more life-centered, interpersonal, and con-
nected view of local place. The thought that women are inherently closer 
to nature and are thus invaluable for the realization of bioregional ways of 
life is not a problem for cultural ecofeminists. What is a problem is when 
culture devalues its feminine categories and thus devalues the virtues nec-
essary for a more viable human relationship with nature. While still mani-
festing hierarchical thinking, cultural ecofeminism argues that privileging 
care and empathy for all human and nonhuman life, instead of privileging 
self-interest and the production of marketable goods, are reversals neces-
sary for an ecocentric, life-affirming culture to emerge.
 Asserting so-called feminine values is central to Andrée Collard’s eco-
feminism, too. Much like Plant, Collard centers her theorizing on the 
importance for environmentalism of accenting an essential woman–nature 
connection. She writes, “Ecology is woman-based almost by definition. 
Eco means house, logos means word, speech, thought. Thus ecology is 
the language of the house. Defined more formally, ecology is the study of 
the interconnectedness between all organisms and their surroundings—the 
house. As such, it requires a thorough knowledge and an intimate experi-
ence of the house” (137). As speakers of the language of the house, Col-
lard argues, women endure the domestic burdens relegated to them under 
patriarchal convention. Women can therefore empathize with the similarly 
abused nonhuman nature, making them better positioned to address and 
correct this latter abuse. Relatedly, cultural ecofeminism stresses the need 
for a collective history of women’s oppressions in patriarchy. One project 
of feminism as a whole is to draw attention to women’s history, but the 
goals of this attention vary. Cultural ecofeminism breaks from the liberal 
feminist endeavor to achieve equal rights and representation for women 
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using the methods of already existing sociopolitical institutions and instead 
seeks change by contrasting the modern history of women’s oppression 
with an ancient history allegedly permeated with prepatriarchal ideals 
such as kinship, egalitarianism, and nurturance. The goal of this juxtapo-
sition is epistemological; lacking knowledge of “what [women] were and 
therefore what [women] can be . . . encourages women to want incorpora-
tion into man’s world on an ‘equality’ basis, meaning that woman absorbs 
his ideologies, myths, history, etc. and loses all grounding in her own tra-
ditions” (Collard 8).
 Much of the work done in cultural ecofeminism involves revaluing 
matriarchal principles historically documented in archeological studies. 
In its spiritual forms cultural ecofeminism promotes the reemergence of 
ancient matriarchal belief systems that coincided in Minoan Crete and Old 
Europe, for example, with peace and respect for all life. Along with Marija 
Gimbutas, Riane Eisler, Starhawk (the author of the deep ecological and 
cultural ecofeminist science fiction book The Fifth Sacred Thing [1993]), 
Charlene Spretnak, Joanna Macy, and Carol P. Christ, Collard is a thinker 
in this tradition. She and others call on modern culture to embrace or at 
least adopt some values of Earth-based spiritualities historically seen in 
goddess-worshipping cultures. “In cultures where the cycle of life is the 
underlying metaphor,” Starhawk writes, “religious objects reflect its imag-
ery, showing us women—Goddesses—ripe in pregnancy or giving birth. 
The vulva and its abstracted form, the triangle, along with breasts, circles, 
eyes, and spirals, are signs of the sacred” (175). According to Spretnak, 
many feminists came to ecofeminism after their exposure, through his-
torical and archeological research, to such an ancient religion “that hon-
ored the female and seemed to have as its ‘good book’ nature itself” (5). 
What was intriguing for early ecofeminists “was the sacred link between 
the Goddess in her many guises and totemic animals and plants, sacred 
groves, and womblike caves, in the moon-rhythm blood of menses, the 
ecstatic dance—the experience of knowing Gaia, her voluptuous contours 
and fertile plains, her flowing waters that give life, her animal teachers” 
(Spretnak 5).
 That cultural ecofeminism is caught up in idealism is one of the main 
criticisms leveled against it. Critics of cultural ecofeminism believe that 
valuing a woman–nature connection is an ineffective liberatory strategy 
that fails to consider and dismantle rationally the logics of the social, 
political, and economic systems responsible for dominations of all types. 
Susan Prentice identifies cultural ecofeminism’s idealism as its worst char-
acteristic. Advocating an understanding of systems of power and domina-
80  c h a p t e r  t h r e e
tion more sophisticated than what cultural ecofeminism offers, she writes, 
“By locating the origin of the domination of women and nature in male 
consciousness, eco-feminism makes political and economic systems sim-
ply derivative of male thinking” (9). For Prentice the assumption that 
men “‘think wrong’” and that “‘biology is destiny’” “trivializes several 
centuries of history, economics and politics by simply glancing over the 
formidable obstacles of social structures” (9). Janet Biehl also voices this 
critique. She chides cultural ecofeminism for narrowly and crudely focus-
ing on patriarchy as the cause of oppression, and for assuming that priori-
tizing women’s supposed biologically determined predispositions is a way 
to eradicate oppression. What about the state, Biehl asks, which histori-
cally as an institution has oppressed women, nature, and men alike? Rac-
ism is rooted in ethnic chauvinisms and economic motivations unrelated to 
gender conflict. And capitalism’s profit motive and growth imperative have 
instigated an entire range of oppressions directed at whoever and what-
ever gets in the way of their realization. Drawing on Prentice’s analysis 
Biehl concludes, “Systems of domination like capitalism, statism, and eth-
nic oppressions—and sexism itself—have a ‘history, logic, and struggle’ of 
their own”; in no way does elevating women’s values above men’s values 
engage the procedures necessary to foster real change (50).
 A strong advocate of rationalist feminism, Biehl also questions the 
validity of cultural ecofeminism’s historical references. Goddess worship 
does not guarantee a benign culture, she argues, yet cultural ecofemi-
nists seem to honor such worship as “the magic carpet by which we can 
reclaim the ‘women’s values’ of the Neolithic” (33). Nor does the presence 
of “full-figured female figurines” in ancient archeological sites confirm 
that the relative peacefulness of early Neolithic cultures resulted from an 
embrace and worship of “a generative female principle” (34). The societies 
of the early Neolithic were complex, and to suggest that their sociopoliti-
cal dynamics grew simply out of goddess worship is to ignore the range 
of social, political, and cultural intricacies that constructed the Neolithic 
temper. Biehl also references archeological evidence of human sacrifice in 
Minoan Crete, which suggests a cruelness in that society overlooked in 
cultural ecofeminism’s idealizations.
 Biehl concludes, “With an ecological ethics grounded in the potential-
ity of human beings to consciously and rationally create a free ecologi-
cal society, we can begin to develop an ecological political movement that 
challenges the existing order on the grounds that it denies both humans 
and nonhumans their full actualization” (130). Biehl’s loyalty to rea-
soned democratic process is crucial, as she values the modes of critical 
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engagement necessary for transformation while at the same time denying 
legitimacy to gender valuations that would lock women’s identities onto 
eternal, nonnegotiable, and politically feeble concepts of femininity. But 
as Elizabeth Carlassare points out, such loyalty comes at the expense of 
discounting “the work of cultural ecofeminists with their emphasis on 
transforming consciousness, reclaiming women’s history, and fostering a 
woman-based culture and spirituality” (229). Perhaps there is something 
valuable not in locating a simple continuity between women and nonhu-
man nature, but at least in esteeming as a vital part of the ecofeminist 
dialogue those ideas that have come about as a result of thinkers whose 
intellectual tendencies move them toward more personal and spiritual 
transformative modes.3 As Carlassare notes,
Criticism of ecofeminism’s essentializing tendencies is important to 
insure critical self-reflexivity and for examining the ways in which 
essentializing may sometimes work against the goals of women’s libera-
tion by homogenizing the diversity of women’s experiences. Dismissing 
cultural ecofeminism on this basis, however, precludes the possibility of 
learning from this position and obscures the legitimacy of the variety 
of positions and discursive forms under ecofeminism’s umbrella. (231)4
Published five years after Ortner’s anthropological study of patriarchy, and 
a decade before ecofeminism rose to prominence as a critical perspective 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Gearhart’s The Wanderground is the 
story of the Hill Women, an all-female society living nomadically in a wil-
derness far away from the “City” and its oppressions. Driving the plot is 
the encroachment of men from the City into the wilderness where, years 
before, various expressions of male potency—aggressive sexuality, mili-
tarism, and destructive technologies—were made impotent by what the 
Hill Women call both the “Revolt of the Earth” and the “Revolt of the 
Mother,” a juxtaposition of “Earth” and “Mother” characteristic of cul-
tural ecofeminism (158). Explaining the Revolt one of the Hill Women 
says, “‘Once upon a time . . . there was one rape too many. . . . The earth 
finally said ‘no.’ There was no storm, no earthquake, no tidal wave, no 
specific moment to mark its happening. It only became apparent that it 
had happened, and that it had happened everywhere’” (158). Guns no 
longer worked in the wilderness, machines broke down, animals refused 
to serve men, and the male libido waned. As imagined by Gearhart, this 
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Revolt represents disdain for mythologies of Earth and its processes as 
tools of a violently retributive god, demonstrating instead Earth as a Gaian 
female subject peaceably protecting herself against men, who have brought 
violence upon women, animals, and land. The effects of the Revolt are dis-
appearing, however. Rumors of male virility’s return outside the City are 
leading men to test their sexual strength through acts of rape and group 
“Cunt Hunts” in the country, generating a fear in the Hill Women that 
“woman energy might again be drained as it had been for millennia before 
the Revolt of the Earth” (130).
 The Wanderground supports an inverted masculine/feminine value 
hierarchy. The novel is self-reflexively aware of its good women/bad men 
dichotomy, presenting one character, Jacqua, who says to herself early in 
the book, “‘It is too simple . . . to condemn them all or to praise all of 
us’” (2). But right away Jacqua declares, “‘for the sake of earth and all she 
holds, that simplicity must be our creed’” (2). This condemnation of men 
and praise of women is a necessary defensive and offensive mantra for the 
Hill Women, for their historical experiences do not reveal anything decent 
in the male sex. In addition, this mantra is key for the novel as a cultural 
ecofeminist thought experiment and radical feminist speculative text moti-
vated by its historical moment to narrate female subjectivity against patri-
archal society’s male gaze, as well as to narrate female possibility when 
released from this gaze’s physical and psychological oppressions.
 As a result of the Revolt and the subsequent escape of the Hill Wom-
en’s predecessors to the wilderness, women have been left free to evolve 
independently of the patriarchal logic of domination. This narrative move 
facilitates Gearhart’s speculation on the qualities inherent in women as 
free subjects living on what Alaimo discusses as “undomesticated ground,” 
nature as “a space of feminist possibility” (23). Although to be expected in 
a science fiction novel bordering on fantasy, these qualities, these estrang-
ing nova, stand out as being more ecological, more embedded and inter-
relational, than the qualities that the text argues men possess as members 
of a fundamentally disconnected sex. The Hill Women fly, or “windride.” 
They have a built-in instinctual mechanism called a “lonth” that acts as 
a flight response allowing involuntary kinesthetic control, demonstrat-
ing their return to an animal nature that modernity has sedated. The Hill 
Women can also communicate telepathically with other Hill Women and 
with flora and fauna, a phenomenon called “mindstretch” that requires 
traits associated in cultural ecofeminist thought with the feminine: 
“‘Meaningful communication,’” a Hill Women lesson goes, “‘is the meet-
ing of two vessels, equally vulnerable, equally receptive, and equally desir-
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ous of hearing’” (115). Finally, the Hill Women engage in a ritual called 
“earthtouch” that uses mindstretching to send energy drawn from Earth 
by one Hill Woman to another in need of this energy. Combined, mind-
stretch and earthtouch represent a dynamic, deep ecological spiritual and 
communicative web of interdependencies between one woman and other 
women, and women and nonhuman nature. This web is an ecological phe-
nomenon permitted to develop as a result of the absence of anti-ecological 
and enforced patriarchal power.
 Just as cultural ecofeminism does more theoretically to elevate what it 
conceives as women’s values than simply to connect women and nature in 
an essential bond, so too does The Wanderground go beyond just concep-
tualizing women as windriders with more ecologically sound instinctual 
and communicative awarenesses. The novel also offers up programs for 
reviewing and challenging modern cultural tendencies that oppress women 
and nonhuman nature. The apparent essentialism of Gearhart’s book thus 
borders on being “a positive tool of liberation,” as Noël Sturgeon notes 
of selected essentialist rhetorics (9). This political possibility ultimately 
wanes, as I will show below, but the first of these programs motivates eco-
feminist practice by uniting the oppressed through their individual histo-
ries. Against a destructive patriarchal memory that recalls the potency men 
used to have outside the City, and thus reinstates the violent misogyny 
of the past after the effects of the Revolt have worn off, the women of 
The Wanderground stress the importance of a collective and constructive 
memory that allows members of their liberated society to understand their 
social history and what motivates their emancipatory project. Thus, while 
the men of the City continually seek to impose and perpetuate a master 
narrative of patriarchal history—requiring every woman to be married, 
allowing men to have several wives, and instituting curfews on women—
the women of the country seek local stories that will illustrate what they 
are escaping from and to, as well as inform their future. Nowhere in this 
collective history do the women subscribe to a master narrative of their 
culture’s experience. Instead,
From countless seemingly disconnected episodes the women had pieced 
together a larger picture so that now they had some sense of what had 
happened during those last days in the City. Over the years as women 
had joined them the memory vessels had been added to: more and more 
stories, more and more horrors, and sometimes a narrative that brought 
with it some hope or humor. As a woman shared, she became part of all 
their history. (23)
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As a cultural ecofeminist text, then, The Wanderground posits compet-
ing historical paradigms—one masculine, one feminine—that use histori-
cal references either to recreate the social conditions of a predetermined, 
univocal social system or to create freeing conditions based on an ecology 
of private experiences.
 Second, as the earthtouch ritual shows, the Hill Women are rooted in a 
deep ecological, Earth-based spirituality that is vital to their selfhood, their 
kinship, and their sense of place. Indeed, advocating such a spirituality is 
imperative for cultural ecofeminism. Earthtouch emphasizes what Riane 
Eisler, a cultural historian, calls a “partnership model of society” (33). 
Developing out of the Gaia tradition, which regards Earth as “a living 
system designed to maintain and to nurture life,” the partnership model 
opposes the “dominator society,” favoring instead a worldview founded 
upon ancient spiritualities in which “the world was viewed as the great 
Mother, a living entity who in both her temporal and spiritual manifesta-
tions creates and nurtures all forms of life” (Eisler 30). Partnership requires 
empathetic nurturance, and thus from a cultural ecofeminist perspective 
can only emerge given a revaluing of the feminine. In The Wanderground, 
partnership in earthtouch is exclusive to those whose feminine capacities 
have been permitted to develop in the absence of masculine power. As a 
political statement Gearhart’s is radically essentialist. To posit a separat-
ist, feminist space where a spiritual ecological conscience can thrive is a 
key theoretical move for ecofeminist science fiction. As unsophisticated as 
this move may be, it initiates speculation on what it is in modern culture 
that undermines the human potential for realizing such an ecological con-
science: masculine aggression, perhaps, but ideologies of dominance more 
accurately. So while Gearhart’s story “reinforces the exclusivity of the cat-
egories of male and female”—something that science fiction scholar Jenny 
Wolmark sees as problematical for its adherence to the same-old gender 
assumptions and the resulting failure to question these assumptions—such 
reinforcement is a viable starting point for an ecofeminist project that 
endorses a worldview contrary to prevailing dogma (85).
 Rounding out Gearhart’s programs for instituting change is The Wan-
derground’s look at the dominant ideology against which the Hill Women 
elevate their collection of personal histories and their feminine partner-
ship, an ideology embodied by men and their collective space, the techno-
logical City. The dystopian City is the institutional space for both men, the 
oppressors, and technology, the tool of their oppressions. Answering why 
the Hill Women, with their extraordinary powers, refuse to seek violent 
revenge on the City with technological weaponry, one of the Hill Women 
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insists, “‘That’s the mistake the men made, sisterlove, and made over and 
over again. Just because it was possible they thought it had to be done. 
They came near to destroying the earth—and may yet—with that notion’” 
(145). Thus, the essential quality of men in the novel is being “‘Driven in 
their own madness to destroy themselves and us and any living thing’” 
with whatever technology is available (3). Even using the tool of language, 
men in the novel impose oppressive aesthetic standards upon women 
(“streamlined,” “limited,” “dependent,” “constantly available”) (63).
 The Wanderground succeeds as a radical statement of cultural eco-
feminism. It establishes and contrasts what it means to be a woman 
both in the oppressive context of patriarchy and in a liberated context. 
As women unchained, the Hill Women restore and develop further their 
innate feminine potentials. Vulnerable, receptive, pacifist, interconnected, 
wild—these terms describe both the natural world that Gearhart imagines 
and the women she envisions evolving free from masculine oppressions, 
women empowered by a Revolt of the Earth-Mother to create themselves 
as subjects who value the qualities of the feminine traditionally dispar-
aged in patriarchy. To make this empowerment clearer, Gearhart sketches 
a woman living in the dystopian City as an unmistakably powerless object 
of the male gaze: “a thickly painted face, lacquerstiffened hair, her body 
encased in a low-cut tight-fitting dress that terminated at mid-thigh” (63). 
This image of stiffness, encasement, and termination reveals the misogyny 
against which the Hill Women are fighting, a misogyny that permits men 
to exercise reckless power over women and sustain a civilization of domi-
nance over women and other-than-human nature.
 Prefiguring the anti-essentialist insights of Prentice and Biehl, feminist 
literary critic June Howard notes of Gearhart’s book,
The evaluation of “feminine” and “masculine” qualities asserted by 
radical feminism and by The Wanderground . . . lends support to the 
idea that differences between men and women are “natural,” and thus 
endangers the basis of our critique of existing social relations and our 
belief that they can be changed. The disagreement is between those who 
accept and build upon the common-sense observation that the sexes dif-
fer, and those . . . who argue that gender identity is constructed by com-
plex, socially and historically specific structures. (72)
From Howard’s point of view The Wanderground promises nothing trans-
formative and is actually dangerous in its maintenance of ahistorical gen-
der divisions. To achieve successfully a more fully developed ecofeminism, 
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Gearhart could have further contemplated the simplicity of her novel’s 
universal condemnation of men—the simplicity that her character Jacqua 
admits. But she passes up this opportunity in favor of cultural ecofeminist 
polemic. In the novel there exists briefly a potential dissipation of essen-
tialist definitions of men: the book’s Gentles are “Men who knew that the 
[Hill Women] were the only hope for the earth’s survival” (2). However, 
this potential is quickly weakened by a subsequent description of the Gen-
tles as “Men who, knowing that maleness touched women only with the 
accumulated hatred of centuries, touched no women at all” (2). The Gen-
tles understand their instinctive male aggressiveness and thus choose to 
abstain from physical contact with women altogether. They know them-
selves as innately hostile male bodies that require self-policing to ensure 
the protection of women and nonhuman nature.
 Of course, this understanding of the Gentles is Jacqua’s, revealed in 
the passage in which she reflects on and endorses the simplicity of the 
Hill Women’s denunciation of all men. Gearhart’s ecofeminist project still 
shows promise of theoretical complexity, though, when it introduces other 
Hill Women who question inscribing a predetermined, inborn aggressive-
ness on the Gentles. Reacting to the developed communicative powers 
of one of the Gentles, the Hill Woman Betha admits that “her absolutes 
began to get fuzzy around the edges when she tried to make them apply to 
a man like Aaron” (115). But again Gearhart does not explore gender dif-
ference as more complex than cultural ecofeminism declares. Only women 
can share power peacefully, her novel insists: “men—even Gentles—found 
it difficult or impossible really to share power” (115). What Betha sees in 
this Gentle does not instigate a revision of the Hill Women’s established 
beliefs. Rather, his “understanding of the essential fundamental knowledge 
[that] women and men cannot yet, may not ever, love one another without 
violence” instead impresses on her a slightly different perception of the 
Gentles than her perception of men in general (115). The Gentles are dif-
ferent from the men of the City merely because they realize and contain 
their natural brutality as well as share the Hill Women’s view of human 
sexual relations.
 Gearhart’s final opportunity to render a more complex ecofeminism 
comes when the Hill Women engage with the Gentles in political process. 
The Gentles have noticed that the increased violence against women out-
side the City correlates with the number of Hill Women on rotation in the 
City, and they want to meet with the Hill Women to discuss this trend. As 
fewer women from the Wanderground make their way in disguise into the 
City to keep an eye on the conditions there, more abuses against the Hill 
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Women happen in the country. Before the meeting in which the Gentles 
share this crucial observation, the Hill Women debate whether they should 
grant the Gentles this meeting at all. Though the meeting does happen, 
it does not take place without opposition: “to some of the women it did 
not matter that the gentles were men sworn to isolate themselves from 
women; if they were men then there was no reason for concourse with 
them” (126). But the eventual decision to let several women meet with 
the men—while greeted unenthusiastically and permitted only under the 
assurance that the individual women speak only for themselves and not 
for the group as a whole—signals a step toward a more socially conscious 
ecofeminism.
 In the end, however, the women maintain their essentialism. Their 
fear of universal masculine aggression prevents them from opening up 
productive conversation with the Gentles about how both groups can 
work together to dodge the intruders from the City. Moments after their 
pledge to communicate the Gentles’ observations to other Hill Women, 
the women return to their separatism after learning that the Gentles have 
discovered in themselves telepathic powers similar to the Hill Women’s. 
Responding to the Gentles’ claim that these powers are nonviolent, Evona 
says, “‘Nonviolent? Never. You know what will happen. You’ll use your 
new power all right. You’ll use it, perfect it, manufacture it, package it, sell 
it, and tell the world that it’s clean and new because it comes from a dif-
ferent breed of men. But it’s just another fancy prick to invade the world 
with’” (179). Evona’s response is laden with the types of ideological barri-
ers that other modes of feminism and ecofeminism avoid in their drives to 
add more complexity to ecofeminist conversations. The Hill Women’s atti-
tude toward the Gentles does not encourage the breakdown of their essen-
tialism into a mode of thought more open to recognizing the potential for 
anyone, man or woman, to exercise social and ecological consciousness, 
and thus for progressive social and ecological change to grow out of dem-
ocratic conversation.
The Wanderground’s brand of ecofeminism defines men as inherently 
oppressive and liberated women as ecologically conscious. Always Com-
ing Home’s ecofeminism is more critical than that, even though Le Guin 
does reflect several facets of cultural ecofeminist thinking. The Kesh soci-
ety of her future history interweaves human culture and nonhuman nature 
in a way that breaks down the culture/nature dualism to favor instead a 
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spirituality of individual, social, and cultural embeddedness in nonhuman 
nature. This deep ecological, cultural ecofeminist ecospirituality informs 
the Kesh’s social organization and treatment of Earth, as it also combats 
a patriarchal quest for dominance over nature that would undermine the 
lived union with nonhuman nature that the Kesh have achieved. Further, 
the Kesh’s gender identifications are analogous to those of cultural ecofem-
inism: the Kesh connect “woman and animal . . . throughout [their] sexual 
and intellectual teaching,” a connection that the narrator of this passage 
declares is not used to devalue woman (420).
 A complex symbol, the “heyiya-if,” illustrates Kesh spirituality and 
gender identifications. Signifying ecological connection with its dual spi-
rals growing inward, as well as openness to change with its center empty 
and refusing to finalize that connection, the heyiya-if permeates and 
defines the Kesh’s cultural activities, their dance choreography, stage pro-
ductions, town planning, art, musical instruments, and meditative prac-
tices. The heyiya-if informs the practices of the Kesh. They make “no 
provision for a relation of ownership between living beings,” arranging 
their society around not just a respect for life—a cultural ecofeminist care 
ethic—but also a deep ecological sense of their place within the ecosystem 
(43). The “Earth People” of the Kesh’s “Five Houses of Earth” include 
“the earth itself, rocks and dirt and geological formations, the moon, 
all springs, streams and lakes of fresh water, all human beings currently 
alive, game animals, domestic animals, individual animals, domestic and 
ground-dwelling birds, and all plants that are gathered, planted, or used 
by human beings” (43–44). The “Sky People” of their “Four Houses of 
the Sky” include “the sun and stars, the oceans, wild animals not hunted 
as game, all animals, plants, and persons considered as the species rather 
than as an individual, human beings considered as a tribe, people, or spe-
cies, all people and beings in dreams, visions, and stories, most kinds of 
birds, the dead, and the unborn” (44). Here, Patrick D. Murphy’s thoughts 
on matrilineal societies are useful: “In matrilineal societies among the first 
nations, . . . kinship is observed in terms of extended families, lodges, 
clans, and entire tribes, not nuclear family structures. As a result, it is more 
accurate to say that there are not others in such cultures, only anothers, 
that is, beings who are neither self nor other in any absolute dichotomy 
but are familiar, related, and connected with us” (Farther 88).
 A specter haunts the ennatured Kesh in the form of a masculinity 
once prevalent in the aptly named “City of Man”—our own Industrial 
Age, our now—and now reemerging in the future world of the Kesh in a 
patriarchally organized warrior group called the Condor, or the Dayao. 
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Representing a time “‘when [people] lived outside the world,’” “a sort of 
peninsula sticking out from the mainland, very thickly built upon, very 
heavily populated, very obscure, and very far away,” the City of Man still 
exists in the world of Always Coming Home in the form of the danger-
ous industrial toxins modernity left behind (Le Guin, Always 153). With 
the Condor this City of Man takes its present form in militaristic aspira-
tion. They want to resurrect the “Great Weapons” of the past, a project 
identified in Le Guin’s book with the essence of masculinity. One weapon, 
a tanklike vehicle named the “Destroyer,” “push[es] through a wall of 
bricks, thundering and shaking through the ruins it made, huge and blind, 
with a thick penis-snout” (349–50). A figurative rape this is, one also 
extended to the other-than-human world: “the Destroyer push[es] against 
the oak trees . . . , push[es] them over” (350). In the masculine culture of 
the Condor, a “man-dominant” culture, the “identification [of woman and 
animal] is used to devalue” (420, emphasis added).
 Le Guin’s book traces one Kesh woman’s navigation through this mas-
culine “outside the world” as well as her experiences of living life under 
the cultural paradigms dominant during the City of Man and now resur-
facing as a force against which the Kesh’s ecologically conscious Valley 
culture must struggle. North Owl is the daughter of a woman of a Val-
ley House, Willow, and a man of the oppressive Condor people, Terter 
Abhao. As one of the Kesh she is among the world as a child enough to 
recognize “the dirt [as] the mother of [her] mothers” and to make her 
coming-of-age ritual one of absolute in(ter)dependence in the wilderness 
(19). However, because North Owl’s father left the Valley so early in her 
life to command an army, she has grown up with the title “half-person” 
(19). At eight years old she feels incomplete. Terter’s return to the Valley 
with his army prompts North Owl to reflect, “He was home, he was here, 
our family was whole; now everything was as it should be, balanced, com-
plete; and so it would not change” (30). But she soon finds out that her 
fantasies of familial completion, informed by a patriarchal concept of the 
family, contradict the greater ecological union valued in Kesh culture.
 When North Owl leaves the Valley to join her father and experience 
Condor culture we get a deeper view of this culture’s supporting struc-
tures, the linguistic, religious, and social configurations that underlie Con-
dor tyranny. In this way, Le Guin’s ecofeminism moves away from strict 
cultural ecofeminist reasoning and into a more critical mode of ecofemi-
nist understanding, one motivated to explore the historically contingent, 
rather than fixed, features of patriarchy. First, unlike the Kesh’s language, 
the Condor’s recognizes hierarchy; Terter renames North Owl “‘Ayatyu,’” 
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“‘woman born above others,’” while he also refers to the people of other 
towns as “people of no account” (186, 189). Condor is a hierarchal desig-
nation symbolizing people who “go in silence, above all the others” (189). 
Second, this linguistic encoding of hierarchy goes hand in hand with the 
patriarchal religion of the Condor people, a monotheism with only one 
person—a man, “The Condor”—able to interpret the word of “One” 
(193). Of religious practice North Owl observes, “Women were not 
allowed into the sacred parts of their heyimas, which they called daharda; 
we could come no nearer than the vestibule in front of the daharda to lis-
ten to the singing inside on certain great festivals. Women have no part 
in the intellectual life of the Dayao; they are kept in, but left out” (200). 
Furthermore, “True Condor warriors were to be one thing only, reflections 
of One, setting themselves apart from all the rest of existence, washing it 
from their minds and souls, killing the world, so that they could remain 
perfectly pure” (201). And finally, with such language and religion comes 
an attendant social and familial structure. North Owl narrates,
Certain men belonging to certain families are called True Condors, and 
others like them are called . . . One-Warriors. No other people are called 
Condors. Men who are not of those families are all called tyon, farmers, 
and must serve the True Condors. Women of those families are called 
Condor Women, and must serve Condor men, but may give orders to 
tyon and hontik. The hontik are all other women, foreigners, and ani-
mals. (193)
In contrast to the “anotherness” of which Murphy speaks, the Condor’s 
social reasoning embraces an otherness steeped in a strict division between 
male warriors—and their approved servants—and “women, foreigners, 
and animals.”
 Tied to such linguistic, religious, and social structures, the Condor’s 
masculine oppressiveness loses the ahistoricity and immovability of the 
masculinity that is represented in The Wanderground. The Condor’s liv-
ing “outside the world” is indeed a product of a certain masculinity, but 
grounded in historically contingent structures, this masculinity is not rigid. 
That the Condor “believed that animals and women were contemptible 
and unimportant” and that “Condors’ wives were expected to have babies 
continuously, since that is what One made women for” demonstrates that 
beliefs and expectations motivate such patriarchal notions (345). If patri-
archy is a sociopolitical construct driven by belief and expectation, then it 
proves to be far more malleable than if it were biologically defined and, as 
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Gearhart’s book largely suggests, inevitable. In the same way, the apparent 
feminine qualities of Kesh culture are more the product of the pervasive 
heyiya-if—a linguistic, religious, and social device—than they are of an 
inevitable feminine principle.
 In addition to its content, the form of Le Guin’s book draws attention 
to the artifactual nature of gendered categories. Always Coming Home 
contains excerpts of literature, artwork, maps, and other objects of Kesh 
and Condor existence. The effect of this cutting and pasting is an emphasis 
on the constructedness of the Kesh’s ecological conscience and the Con-
dor’s tyranny, both of which are products of a set of historical relics and 
not fundamental to sex. The heyiya-if produces and is produced by the 
ecological mind-set of the Kesh just as the Condor’s crimes feed and are 
fed by their hierarchical religious language. Social change, it seems, is pos-
sible given transformations in the frameworks that make up any cultural 
system. While North Owl’s journey from living with the Kesh and inside 
the nonhuman community to living with the Condor and outside this com-
munity, ultimately to return to the Kesh, represents a journey between 
opposite ends of a gendered spectrum, Always Coming Home does not 
frame this spectrum as natural and something to be dealt with using sep-
aratist strategies. As a result, Le Guin’s book contributes much to eco-
feminist theorizing, embracing much in cultural ecofeminist thought but 
positing additional, more complex theoretical questions.
If we evaluate The Wanderground, Always Coming Home, and Sloncze-
wski’s A Door Into Ocean using a strict cultural ecofeminist rubric, then 
their authors’ creations of separate spaces for the ideological positions 
they critique and celebrate display quite adequately the gender associa-
tions upon which cultural ecofeminism bases its thinking. The Wander-
ground’s potently masculine, aggressively sexual, and technological City 
invades an ecofeminist wilderness of liberated and highly evolved women. 
Always Coming Home’s reestablished City of Man, which like its ances-
tral Industrial Age lives “outside the world,” intrudes upon a revived eco-
centric culture and this culture’s Earth-based spirituality. A Door Into 
Ocean’s colonialist and patriarchal culture of planet Valedon threatens 
the sovereign, all-female, all-water world Shora, whose inhabitants have a 
remarkable knowledge of ecology and a strong sense of place. Slonczew-
ski’s clear gendering of colonialist politics and ecological wisdom as male 
and female, respectively, operates in much the same way as Gearhart’s and 
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Le Guin’s gendering of similar ideological stances—as cultural ecofemi-
nist polemic. But like Always Coming Home’s ecofeminism, A Door Into 
Ocean’s goes beyond this polemic to fashion more complex understand-
ings of gender and thus more effective liberatory strategies for women and 
nonhuman nature.
 A shift toward a more critical position characterizes Slonczewski’s eco-
feminism, but as with Always Coming Home this shift does not involve a 
wholesale dismissal of cultural ecofeminist ideas. Read together, Le Guin’s 
and Slonczewski’s books provide a full sense of what I believe is the eco-
feminist position they both ultimately participate in and argue for, a posi-
tion that is aligned with the ecofeminist Ynestra King’s resistance to an 
academic fragmentation of the movement into dichotomous theoretical 
brands. I will explicate A Door Into Ocean within this context shortly, 
after taking a moment to note that King’s dialectical ecofeminism—a 
label I am adopting from Catriona Sandilands—at once rejects essential-
ist gender associations and revalues nurturance, interdependence, and 
other subordinate yet more ecologically conscious precepts.5 What sets this 
ecofeminism apart from the cultural ecofeminism of Plant, Collard, and 
Gearhart is its anti-essentialist stance; what sets it apart from the rational-
ist feminism of Prentice and Biehl is its open-mindedness to alternative 
forms of critical engagement, such as spirituality, intuition, passivity, and 
emotion.
 King argues that ecofeminism must be revised to embrace the more 
complex social conscience of rationalist positions while still preserving the 
ecological conscience of cultural ecofeminism. She admits that in choosing 
nature over culture and feminine values over masculine values, cultural 
ecofeminism does not adequately question these illusory dualisms. Dem-
onstrating a more constructionist standpoint she writes, “women’s eco-
logical sensitivity and life orientation is a socialized perspective that could 
be socialized right out of [them] depending on [their] day-to-day lives” 
(23). Continuing, she notes, “There is no reason to believe that women 
placed in positions of patriarchal power will act any differently from men” 
(23). Women’s ecological sensitivity is context-specific, not universal. Just 
as women can be healers, nurturers, or defenders of nonhuman nature, 
given different cultural contexts they might also oppose these traits. Like-
wise, whereas men can be culturally programmed to be militaristic, other 
contexts might determine them to be caring.
 Such critical positions on gender and gendered value categories help 
free ecofeminism from some potentially devastating theoretical and practi-
cal limitations, the same limitations that hinder The Wanderground from 
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today providing a more effective and applicable critique. In King’s eco-
feminism the transformative impulse is not tied to the idea that change 
can happen only within a supposedly universal feminine social or spiri-
tual framework, and in the absence of an equally universal masculinity. 
Instead, ecofeminist reform begins in comprehending gender assumptions 
as constructed social phenomena. King’s final image of a more effective 
ecofeminism is one that welcomes a multiplicity of views not strictly con-
structionist or rationalist:
Ecofeminism suggests . . . a recognition that although the nature-culture 
dualism is a product of culture, we can nonetheless consciously choose 
not to sever the woman-nature connection by joining male culture. 
Rather, we can use it as a vantage point for creating a different kind of 
culture and politics that would integrate intuitive, spiritual, and rational 
forms of knowledge, embracing both science and magic insofar as they 
enable us to transform the nature-culture distinction and to envision 
and create a free, ecological society. (23)
King blends cultural ecofeminism and rationalist feminism in a way that 
creates a new category for the movement, a category deeply concerned 
with removing the extremes of these two positions while embracing what 
is most valuable in each. Such an ecofeminism understands woman–nature 
connections, man/nature disconnections, and nature/culture dualisms as 
malleable cultural products that must be evaluated using a range of criti-
cal voices and tools, from the engaged democratic processes of rational-
ist feminism to the deeply personal, ecospiritual reflections of cultural 
ecofeminism.
 As with Gearhart’s and Le Guin’s speculative fictions, Slonczewski’s 
novel shares with cultural ecofeminism the dual goals of censuring patri-
archy’s social and ecological oppressions as well as highlighting the eco-
logical conscience associated with women. And like Le Guin’s book, 
Slonczewski’s develops its ecofeminist position further by adding a level 
of complexity characteristic of the dialectical ecofeminism just reviewed. 
Shora’s inhabitants, Sharers, are much like the women of The Wander-
ground and the Village dwellers of Always Coming Home in that they 
have traits demonstrating their deep connection to place. Physically, the 
“breathmicrobes” of the Shoran atmosphere turn Sharers’ skin deep pur-
ple, a preventable phenomenon they accept as part of dwelling on Shora. 
Their lungs have evolved to allow long stints of breathlessness under 
water. Conceptually, the notion of sharing that gives Shora’s inhabitants 
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their name erases the hierarchies inherent in dualistic, patriarchal think-
ing; their expressions “learnsharing, worksharing, [and] lovesharing” nul-
lify any paradigm denying that “‘Each force has an equal and opposite 
force’” (36). And intellectually Sharers understand their lives as dependent 
on an intact ecological web. When asked why she does not spray the liv-
ing rafts, upon which Sharers make their homes, with an insecticide when 
parasites threaten them, Merwen—a native of Shora—responds, “‘Then 
seasilk would choke the raft. And fingershells would go hungry, and tube-
worms die of the poison; then fish and octopus would have nothing, and 
what would Sharers eat?’” (60). Their physical, conceptual, and intellec-
tual embeddedness in ecological place sets the Sharers apart from their 
patriarchal oppressors, whose intrusion into Shora constitutes much of the 
plot of Slonczewski’s novel.
 Valedon’s people, Valans, know the Sharers as “women-like creatures 
who lived in the endless sea, women whose men were never seen, who 
subsisted on seaworms and could dive deep beyond light’s reach with-
out going mad” (9). This perspective shrouds the Sharers in a mystery of 
otherness that for the Valans justifies attempts at their exploitation by a 
patriarchy cemented to hierarchical value structures. Historically Valedon 
had a native population, known derogatorily as “Trolls,” that “passed 
away when the godlike Primes”—who were modern humans, but are now 
extinct due to nuclear catastrophe—“came to remodel the planet . . . to 
human standards” (36). As “creatures,” Sharers, too, are threatened by a 
new manifestation of power; the rulers of the universal political system of 
which Valedon is a part—the Patriarchy—want to open up Shora for min-
eral exploration and textile markets. Sharer compliance is necessary for 
this to happen, but since increased economic exploitation threatens the life 
forms of Shora, such compliance will not happen. Valan trade there has 
already brought on much ocean noise, drowning out the communications 
of animals essential to Shoran ecological integrity. The traders’ applica-
tions of poisons to the Shoran sea has also threatened life. Thus the Shar-
ers defend their planet against these, and many more, intrusions.
 The Patriarchy was formed to regulate independent governments 
away from the dangerous uses of military power that ended the reign of 
the Primes. But the events of A Door Into Ocean suggest little distinction 
between the violent use of nuclear weaponry by the Primes and the violent 
use of economic weaponry by those now in the Patriarchy. The Patriarchy 
claims to follow “the lesson of the dead gods: too many people smashed 
too many atoms—and planets, in the end,” but its support of Valedon’s 
social, political, and economic exploitation of Shora demonstrates that it 
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fails to see this exploitation as another way of smashing planets (21). In the 
same way that Le Guin extrapolates the Condor from the poisoned soci-
ety of the Industrial Age, Slonczewski relates the Patriarchy to the extinct 
Primes to urge a radical move away from the logic of domination and its 
consequential social, political, and ecological abuses. This concern about 
patriarchy is not specific to cultural ecofeminism. As a feminist mode, eco-
feminism is always critical of patriarchy’s logic of domination. But explicit 
in A Door Into Ocean is the cultural ecofeminist view of “feminine” ways 
of knowing and being as promising an alternative needed to move toward 
a more ecologically conscious society and politics. In this way the cultural 
ecofeminist moments of Slonczewski’s book share much with their equiva-
lent moments in Gearhart’s book.
 The stark contrast between Valedon’s social and political norms and 
the life ways of the Sharers leads to gendered ideological collisions as 
Valans attempt to take possession of Shora. While the outcomes of these 
collisions seemingly favor masculine power, in the end the Sharers over-
throw their colonial oppressors by using what Slonczewski’s book overtly 
considers a feminine will. Most tellingly indicating the radical cultural 
ecofeminism of this novel, the Sharers live in a female separatist ecoto-
pia where the absence of men permits certain values to thrive: respecting 
social and ecological interconnectedness, affirming and nurturing life, and 
building communicative networks. Sharer science is a science of life, their 
intellectual supremacy in biology used not to destroy but to nurture eco-
logical systems. Their politics is one of open communication between all 
of Shora’s raft communities during events called Gatherings. And Shar-
ers are pacifists. In an instance that reveals the intertwining of their sci-
entific knowledge and valuing of life, their political methodologies, and 
their pacifism, at one Gathering a Sharer named Yinerva proposes to use 
biological warfare to rid Shora of “‘the Valan pestilence’” that threatens 
“‘Not only Sharer children and survival . . . , but all the other creatures 
of Shora, the lesser sisters, seaswallowers, fanwings, rafts—from snail to 
swallower’” (309). The group, however, ultimately chooses to preserve 
their nonviolent ways and instead to conquer the Valans with what the 
defeated Valan general calls “bloodless ‘invasions’” (395). The Sharers’ 
nonviolent techniques for resisting Valan aggression include whitetrance—
a form of “Gandhian discipline” in which a Sharer grows pale, still, and 
unresponsive to outside threats—as well as boycotting Valan goods (Slon-
czewski, “Study Guide” par. 31).
 Read as a cultural ecofeminist text A Door Into Ocean demonstrates 
the potential for “feminine” values to triumph over “masculine” imposi-
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tions. But because the reason for Shora’s ultimate defeat of Valedon and 
the Patriarchy is only partially tied to gendered values, it would be an 
incomplete judgment to deem Slonczewski’s novel a work of hard cultural 
ecofeminism without considering the range of its critical thinking. For one, 
Valedon’s racism also instigates its military’s retreat. While Valan patriar-
chy indeed cannot beat down Shoran ways of life, Valan racism cannot 
permit Valedon’s army to succeed in its colonialist task. One of the most 
effective ways the Sharers defeat the Valans is not by conscious tactic but 
by possessing a racial characteristic that signifies for the Valans various 
substandard associations: purple skin. From the perspective of the Valan 
mind-set, Sharers are low creatures. They are natives who “‘don’t think 
like civilized people,’” who are “‘just naked women,’” and who do not 
“‘acknowledge the authority of Valedon’” (275, 253, 249). When the skin 
of the Valan occupiers begins to take on the marker of Sharer nativeness, 
they fear the “Purple Plague” (299). Troop morale plummets, contributing 
to the ultimate withdrawal of the army.
 While this particular criticism of racism is perhaps and at first odd 
in its suggestion, against history, that colonialist fears of the predefined 
Other can protect colonized cultures—rather than justify and prompt mil-
itaristic and/or economic endeavor against them—it is nonetheless cru-
cial in its recognition that colonial power is a conglomeration of several 
oppressive forces, including racism and patriarchy. Thus, A Door Into 
Ocean shares the theoretical positions of Prentice, Biehl, and King, who 
also do not limit their critiques of oppression to patriarchy alone. Pren-
tice’s and Biehl’s rationalist feminisms, and King’s dialectical ecofeminism, 
complement Murray Bookchin’s social ecology, which targets hierarchy as 
the foundation upon which sexism, racism, and other modes of domina-
tion are built (hence his attacks on deep ecology, a movement that wants 
to reorder the anthropocentric/ecocentric hierarchy). According to social 
ecology, interrogating any one of these forms of oppression alone does 
not achieve the complete critical assessment and revision that interrogat-
ing their underlying motivating force can. As Mellor observes, “Patriar-
chy only exists as one form of hierarchy, it is neither the original, nor the 
primary oppression” (158). Gaard also makes this point when defining 
social ecofeminism: “Features unique to social ecofeminism include . . . its 
analysis of the hierarchical structure of oppression as even more descrip-
tive than the specific forms of oppression” (Ecological 43). A Door Into 
Ocean moves into such a critical territory, beyond the limited range of 
cultural ecofeminism’s exclusive focus on patriarchy—and often its sup-
port of alternative valuations that are hierarchical nonetheless—and into a 
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focus on questioning together patriarchy, racial essentialism, and anthro-
pocentrism. Such a complete critical evaluation is necessary for the total 
dissolution of hierarchy, in general, that would liberate nonhuman nature 
from human tyranny as it also liberates oppressed humans from oppres-
sive ones.
 Though A Door Into Ocean’s focus on race, or hierarchy more gener-
ally, is secondary to its primary focus on gender and patriarchy, the novel 
still moves strongly away from strict cultural ecofeminism. Operating on 
patriarchy not simply to reverse its assumptions, but more so to include 
it in a broader critical analysis of gender assumptions in general, Sloncze-
wski’s book tests cultural ecofeminism and patriarchal essentialism alike 
with two of its characters, the male Spinel and the female Jade. As Susan 
Stratton notes, “Gender duality [in A Door Into Ocean] is challenged both 
by the successful adaptation of a Valedonian male teenager to Sharer ways 
and by the fact that the most vicious of Valedonian soldiers is female” 
(“Intersubjectivity” par. 22). These characterizations complicate essential-
ist notions and open the door for ecofeminism to look more at the social 
than the so-called innate origins of male and female behavior and relation-
ships with nonhuman nature.
 Slonczewski’s novel is in part a bildungsroman about Spinel, an ado-
lescent boy from Valedon who goes to Shora, experiences life there, and 
ultimately chooses to stay. Spinel’s acceptance of Sharer ways, however, 
comes after his interior battle with himself over the patriarchal ideology 
that defines him. Going through hard times financially, Spinel’s parents 
arrange for him to seek opportunity on Shora. The Sharers promote the 
move, for Spinel presents them with the opportunity to study masculin-
ity and to prove that a man can become a Sharer. But Spinel is not so 
excited. It is outrageous to him that there are not any men on Shora, and 
he believes that “‘A world without fathers could have no place for him’” 
(22). Coming from a hierarchical society Spinel sees the equality among 
Sharers as the product of “bizarre logic”; to him the planet is “ridiculous” 
(61). And as Spinel’s exposure to the Shoran atmosphere turns him purple, 
he demands a medicine that will curtail the phenomenon.
 With his compulsory defense of the heterosexual family unit, his 
hierarchical logic, and his unwillingness to experience difference, Spinel 
embodies essentialist notions of masculinity. But Spinel is not the subject 
of essentialist contention. Central to Slonczewski’s argument is that mas-
culinity is a socialized characteristic, and this is made obvious as Spinel 
embeds himself more and more into Shoran life, shedding his socialized 
masculinity and adopting a social and ecological conscience. Interestingly, 
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this embedding begins after he witnesses the wonders of Shoran ecology.6 
Afterwards, “Spinel was now more than simply curious about Shora. 
Something compelled him to come to grips with this place that was inexo-
rably becoming a part of him” (100). That “Something” is likely the very 
nonhuman nature within which he overtly experiences his embeddedness 
as his skin deepens to purple and his ocean dives increase in depth and 
duration. Spinel’s newfound sense of place ultimately leads him to join 
the Sharers in defending their planet against Valan exploitation, his sea 
change expressed in the final words of the novel as he swims away from 
the spacecraft that would have taken him back to Valedon: “a friendly 
fanwing dipped and soared overhead like a hand beckoning, Come, love-
sharer, come home” (403).
 That a male can become a “lovesharer” is one part of the construction-
ist ecofeminist claim of A Door Into Ocean. The other is that given the 
cultural atmosphere a woman can embody the worst of masculine aggres-
siveness. As Chief of Staff of the Valan army, Jade is a woman whose 
militarism challenges essentialist notions of femininity and the idea that 
violence and hostility are sex-specific. About militaristic conditioning, eco-
feminist scholar Janis Birkeland writes, “men are taught to despise and dis-
tance themselves from their ‘feminine’ side, or their emotions and feeling” 
(35). Slonczewski’s narrative shows that such conditioning is inscribable 
on both men and women. Jade derogatorily nicknames the Sharers “cat-
fish,” placing them at the bottom of an ontological hierarchy that denies 
species equality and justifies Valan oppressions against Shoran natives. 
“‘Catfish aren’t human,’” Jade says, “‘they’re Vermin, and that’s how 
to treat them’” (323). Jade admits that it is her duty to kill, as she also 
administers a range of tortures in an attempt to crack the Sharer’s nonvio-
lent protests. In Slonczewski’s world masculinity is a socialized trait; mili-
tarism and violent aggression do not emerge simply from being male but 
are characteristics etched on any sex by genderless oppressive institutions.
Stephanie Lahar asks,
Is there a way to know whether there were ever times and places when 
human beings lived in easy cooperation with each other and the nonhu-
man environment, without the sexist, oppressive, and exploitive com-
plex of power relations we call patriarchy? Is seeking such times and 
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places useful in empowering women today, by portraying model societ-
ies in which women either shared or held primary power? (97)
As works of science fiction, Gearhart’s, Le Guin’s, and Slonczewski’s nov-
els all imagine such times and places. But their positions, like ecofeminism 
itself, are diverse. Espousing the multiplicity of perspectives within eco-
feminism, Lee Quinby notices that ecofeminism “has combated ecological 
destruction and patriarchal domination without succumbing to the totaliz-
ing impulses of masculinist politics,” embracing as political strategy a plu-
rality of theoretical positions rather than a single, hegemonic stance (123). 
The ecofeminist texts reviewed in this chapter confirm Quinby’s point, at 
least regarding science fiction’s ecofeminist theorizations.
 Often challenged as essentialist in its judgments, The Wanderground 
embraces as political strategy the spatial separation of men and women as 
well as the safeguarding and uninhibited self-realization of both women 
and nonhuman nature associated with this separation. Ecotopian? Per-
haps. But as discussed in chapter 2, ecotopian visions have transforma-
tive potential, if not to lay a literal groundwork then certainly to posit 
an intellectual compass for moving toward a new ground. And in Gear-
hart’s novel, that compass is one necessitated by the experiences of women 
and nonhuman nature during the time of the book’s composition—the 
1970s—when both feminists and environmentalists were pushing the 
boundaries of dominant ideology and reaching for new and effective criti-
cal methodologies.
 Always Coming Home and A Door Into Ocean also embrace cultural 
ecofeminism, positing as a critical strategy the consideration of gender dif-
ference. But these books intrinsically question their own considerations. 
Le Guin’s work does not locate gender difference in inflexible biological 
determinations, instead highlighting the malleability of the structures and 
symbolisms determining female and male relationships with nonhuman 
nature, and with each other. Slonczewski’s book expands the ecofeminist 
critique of patriarchy to a broader social critique of hierarchy as it also 
underscores gendered behavior as specific to the atmospheres constructing 
such behavior, regardless of sex. By doing so, Always Coming Home and 
A Door Into Ocean develop on cultural ecofeminism without watering 
down what is most important in its message: the liberation of women and 
nonhuman nature from oppression. These liberations demand theoretical 
and practical diversity. The Wanderground, Always Coming Home, and A 
Door Into Ocean together offer us literary explorations of this diversity.
As  t h e  p r e v i o u s  chapters have shown, environmental science fic-  tion recurrently criticizes capitalist economic productivism and/or  the ideological positions that enable this productivism. Olaf Sta-
pledon’s Last and First Men comments on the economic exploitation of 
nonhuman nature. George R. Stewart’s Earth Abides contains a critique of 
the myth of human supremacy, which morally justifies capitalist exploita-
tion. Dune raises questions about whether we can even locate something 
called “nonhuman nature” in our contemporary economic situation, when 
imperial dominance threatens an already second nature with a dystopian 
third one. Both Ernest Callenbach’s and Marge Piercy’s ecotopias aban-
don capitalist economies, favoring instead a qualitative affluence; and 
John Brunner’s books express clear anxieties about capitalist production 
and consumption patterns. Fredric Jameson observes the identification 
of patriarchy with capitalist imperialism in Ursula K. Le Guin’s Always 
Coming Home (67), and Sally Miller Gearhart’s and Joan Slonczewski’s 
ecofeminist novels likewise connect patriarchy to economically motivated 
imperial aggression toward nonhuman nature.
 Much environmental science fiction attends to the “tensions between 
the economic forces of production and local ecological conditions” high-
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lighted by sociologist James O’Connor and environmental historian Car-
olyn Merchant (Radical 9). Historically considered, the subgenre is an 
environmental literary movement that has emerged in response to the 
degradation of nature that characterizes the capitalist productivism of the 
last one hundred years. Each story, as with each transformative movement 
reviewed in this study, responds differently to this degradation. Neverthe-
less, this degradation seems most often to be perceived in environmental 
science fiction as born if not always in productivism, then certainly in the 
deep-seated values that make the destruction of nonhuman nature for eco-
nomic gain morally tolerable.
 Spanning the second half of the twentieth century, a period of time 
that saw the largest increases of economic production and consumption 
in human history, the novels analyzed in this chapter look critically upon 
the historical economic circumstances within which each was written, and 
which collectively enabled such massive economic growth. Frederik Pohl 
and C. M. Kornbluth’s The Space Merchants (1952) offers a satirical look 
at “the new emphasis on consumption in the post-war American econ-
omy” (Luckhurst 110), particularly calling out the advertising industry 
whose self-admitted goal was—and still is—to “maintain the multiplic-
ity and intensity of wants that are the spur to the standard of living in the 
United States” (Lebow 9). Twenty years later in The Word for World Is 
Forest (1972), Le Guin reads “the ethic which approved the defoliation of 
forests and grainlands and the murder of noncombatants in the name of 
‘peace’” during the Vietnam War as “a corollary of the ethic which per-
mits the despoliation of natural resources for private profit or the GNP” 
(Le Guin, “Introduction to” 151). And Kim Stanley Robinson’s Mars tril-
ogy (1993, 1994, 1996) appears about another twenty years later in the 
post-Reagan era of global capitalist expansion to think about the ecologi-
cal consequences of economic hyperactivity and to imagine political solu-
tions to rampant, unfettered capitalist development. As a result of their 
critical engagements with the capitalist mode of production, these books 
can be read within the context of the final transformative environmental 
philosophy that I will discuss in this study: ecosocialism.
Ecosocialism stands for the supersession of capital by a system of democ-
ratized socioeconomic organization that assures social justice and main-
tains ecological integrity. Joel Kovel, author of the ecosocialist manifesto 
The Enemy of Nature, defines an ecosocialist society as “a society that is 
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recognizably socialist, in that the producers have been reunited with the 
means of production in a robust efflorescence of democracy; and also rec-
ognizably ecological, in that the ‘limits to growth’ are finally respected, 
and nature is recognized as having intrinsic value and not simply cared for, 
and thereby allowed to resume its inherently formative path” (10). Ecoso-
cialism is necessarily a class movement, finding in capital’s state-supported 
class structure the social foundation for an inherently repressive mode of 
economic production—that is, an elite-driven system that denies workers 
(and with colonization, indigenous peoples) their control of the tools, raw 
materials, and sites of material production and with wage labor exploits 
their labor power in an effort to realize a profit in a globalized network of 
commodity exchange.
 As an ecological movement ecosocialism highlights the effects of such 
tendencies on ecosystemic integrity. First, severing workers from a collec-
tively owned and democratically managed means of production enables 
the production of commodities with value only as things to be exchanged 
globally for the profit of the owner class (exchange values) rather than 
as goods necessary to satisfy human needs (use values) and, importantly, 
obedient to local ecological limits. In capitalism, exchange is the privileged 
value. As O’Connor writes,
This means that (1) in the workplace, land use practices, divisions of 
labor, and so on, are governed first and foremost by the need to pro-
duce exchange value, or profit. The needs to preserve ecological diver-
sity, avoid ecological debts to other workplaces and future generations, 
promote the intellectual development of the worker, and the like are 
subordinated to production for profit; and (2) in the sphere of consump-
tion . . . clean air and water, uncongested transport, and other social 
and ecological “goods” are sacrificed to the need to realize exchange 
value in the market. (327)
 Second, in capitalist wage labor, workers—who because of the ubiq-
uity of capitalism are under economic compulsion to seek employment in 
producing surplus value for the owners of private enterprise—are alien-
ated from nonhuman nature, and nonhuman nature is alienated from the 
creative, ecologically sensible human. Wage labor relegates workers to 
the status of interchangeable factory, monocultural plantation, or cubi-
cle occupants who are thus psychologically and physically removed from 
their place within the ecological field of relations that for ecosocialism, 
and deep ecology, defines a whole human self. While ecosocialists indeed 
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find much wanting in deep ecology, both movements encourage the de-
alienation of humans as a prerequisite for realizing our selves within the 
mesh of ecosystemic relationships.1 As Kovel argues, the “human trade-
mark”—which is different from the trademarks of other species only in 
terms of varying capacities and ways of fitting into the ecological whole—
is characterized by inwardness and acting upon imagination in materially 
transforming ways (109). The realization of our full humanity is a func-
tion of the degree to which we participate freely in the production of use 
values, in the production of the necessities of our own lives, and the com-
munity’s life, as integral components of ecosystems. Under capitalism the 
private owners of the means of production, following the profit motive 
and a market whim instigated largely by capital’s sophisticated advertising 
and marketing complex, disunite workers from nonhuman nature and use 
value, defeating their beings as “organismic totalities . . . who act in the 
ecosystemic world and are acted upon by the world” (Kovel 99). And if 
capitalism is dehumanizing because it prevents workers from being in eco-
systemic relationship, then it is anti-ecological in part because by contriv-
ing and mandating the privately owned wage laborer it denies ecosystems 
the ecological creative capacity of human beings, replacing this capacity 
with “consumption habits artificially produced by advertising” (Löwy 7).
 Finally, the profit motive of capital’s owner class commands a growth 
imperative that sees social and ecosystemic boundaries as opportunities for 
new investment and commodification. Capital thus proceeds with an atti-
tude of limitlessness, wreaking social and ecological havoc in the process. 
Noncapitalist cultures are penetrated and contained within the ruling capi-
talist totality as “Other—barbarians, savages, human animals, and eventu-
ally (with the growth of science), ethnicities and races,” thereby justifying 
their place at the bottom of a class hierarchy where uncreative wage labor 
prevails and social life remains perpetually deteriorated despite the prom-
ises of trickle-down theory (Kovel 122–23). Capital “alters [life worlds] in 
ways that foster its accumulation, chiefly by introducing a sense of dissat-
isfaction or lack—so that it can truly be said that happiness is forbidden 
under capitalism, being replaced by sensation and craving” (52). Kovel 
continues,
The culture of advanced capital aims to turn society into addicts of com-
modity consumption, a state ‘good for business,’ and, pari passu, bad 
for ecologies. The evil is doubled, with reckless consumption leading to 
pollution and waste, and the addiction to commodities creating a soci-
ety unable to comprehend, much less resist, the ecological crisis. (66)
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Capital’s movement to commodify new pools of labor and to appeal in so 
many ways to untapped markets parallels its intrusions into nonhuman 
nature, which along with human labor constitutes what Karl Marx called 
“conditions of production.” Such intrusions, as ecosocialism argues, are 
responsible for ecological degradation.
 O’Conner’s “second contradiction of capitalism” and Merchant’s “first 
contradiction” of contemporary society are parallel observations on the 
tendency for productivist economic activity to be in tension with eco-
logical integrity. Capitalist activity has increased atmospheric warming, 
decreased soil fertility, exterminated species, polluted oceans, poisoned 
groundwater, and more.2 The agents of capital thus damage the external 
physical conditions of capitalist production. This damage, combined with 
further injury to social and personal conditions (e.g., intensified urban 
congestion, increasing healthcare costs, divorce, crime) raises the economic 
system’s costs. Operators of the system therefore create a crisis that “has 
more to do with external or natural barriers than with the internal or class 
antagonisms of the system” (Foster, “Capitalism” par. 9). Important here 
is O’Connor’s and Merchant’s theoretical split from traditional Marxism, 
in which internal economic crisis and class antagonisms are perceived to 
instigate historical transformation. Instead, the economic mode’s inher-
ently anti-ecological and antisocial activities instigate, as Merchant notes, 
“new ecological social movements: environmental health and safety, farm-
workers’ antipesticide coalitions, ecofeminist protests over groundwater 
toxins, leftwing green parties, and so on” (Radical 149).
 “The root of ecological crisis is economic,” Derek Wall asserts (7). A 
transformative solution to such crisis is thus to expose capitalism by high-
lighting its methods and effects, and then to challenge the economic system 
with a newly imagined democratic mode of production. This new mode 
would oppose a prevailing global capitalism that, as the dominant force 
behind anthropogenic pressures on planetary boundaries today, is socially 
and ecologically unsustainable. As responses to capitalism’s second contra-
diction, the following science fiction works do much to navigate capital-
ism’s problems, and in the case of the Mars trilogy, point the way forward 
toward a different economic system.
Deemed by M. Keith Booker and Anne-Marie Thomas as “a founding text 
of environmentalist science fiction,” The Space Merchants presents an eco-
logically dire future Earth where freshwater is in severe decline, coal is 
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still a big industry, and polluted air necessitates nasal antisoot plugs (207). 
Overpopulation has people yearning for the more roomy past, and wood 
is so rare that oak and pine jewelry signify the status that precious met-
als and jewels signify today. And to meet global food-supply needs in 
the absence of land fit enough to grow food organically, one company, 
Chlorella Proteins, develops and maintains Chicken Little, once a small 
piece of heart tissue and now a gigantic blob of protein-rich meat sliced, 
weighed, shaped, frozen, cooked, flavored, packaged, and shipped all over 
the world. The atrocious ecological conditions of this future Earth have 
not instigated any sort of broadly accepted revolutionary or ecotopian 
economic program, however. Despite the strain of the growth-centered 
economy on Earth’s limited life-support systems, and thus on most of the 
planet’s human and nonhuman population, the wheels of this economy 
keep turning in what David Mogen, the author of a book about mytholo-
gies of the American West in science fiction, identifies as a frontiersman-
ship imported from the past to drive the modern economy.
 Where The Space Merchants is most acute in its criticism is not in 
condemning the ramping up of capitalist production and the associated 
consumerist ethos in post–World War II America but in illustrating the 
pernicious nature of capital’s principal instigator of this ethos. This insti-
gator is an advertising institution motivated both to pave the way for 
global economic expansion into regions of disparate cultural attitudes and 
practices, and to obfuscate empirical evidence that would otherwise impli-
cate the economic system it serves in a range of misdeeds. Read as a work 
of environmental science fiction’s economic critique, The Space Merchants 
is most effective when it shows how much the capitalist economy depends 
on an advertising industry whose foremost obligation is to facilitate social 
amnesia about the regrettable origins of whatever this economy produces 
or never to admit that such origins exist in the first place.
 In The Space Merchants advertising perpetuates at least two of the 
mythologies necessary for capital’s expansion: (1) there is a pancultural 
desire and need for the capitalist mode of production, and (2) capitalist 
production processes and their resulting commodities are harmless. In the 
book the large advertising agency Fowler Shocken Associates makes its 
fortune pioneering for economic globalization. One of Fowler Shocken’s 
favorite accounts is Indiastries, for which the agency prepared “‘a whole 
subcontinent’” to merge “‘into a single manufacturing complex’” (3). 
Fowler Shocken himself outlines the “history of advertising—from the 
simple handmaiden task of selling already manufactured goods to its pres-
ent role of creating industries and redesigning a world’s folkways to meet 
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the needs of commerce” (6). While Fowler celebrates marketeering efforts 
to expunge social and cultural difference around the world to facilitate 
capitalist growth, such efforts are a key target of critique for contempo-
rary critics of the global economy. Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, 
editors of The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn Toward 
the Local, write, “For corporations, the overwhelming drive is constantly 
to expand their resource bases and their markets to create globally homog-
enized consumerist life-styles” (295). Developing this point in the same 
collection, social justice advocate Tony Clarke observes the effect of the 
growth economy’s homogenizing objectives: “a global monoculture is 
emerging, which not only disregards local tastes and cultural differences 
but threatens to serve as a form of social control over the attitudes, expec-
tations, and behavior of people all over the world” (300).
 Fowler’s brief history of advertising demonstrates what critics of glo-
balization notice today: in the interest of profit and the perpetuation of 
capitalism, the agents of capital are annihilating cultural tradition. Of the 
many problems with this subordination of difference to economic purpose, 
one is indeed ecological, especially if that difference is one of a culture’s 
desire to maintain its aboriginal place and maintain its indigenous econ-
omy. Referencing environmental thinker and activist Vandana Shiva, Brian 
Tokar writes in Earth for Sale, “development . . . systematically degrades 
the knowledge, skills and cultural practices that have made it possible for 
people to thrive completely outside of a commercial context for thousands 
of years” (170). Indeed, capital’s systematic degradation of knowledge and 
skills is what leads Daniel R. Wildcat to call for an “indigenous realism,” 
mentioned earlier in this study as lived embeddedness. Epitomizing Shiva’s 
point and making Wildcat’s efforts more urgent, apologists for global capi-
talism believe, as global money manager Peter Marber demonstrates in 
his book Money Changes Everything, that because citizens of economi-
cally disadvantaged nations sport American brand-name clothes they must 
desire to throw away their culture and enter the global marketplace (158). 
In replacing the noncommercial with an omnipresent commercial, or sub-
suming noncommercial cultural practices into commercial exchange as 
identity commodities, the development policy that extends from Marber’s 
attitude—indeed, the very attitude that Fowler Shocken fosters in Pohl and 
Kornbluth’s novel—erodes not only cultural integrity but also ecological 
integrity, since the latter is often a core concern of the groups that capital-
ism’s extractive industries target.
 The exhausted ecology represented in The Space Merchants is the 
result of the reckless consumption encouraged by advertising’s ubiqui-
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tous fictional and concealing narratives. After defining early the motiva-
tion that drives the advertising industry, Pohl and Kornbluth show this 
industry in action. Having “‘actually and literally conquered the world” 
with Indiastries and other accounts, and “‘Like Alexander, [weeping] for 
new worlds to conquer’” (6), Fowler initiates his next project: the “devel-
opment and exploitation of the planet Venus” (7). With “Sales” as their 
god, Fowler’s agency begins its marketing. To start, Mitchell Courtenay, 
the agency’s language man and the novel’s narrator, consults with Jack 
O’Shea, the only person to have travelled to Venus, to locate in O’Shea’s 
experiences images that will appeal to prospective immigrants to, and 
consumers of, the planet. O’Shea’s honesty about Venus, though, is not 
what Mitch wants to hear. Asked to “‘Suppose [he] wanted a lot of people 
to go to Venus. What would [he] tell them about it?’” Jack replies, “‘I’d 
tell them a lot of damn big lies’” (17). How else to sell an atmosphere 
of “‘embalming fluid,’” heat that “‘averages above the boiling point of 
water—if there were any water on Venus, which there isn’t,’” and winds 
“‘clocked five hundred miles an hour’” (17)? Mitch, however, trusts that 
“‘there are answers for all those things’” and instead wants Jack to give 
him “‘the feel of the place’” (17).
 The contrast between the actual Venus of Jack’s experience and the 
imaginary Venus that Mitch wants to sell speaks to a fundamental strategy 
of global capital to conceal physical and or social reality using appealing, 
marketable symbolic values. But Mitch soon gets to experience the decep-
tiveness of advertising language when he is thrust into the authentic envi-
ronment of another one of his accounts, Chlorella Proteins. Kidnapped 
and given a new identity as a laborer at the oppressive Costa Rican fac-
tory that houses Chicken Little, Mitch cannot help but recall the words he 
wrote to sell Chlorella’s products: “‘From the sun-drenched plantations of 
Costa Rica, tended by the deft hands of independent farmers with pride 
in their work, comes the juicyripe goodness of Chlorella Proteins’” (68). 
In contrast to the advertising language, Chlorella Proteins greets labor-
ers—not family farmers—with “a gush of disinfectant aerosol,” a team 
of condescending guards, and number plaques to wear around their necks 
(67). The factory is eighty stories high and its photosynthesis mirrors cre-
ate working conditions too bright to be safe.
 Opposing Fowler Shocken Associates and the consumer culture that 
the firm promotes, the World Conservationist Association (W.C.A.) works 
to curtail the “reckless exploitation of natural resources” that it believes 
“has created needless poverty and needless human misery” (80). However, 
in the world of The Space Merchants, a world in which the ideology of 
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capital permeates social consciousness, the W.C.A. offers a criticism too 
contrary to be adopted comfortably.3 As with the Trainites in The Sheep 
Look Up, the W.C.A. is demonized by those in power who control public 
discourse, thus neutralizing their message. A W.C.A. pamphlet attempts to 
debunk myths about the organization:
You have probably heard that “the Consies” are murderers, psychotics, 
and incompetent people who kill and destroy for irrational ends or out 
of envy. None of this is true. W.C.A. members are humane, balanced 
persons, many of them successful in the eyes of the world. Stories to 
the contrary are zealously encouraged by people who profit from the 
exploitation which we hope to correct. (80)
As a key player in capital’s mind control Mitchell knows the W.C.A. only 
as malcontents. His resentment of the “Consies,” as well as his position as 
an enabler of hyperactive consumer behavior, comes out when he reflects 
on the fellow factory worker and secret W.C.A. member who handed him 
the abovementioned leaflet:
I hated the twisted minds who had done such a thing to a fine consumer 
like Gus. It was something like murder. He could have played his part 
in the world, buying and using and making work and profits for his 
brothers all around the globe, ever increasing his wants and needs, ever 
increasing everybody’s work and profits in the circle of consumption, 
raising children to be consumers in turn. (82)
Mitch must feign sympathy with the W.C.A. cause to escape the Costa 
Rican factory, and though he seems too firmly embedded in capitalist ide-
ology to adopt any conservationist sentiment while intermingling with 
members of the organization, in the end he does just that.
 Once he is outside his corporate physical and ideological space, 
Mitch sees a reality that his entrenchment within the capitalist fantasy 
prevented him from seeing. Interestingly, Mitch’s experiences in and 
realizations about this reality attest to a worldview so different from 
the worldview of global capital that Fowler Shocken writes them off 
as imagined. Contrary to the mythologies perpetuated by capital, “The 
interests of producers and consumers are not identical,” “Most of the 
world is unhappy,” “Workmen don’t automatically find the job they do 
best,” “Entrepreneurs don’t play a hard, fair game by the rules,” and 
“The Consies are sane, intelligent, and well organized” (135). But Sales 
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is to Fowler a Truth that “could do no wrong” (136). As Mogen argues, 
Fowler’s “convictions are part of a system of culturally-reinforced delu-
sions that provide rationalizations for the system from which he prof-
its” (65). Embodying the global capitalist hegemony, Fowler dismisses 
Mitch’s disclosures the same way capital has dismissed economic alter-
natives throughout the novel, discounting Mitch’s new conscience as the 
product of a “wicked, untamed id” (136).4 The novel ends after Fowler 
dies and leaves Mitch with majority shares in Fowler Shocken Associ-
ates. With his new ecological and social conscience, Mitch exercises his 
advertising aptitudes and financial resources to convince the public to 
stay away from Venus. Using the government-sponsored Venus rocket, he 
relocates to the planet with a group of W.C.A. members—an ending that 
prompts Mogen to reflect, “Though The Space Merchants spends much 
of its time lampooning the absurdity of importing myths from our fron-
tier past into the context of the Space Age, it finds its resolution in the 
tried and true American solution to social and personal problems: escape 
to the frontier” (66).
 In the second edition of her book Screening Space, Vivian Sobchack 
draws from Ernest Mandel and Fredric Jameson to define the “postin-
dustrial” age and to characterize the cultural dynamics of what is often 
called “late capitalism.” She notes, “With the 1940s . . . and coincident 
with the technological development of nuclear and electronic power 
marked progressively by the atom bomb, the television set, and the com-
puter, comes a new moment of capitalist expansion” (243). Marking this 
late capitalism is “The totalizing incorporation of Nature by industrial-
ized culture . . . into a visible and marketable ‘desire’ produced as media 
spectacle” (244). When in The Space Merchants Mitch stares through the 
window of a tourist rocket at the Amazon valley and Tierra Del Fuego 
only to be interrupted with advertisements that opaque his view, he is 
experiencing late capitalism. These places are already capitalist spaces in 
the book—the Amazon basin home to the world’s biggest power dam and 
Tierra Del Fuego a whale fishery—and are thus doubly commodified when 
Mitch’s gaze is subjected to advertisements. Indeed, with their imaginative 
descriptions of scarcity, sterility, and pollution amid the hypercapitalist 
symbolic strategies that overwrite this ecological reality in every way pos-
sible, Pohl and Kornbluth underline the problems of a late capitalism too 
caught up in an ideology of perpetual economic growth to notice, or even 
care about, the physical limits of its activities.
 Mogen highlights the irony of The Space Merchants’s social and per-
sonal escapism in the face of its biting critique of what is ultimately that 
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same escapism used to enable capitalist expansion. But given Mitch’s 
seemingly intractable grounding and participation in an economic mode 
that commodifies nonhuman nature and human culture in ways that go 
beyond overwriting them with marketing language, his adoption of a con-
science critical of capitalist production at least signals a hopeful shift in 
social consciousness. The frontier is not literally the new world of Venus, 
but instead the new world of thinking beyond capitalism. Mitch’s physi-
cal relocation from a completely commercialized and dominated Earth to 
a Venus he vows not to compromise to corporate interests symbolizes the 
possibility of a movement in culture from a productivist ideology unwill-
ing to confront its inherent hazards—and a resulting consumer conscience 
unaware of the effects of economic growth on ecosystems and cultures—to 
an ecological conscience awake to the effects of capital’s global supremacy 
and willing to meet this supremacy with new ideas.
“One of the major [science fiction] denunciations of the American geno-
cide in Vietnam” and thus of the cultural attitudes that helped sustain that 
war, Le Guin’s The Word for World Is Forest could be discussed within 
the context of part-of-nature, ecological thinking, deep ecology, and eco-
feminism (Jameson 274). Its description of the forest on the planet Athshe, 
the novel’s setting, expresses a biological reality that challenges moder-
nity’s taming of wild nature in the interest of economic development. In 
the forest,
No way was clear, no light unbroken. . . . Into wind, water, sunlight, 
starlight, there always entered leaf and branch, bole and root, the 
shadowy, the complex. Little paths ran under the branches, around 
the boles, over the roots; they did not go straight, but yielded to every 
obstacle, devious as nerves. The ground was not dry and solid but damp 
and rather springy, product of the collaboration of living things with the 
long, elaborate death of leaves and trees; and from that rich graveyard 
grew ninety-foot trees, and tiny mushrooms that sprouted in circles half 
an inch across. (25)
Here, complexity and decay mark the actuality of the nature from which 
life is born, the wild nature of which humans are a part and that must 
be preserved if life is to continue to be born. The book also reflects on 
deep ecological concerns. When one character, Kees, worries that Don 
e c o S o c i a l i S t  c r i t i q u e   111
Davidson’s Terran logging crew is breaking ecological protocol when it 
poaches deer on Athshe, Davidson argues his point with anthropocentric 
reasoning (5): “‘it’s the men that count. Not the animals’” (4). Continu-
ing his dispute with the ecologically conscious Kees, Davidson declares, 
“‘You worry about deer and trees and fibreweed, fine, that’s your thing. 
But I like to see things in perspective, from the top down, and the top, 
so far, is humans. We’re here, now; and so this world’s going to go our 
way’” (5). This reasoning is coupled in Davidson with an androcentrism 
that imposes hierarchical sexual relations in the same way it imposes top-
down human–nonhuman nature relations. In fact, the novel begins with 
Davidson anticipating his visit to the “new shipload of women . . . breed-
ing females . . . 212 head of prime human stock” (1).
 While Le Guin’s novel invites readings from the perspectives of norma-
tive ecology, deep ecology, and ecofeminism, its central conflict demands 
a reading critical of capitalist expansion and production—an ecosocialist 
reading. The book’s success as a work of environmental science fiction 
comes mostly from its insistence that it is foremost the ideology of capital, 
with its constituent ways of thinking about human and nonhuman nature, 
that enables the erosion of biological systems and the oppression of human 
and nonhuman Others. If The Space Merchants is chiefly about the sym-
bolic strategies used to disguise capitalism’s malignancies while expanding 
its reach, then Le Guin’s The Word for World Is Forest is a closer explora-
tion of these malignancies. It argues that the capitalist mode of production 
necessitates ecophobia, speciesism, racism, and misogyny. To build firm 
inter- and intraspecies hierarchies authorizes the dominant species and the 
dominant class and race to behave only in its own interests; to objectify 
women makes them available for consumption. Put differently, capital-
ism needs understandings of human and nonhuman Others that allow 
these Others to be commodified in the first place. Capital’s knowledge of 
people and place—indeed, Davidson’s knowledge in the novel—is strictly 
economic, fed by a fetish for markets and the emptying of cultural and 
ecological meaning that turns people and places into objects of exchange.
 Demonstrating this emptying of meaning, Davidson reflects on the 
motivations of those exploiting Athshe: “men were here now to end the 
darkness, and turn the tree-jumble into clean sawn planks, more prized 
on Earth than gold. Literally, because gold could be got from seawater 
and from under the Antarctic ice, but wood could not; wood came only 
from trees. And it was a really necessary luxury on Earth. So the alien 
forests became wood” (7). Davidson’s explanation of capital’s intentions 
on Athshe characterizes capitalism’s perception of nonhuman nature and 
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of itself. Terms such as “darkness” and “tree-jumble,” disassociated from 
their signification of the life-giving qualities of nonhuman nature high-
lighted in the blocked passage above, are imposed on the Athshean woods, 
writing off their place within a complex ecological totality to serve instead 
a mythology in which production saves the day by taming the forest and 
transforming it from a locale of “primeval murk and savagery and igno-
rance” to “a paradise, a real Eden” (3). Seeing themselves as honorable 
in disinfecting the forest and its people, the agents of capital in Le Guin’s 
novel provide the necessities of human life—wood—and are thus all the 
more pious. To say wood is a “necessary luxury,” though, is oxymoronic, 
for as the consumer culture theorist James Twitchell contends, luxuries 
are “totally unnecessary” (1). The logging of the forest is necessary only 
in that it serves the very economic system that imposes a rhetoric of need 
upon its products.
 With the capitalist vocabulary lifted from Davidson’s project, no lon-
ger is it a noble endeavor to sanitize Athshe and fulfill human necessity. 
Instead, it is a deforestation project supported by “the Development peo-
ple” whose real interest in Athshe is the one hundred twenty million dol-
lars’ worth of lumber that the planet provides the Terran market annually 
(76). Certainly, this project has a number of ecological and cultural rami-
fications. His thoughts focused on “212 buxom beddable breasty little fig-
ures,” Davidson is inconvenienced by news of the ecological consequences 
of his venture: “Dump Island”—the first Terran colony on Athshe—can-
not sustain crops or a healthy ecology with its forest logged (1). Miss-
ing the ecological network of root systems and fibreweed that stabilizes 
the topsoil, Dump Island dies as quickly as the rain can wash its soil into 
the sea. Concerned about the ecology of Athshe and critical of the Terran 
development plan for the planet, one character, Raj Lyubov, admits, “As 
for the total land ecology . . . I say we’ve irrecoverably wrecked the native 
life-systems on one large island, have done great damage on this subcon-
tinent Sornol, and if we go on logging at the present rate, may reduce the 
major habitable lands to desert within ten years” (71).
 Lyubov is an anthropologist for the Terran colonies and his ultimately 
inaccurate assessment of the Athsheans as a passive and consequently 
exploitable species leads those in power to disregard his ecologically lit-
erate observation as another erroneous judgment. But Lyubov’s specula-
tion exhibits one of environmental science fiction’s key environmentalist 
features, and it returns us—as any extrapolative assessment could—to the 
issue of extrapolation I discussed in the introduction to this book. As Frank 
M. Robinson avows, science fiction writers are “our early warning system 
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for the future” (255), and Carol P. Hovanec maintains, “This is certainly 
one of Le Guin’s purposes”—to offer a theoretical case study “of what 
might happen in the future if humanity continues to exploit the environ-
ment” (84). Science fiction does ask imperative questions about the future, 
but as Le Guin asserts, “Science fiction is not predictive; it is descriptive” 
(Introduction par. 7). By depicting spaces ravaged by economic produc-
tion, environmental science fiction authors raise questions about how we 
should behave now to avoid such consequences in the future. But, impor-
tantly, they also engage in such depictions to make us aware that much 
of what they portray or forecast is happening now.5 Lyubov’s predic-
tion operates on both levels. It serves as a warning to the Terrans (and 
us) about the consequences of current extractive activities, and it reminds 
them that these consequences have already been experienced somewhere 
else. Disputing the argument that the Terran development plan for Ath-
she can progress with minimal ecological impact, Lyubov asserts, “‘That’s 
what the Bureau of Land Management said about Alaska . . . The sur-
vival percentage of Native Alaskan species in habitat, after 15 years of the 
Development Program, was .3%. It’s now zero’” (72).
 Identifying Davidson with the industrialists of late-nineteenth-century 
America, Hovanec writes, “In his desire to destroy the forest and convert 
it to products useful for Terran, he also resembles the deterministic indus-
trialists who saw the environment as an expendable commodity” (88). 
The concept of the expendability of nonhuman nature is a central, though 
as we have seen contradictory, justification for capitalist production and, 
as Le Guin’s novel demonstrates, the focus of its rhetoric. And with the 
mindset that the interests of markets take precedence over a feared and 
disposable nonhuman nature comes the outlook that everything in this 
nature must make way for the development that capital brings. Just as 
Davidson represents the attitude of capitalist agents toward an expendable 
nonhuman nature, he also represents their feelings about those who dwell 
in the places they desire to exploit. Davidson remarks about the native 
Athsheans, “‘They’re going to get rubbed out sooner or later, and it might 
as well be sooner. It’s just how things happen to be. Primitive races always 
have to give way to civilized ones. Or be assimilated. But we sure as hell 
can’t assimilate a lot of green monkeys’” (12).
 Labeling the Athsheans as inevitable victims of colonialism, as premod-
ern, and as inferior, Davidson validates capitalist activities that threaten 
a native culture whose lives are interconnected with the living forests 
and with each other, or in Davidson’s estimation, a substandard herd of 
“creechies” whose wild life ways attest to their baseness. Once “Perfectly 
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integrated into the natural ecology of their planet,” the Athsheans are so 
dislocated as a result of Terran activity that they sacrifice their pacifism to 
engage in their own fierce project to end Terran exploitation (Yanarella 
100–101). Also a culturally critical voice in The Word for World Is Forest, 
Lyubov speculates on the Athsheans’ recent violence toward the Terran 
occupiers:
“I wonder if they’re not proving their adaptability, now. By adapt-
ing their behavior to us. To the Earth Colony. For four years they’ve 
behaved to us as they do to one another. Despite the physical differ-
ences, they recognized us as members of their species, as men. However, 
we have not responded as members of their species should respond. 
We have ignored the responses, the rights and obligations of non-vio-
lence. We have killed, raped, dispersed, and enslaved the native humans, 
destroyed their communities, and cut down their forests.” (62)
A postcolonial analysis of Le Guin’s novel might examine the cultural ram-
ifications of the Terrans’ introduction of violence into Athshean civiliza-
tion, particularly how that civilization is in effect erased as a consequence 
of the erasure of one of its key defining characteristics: nonviolence. Selver, 
the Athshean who leads the successful revolution to defeat Terran con-
quest, even laments to one Terran, “‘Maybe after I die people will be as 
they were before I was born, and before you came. But I do not think they 
will’” (169).
 With the Athsheans’ new knowledge of how to kill, their ecological 
consciousness might forever be changed as well. Though this claim is spec-
ulative (Selver’s statement ends the novel and we never find out if his pre-
diction comes true, or to what end), it follows that such a drastic mutation 
of a nonviolent, embedded culture could dissolve any sense of ecological 
connectedness that the culture has. If the people “they were before” were 
seamlessly integrated into the ecology of Athshe and had developed their 
nonviolent, cooperative social tendencies as a result of this integration, 
then the introduction of social violence is also the introduction of an idea 
and a state of being that could separate the Athsheans from the nonhu-
man nature that made them as they were before. Speaking on this point 
in a different, real-life context, the Okanagan Native activist Jeannette 
Armstrong writes, “Indigenous people, not long removed from our coop-
erative self-sustaining life-styles on our lands, do not survive well in this 
atmosphere of aggression and dispassion” (467). Asserting the idea that Le 
Guin’s book also asserts—that “We are our land/place”—Armstrong rec-
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ognizes how capitalist violence and its inherent deficit of cooperation and 
lived embeddedness severs native people from their traditional ways of life 
(466). Armstrong shares with Le Guin an uneasiness about the effects of 
capitalism on nonhuman places and on the cultures that dwell in them. 
Ultimately, Le Guin’s tale calls for something to be done about the exploi-
tation of people and place executed in the name of economic growth and 
the perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production.
Robinson’s Mars trilogy is especially successful at imagining an economic 
system that fundamentally rejects the types of capitalist obfuscations, 
oppressions, and assaults that are underlined in The Space Merchants and 
The Word for World Is Forest. Set on Mars, a “blank red slate” of social, 
economic, political, and environmental historical possibility, the entire tril-
ogy illustrates the challenges of moving beyond the blemished Terran past 
and toward a utopian Martian future (Red Mars 85). Early in Red Mars 
the group of one hundred first settlers who are chosen to establish a Mar-
tian colony look forward to beginning a small scientific research station on 
the planet. Back on Earth capitalism’s second contradiction has played out 
fully and the resulting shortages of exploitable resources encourage mining 
and oil drilling on the protected continent of Antarctica, “‘the last clean 
place on Earth’” (251). As a result, like Venus in The Space Merchants 
Mars becomes the next site of growth, the latest economic venture neces-
sitated by capital’s destruction of its own conditions of production, which 
is in this case Earth’s nonhuman nature.
 Capitalist intentions take precedence over the scientific motives of the 
first settlers, and the subsequent intrusion of transnational corporate inter-
ests instigates many of these settlers toward revolt later in Red Mars. The 
first sign of this intrusion is when the millionaire and UN Office for Mar-
tian Affairs bureaucrat Helmut Bronski violates a Mars treaty by allowing 
the Armscor corporation to begin prospecting on Mars. As John Boone, 
the settlement’s symbolic father, observes the mining operations at Brad-
bury Point his thoughts suggest an environmentalist’s distress over the 
effects of capital’s productivist activities:
John shook his head. That afternoon they drove for an hour back to the 
habitat, past raw pits and slag heaps, toward the distant plume of the 
refineries on the other sides of the habitat mesa. He was used to seeing 
the land torn up for building purposes, but this . . . It was amazing what 
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a few hundred people could do. . . . wreaking such havoc just to strip 
away metals, destined for Earth’s insatiable demand. . . . (276–77)
Though at this point in the book Mars has just been settled, the land is 
quickly becoming marred by the same industrial overdevelopment that ini-
tially compelled the economic exploitation of yet another planet.
 Robinson’s reflections on the insatiable demands of capitalist produc-
tion do not end with the mention of Antarctica and the Armscor “gold 
rush,” as John later calls it (284). One of the most awful (in both senses of 
the word) technologies in Red Mars is the space elevator, a twenty-three-
thousand-mile-high traversable cable that allows the various ores being 
mined on Mars to be shipped efficiently to Earth. Phyllis Boyle, the pri-
mary visionary of the space elevator, explains,
“It will . . . be possible to use the cable’s rotation as a slingshot; objects 
released from the ballast asteroid toward Earth will be using the power 
of Mars’s rotation as their push, and will have an energy-free high-speed 
takeoff. It’s a clean, efficient, extraordinarily cheap method, both for 
lifting bulk into space and for accelerating it towards Earth. And given 
the recent discoveries of strategic metals, which are becoming ever more 
scarce on Earth, a cheap lift and push like this is literally invaluable. It 
creates the possibility of an exchange that wasn’t economically viable 
before; it will be a critical component of the Martian economy, the key-
stone of its industry.” (306–7)
Though Phyllis promotes the elevator’s clean operation and efficient energy 
use, her seemingly environmentally conscious assurances conflict starkly 
with John’s observation earlier of the “raw pits,” “slag heaps,” and “dis-
tant plume[s]” that litter the Martian landscape and that are the results of 
the mining that Phyllis understands to be essential for developing a Mar-
tian economy. Phyllis also perceives the scarcity crisis in the availability of 
ores back on Earth, yet her attitude toward the very mode of production 
that enabled such a crisis goes unchanged.
 As a set of economically critical environmentalist texts, The Space 
Merchants, The Word for World Is Forest, and the Mars trilogy argue the 
same general point: capitalism is ecologically destructive. Pohl and Korn-
bluth’s book looks at the ways capital’s symbolic apparatus masks bleak 
environmental realities that should signal the need for other economic 
paths; Le Guin’s book narrates the host of social and ecological abuses 
and attitudes that capitalist production requires; and Robinson’s books 
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continue Le Guin’s observations of capitalist avarice. But out of these three 
works, Robinson’s trilogy also theorizes an alternative economic system. 
Against the growth-centered mode of production practiced back on Earth 
and now being imported onto the newly settled Mars, the Mars trilogy 
presents a counter model of economics: eco-economics. Thought up by 
two of the trilogy’s biologists, Vladimir Taneev and Marina Tokareva, eco-
economics places value on individuals and institutions according to their 
material affects on ecosystems: “‘Everyone should make their living, so 
to speak, based on a calculation of their real contribution to the human 
ecology’” (Red Mars 298). Detailing the eco-economy further in a rousing 
speech in Red Mars, John declares, “‘what you take from the system has 
to be balanced by what you give in to it, balanced or exceeded to create 
that anti-entropic surge which characterizes all creative life’” (378).
 In their related assertions, Vlad, Marina, and John realize collectively 
that a living, ecologically defined, is determined by one’s production of use 
values with respect to ecosystemic integrity, with respect to safeguarding 
and contributing to the processes of interrelated, flourishing human and 
nonhuman life. Kovel writes, “The work of life, and the intricate dance of 
energy and form that goes into it, are essential enterprises to stave off and 
reverse the Second Law [of Thermodynamics],” which says that entropy—
the loss of energy we know as death—increases over time (95). Individu-
als of any species cannot succeed alone in the struggle to resist entropy; 
“each creature is insufficient in-itself,” because “life must exist in relation 
to other life and to nature as a whole if it is to contend with the Second 
Law” (Kovel 95). Blind to this fundamental ecological phenomenon, and 
in fact having no “internal (or external) regulatory mechanism that causes 
it to reorganize” in response to biological and/or ethical imperatives to 
preserve life-sustaining ecological integrity, capitalism functions under the 
principle that only rate of return on financial investment determines the 
success or failure of an economic venture (Foster, “Capitalism” par. 14). 
Under an eco-economy, though, the success or failure of an economic proj-
ect is determined by the degree to which it can be continued across genera-
tions without threatening the ecosystemic relationships that facilitate the 
anti-entropic surge.
 Having finally gained independence from Earth’s political and eco-
nomic institutions, the leaders of Mars in Blue Mars organize a congress to 
establish an official Martian government. As Marxist literary scholar Wil-
liam J. Burling notes, “At the constitutional congress the ‘economic prob-
lem’ looms over the entire process, and not until the matter is resolved 
by active debate and democratic political process is a peculiarly Martian 
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system of ‘eco-economics’ given birth” (160). During this congress one 
character debates that the eco-economic model of the Martian economy 
“‘is a radical and unprecedented intrusion of government into business’” 
(Blue Mars 141). Vlad counters by pointing out the inherent problem 
of such an attitude: business relations are hierarchical, contradicting the 
democratic values that have guided the new Martian civilization since its 
earliest days. He then outlines the eco-economic system, which socially 
provides the equal rights and self-rule that the hierarchical structure of 
capitalism cannot, and which philosophically challenges capitalist con-
ceptions of nonhuman nature. As Vlad states, “‘the world is something 
we all steward together’” rather than exploit privately (144). Important 
in eco-economics is its synthesis of socialist elements—workers owning 
the means of production and “‘hiring capital rather than the other way 
around,’” for example—with environmentalist elements (147). Nonvio-
lent stewardship becomes everyone’s responsibility, and environmental 
courts “‘estimate the real and complete environmental costs of economic 
activities, and help to coordinate plans that impact the environment’” 
(146). Ultimately, the eco-economic model is voted in and the Martian 
civilization becomes a more embedded citizenry through a new economic 
paradigm that values ecosystemic integrity.
 Burling draws attention to the democratic political process of the 
Martian congress and its outcomes to emphasize a key departure of the 
Mars trilogy from traditional socialist theory. In such theory, as already 
noted, capitalism is predicted to give way to socialism as a result of con-
tradictions within the economic system. O’Connor summarizes this “first 
contradiction”: “capitalist production is not only production of commodi-
ties but also production of surplus value, that is, capitalist exploitation 
of labor. The exploitation of labor means simply that class struggle and 
economic crisis are inherent in capitalism” (127). But as Burling observes 
of the Martian congress, “capitalism did not in any sense collapse due to 
economic dynamics but was replaced via the political process,” an obser-
vation that allows us to shift our attention from the content of the con-
gress—namely, the details of the eco-economy—to its political form, one 
of a radical democratic participation foreign to, and even threatening to, 
capitalist social relations (160). This shift in turn allows us to dwell for 
a bit on a complementary analysis of this radical political form from the 
specifically ecosocialist literature: Kovel’s discussion of differentiation and 
dialectics.
 As Kovel notes, ecological integrity is dependent upon differentiation, 
“a state of being that preserves both individuality and connectedness” 
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(106). “Elements of living ecosystems do not exist as separable parts,” 
Kovel writes, “they also exist in relation to the Whole, which is non-reduc-
ible to any of its parts, which plays a role in determining them, and can-
not exist without them” (105). But “capital is riddled with the sequelae 
of splitting” (Kovel 139); capitalism disintegrates ecosystemic integrity 
through its quantification and extraction of exploitable resources from, for 
example, an ocean ecosystem that is not simply a temporary holding area 
for marketable seafood but a complex totality of interdependent living and 
nonliving parts, most of which have no economic value. If we are ethically 
interested in ecological integrity for the sake of humanity and otherkind, 
then we need to rise above such splitting with a noncapitalist practice of 
recognized ecosystemic differentiation. But for this to happen requires a 
fundamental change from a decidedly nondemocratic economic mode that 
is deaf to the people who speak for ecosystemic integrity, to a democratic, 
dialectical communal mode that is always open to the voices of its stake-
holders, many of whom for various reasons constitute the new ecological 
movements that O’Connor sees emerging as a result of the second contra-
diction of capitalism. In other words, a viable ecopolitics must be mod-
eled on ecological differentiation; it must operate as a dialectical process 
that brings together individuals “in a dialogical spirit of open discourse—a 
process the fulfilment of which requires a free society of associated pro-
ducers, that is, a society beyond all forms of splitting, in particular those 
imposed by class and gender or racial domination” (Kovel 140).
 Critic William Dynes writes,
Read as a whole, the Mars series evokes a utopian call for community: 
of wholeness within the self, within interpersonal relationships, within 
political and economic entities, within the species itself. This unity, how-
ever, comes not through a creation of shared identity, nor through a 
hierarchical subordination of the many to the few. Rather, true com-
munity is realized in syncretism—messy, complicated, frustrating, but in 
the end enriching and fruitful. (151)
This “syncretism” reaches its high point in the Martian congress, when 
twenty-one political parties and other organizations come together with 
the shared goal to create a Martian government. It is in this congress that 
those who favor the capitalist mode of production cannot make a good 
case for private business interests against collective responsibility for the 
commons, the reuniting of workers with the means of production, and a 
legal system that oversees and regulates the impact of economic activity on 
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the Martian environment. The genuine democratic political process of the 
congress becomes, in the end, the key to defeating capital and ushering in 
the new economic mode.
For Burling democratic political process finally enables the supersession of 
capital. For O’Connor capitalism falls, or at least takes on more transpar-
ent forms, as a result of the new social movements that come into being as 
individuals and communities start to see and feel the environmental and 
social costs of doing business in the capitalist economic mode. There is a 
complementary relationship between these two theories, and we can see 
this relationship in the Mars trilogy. In Green Mars the democratic con-
gress at Dorsa Brevia generates seven work points, the last of which reads, 
“‘The habitation of Mars is a unique historical process, as it is the first 
inhabitation of another planet by humanity. As such it should be under-
taken in a spirit or reverence for this planet and for the scarcity of life in 
the universe’” (390, emphasis added). Given work points three through 
five—which affirm the collective stewardship of the Martian commons, 
the personal ownership of one’s labor, and thus the complete incompat-
ibility of the economic order currently practiced on Earth with the order 
desired by most people on Mars—the issue of scarcity stressed in point 
seven is a direct response to the now “metanational” corporations that are 
trying to make their move onto Mars. The perception of scarcity requires 
some kind of understood environmental crisis, whether species extinction, 
water crisis, or in the case of the Mars books, the combination of Earth’s 
various economogenic environmental problems and the visible effects of 
capitalism on Mars (e.g., “raw pits and slag heaps” and refinery plumes). 
Work point seven is thus a public response to capital’s degradation of the 
conditions of production, a response that is codified later in the Martian 
congress when the eco-economy is approved.
 It could be said then that the perception and experience of environ-
mental exploitation leads to increased participation in democracy, which 
in turn leads to increased social pressures on the economic system that 
according to ecosocialism is responsible for such exploitation. Of course 
in the economically developed West our perception and experience of eco-
systemic degradation is both mediated by capitalism’s symbolic apparatus 
and limited by the economic mode’s geopolitical dynamics. As The Space 
Merchants can help us understand, marketing and advertising teach us 
nothing about the actual origins of products and in fact necessarily pro-
e c o S o c i a l i S t  c r i t i q u e   121
mote consumption as the only path to personal satisfaction. And as Slavoj 
Žižek observes in the film Examined Life, it is too easy for us in the West 
to fall into ideological disavowal when confronted with issues of environ-
mental degradation, to “act as if [we] don’t know” about global climate 
change or biodiversity loss. This is largely because of the way the evidence 
of capitalism’s effects on ecological integrity is mapped geographically, 
with economically and politically disadvantaged groups carrying the eco-
logical and social burdens of industrial production. For most citizens of 
the developed North, however, it is hard to believe that environmental cri-
sis is upon us when after reading books and articles about climate change, 
peak oil, and water wars, we step outside and see, again in Žižek’s words, 
“nice trees, birds singing, and so on.”
 There are thus at least two major obstacles in the way of communicat-
ing the political urgency with which we need to be addressing the very real 
ecological exploitations inherent in the capitalist economic mode: (1) the 
broad lack of serious, action-generating public interest in environmental 
issues due to the counterforce of ever-present advertising messages that 
advocate a supposedly benign and life-enhancing consumption, and (2) 
the broad lack of likewise action-generating experience of environmental 
issues in a Western society that has distanced itself from the places and 
people whom it exploits to maintain a certain way of life. Indeed, as envi-
ronmental degradation comes closer to home, as it did in the United States 
in April of 2010 with the British Petroleum oil gusher in the Gulf of Mex-
ico, perhaps more and more citizens of the North will enter into fruit-
ful democratic political process. But we do not have to wait for oil spills, 
water crises, species extinctions, and more to heighten our perception of 
local and global environmental problems and to generate our concern 
and action. Among a host of available resources, we have transformative 
environmentalism and we have environmental science fiction to direct our 
attention toward what we are doing and what we need to be doing. In the 
case of the works reviewed in this final chapter, The Space Merchants, The 
Word for World Is Forest, and the Mars trilogy can help us overcome the 
obstacles to our full understanding of capital’s role in environmental crisis, 
as well as lead us to a full appreciation for an as yet unrealized mode of 
ecologically responsive and democratic economic production.
G r e e n  S p e c u l at i o n S  has addressed key works of environmen - tal science fiction ranging from Olaf Stapledon’s 1931 Last and First Men through Kim Stanley Robinson’s 2005 Fifty Degrees 
Below. I want to end this book with a brief look at one of the most recently 
published works of environmental science fiction, not to activate a new 
line of inquiry, but instead to look forward to the future of environmental 
science fiction and its continued engagement with transformative move-
ments. If Paolo Bacigalupi’s award-winning The Windup Girl (2009) is 
any indication, the subgenre will continue to bring to the forefront of our 
consciousness the various issues that have instigated transformative envi-
ronmentalist critique for at least the past fifty years. Among the several 
interrelated plotlines of Bacigalupi’s ecodystopia is the story of Anderson 
Lake, an employee of the Des Moines, Iowa–based biotechnology company 
AgriGen. Anderson runs a factory in Bangkok, Thailand that produces 
kink-springs, which store energy and make it available for any number of 
uses in the novel’s post-oil future. But the factory is a cover for Anderson’s 
real reason for being in Thailand: to work his way into Thai politics and 
then to get access to the nation’s seedbank for AgriGen scientists.
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 Along with PurCal and Total Nutrient Holdings, AgriGen is a “calorie 
company” that secures its global food markets by selling patented seeds 
engineered to produce edible but sterile crops, preventing seed saving by 
farmers (2–3). In the book, Thailand’s near neighbors India, Burma, and 
Vietnam—all “starving and begging for the scientific advances of the cal-
orie monopolies” to provide food amidst waves of crop plagues—have 
already been subsumed into the schemes of the calorie companies (3). 
But Thailand has remained fiercely protectionist in not allowing calorie 
company seeds to cross its borders and in employing the former AgriGen 
genetic engineer Gibbons to help the country stay ahead of new plagues, 
which Gibbons suggests are actually intentional attacks of corporate sabo-
tage on Thai croplands. It is this protectionist policy that Anderson and 
representatives of other global corporations want to change in Thai poli-
tics. Due to corruption in the powerful Thai Environment Ministry, the 
outside pressures of business interests such as AgriGen, and other influenc-
ing factors, a Thai Trade Ministry once vehemently opposed to doing busi-
ness with the calorie companies, but no longer so, ascends to power and 
ushers in a new era of commerce for Thailand—at least until the end of 
the novel.
 The Windup Girl can be used effectively to sustain conversations 
from the perspectives of all of the environmental philosophies outlined 
in the previous chapters. This is not to suggest that the other works of 
environmental science fiction examined in this study cannot be success-
fully explored from a multitude of transformative environmentalist points 
of view, but instead to give readers a concise sense of the ways in which 
decades of carefully debated and formulated environmentalist philosophies 
continue to find their way into science fiction. Bacigalupi’s entire book is 
persistent in fleshing out the ecodystopian implications of Val Plumwood’s 
Illusion of Disembeddedness—my focus in chapter 1—and Gibbons pro-
vides the most succinct admission about the resulting new world of genetic 
manipulation: “Nature has become something new. It is ours now, truly” 
(247). But for us, today, nonhuman nature is not something entirely new, 
yet. It is not yet “ours now, truly” despite the decidedly second nature 
within which we live. The collective goal of environmental science fiction, 
and of our ecocritical analysis of it, is to contribute to a host of cultural 
efforts that aim to prevent the total realization of what Gibbons observes. 
Indeed, the very focus of ecocritical literary study is extratextual, challeng-
ing us “to bring to consciousness [our] views about the world, [our] sense 
of personal responsibility in that world, and to consider the impact of con-
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temporary society on the environments in which everyone lives and dies” 
(Murphy, Ecocritical 6).
 From the perspective of deep ecology The Windup Girl offers an inter-
esting and complicating extratextual discourse about the transforma-
tive movement’s ecosystemic protectionism, bringing to consciousness an 
understanding both of ecological and community vulnerability and of the 
challenges that come along with efforts to liberate ecologies and commu-
nities from the less-than-ecological trajectory of modern history. Chapter 
2 reviewed Arne Naess’s principle of ecosystemic vulnerability to out-
side influences and later examined the wats in John Brunner’s The Sheep 
Look Up—utopian enclaves trying unsuccessfully to fend off the dysto-
pian intrusions of the external world. Ecotopian deep ecology admirably 
wants to maintain a strong localism in self-sufficient communities, and 
ecodystopian fiction raises important questions for deep ecology about the 
possibilities of doing so when the borders separating such ecologies and 
communities can only be imaginary. The corrupted outside world cannot 
be held at bay, to be sure. But what about the world inside the separatist 
ecotopia? For Bacigalupi this world is likewise corrupted. Together with 
being easily bribed, the Thai Environment Ministry’s “white shirts” are 
brutally nationalistic, and along with their laudable policies against calo-
rie company foods comes their unethical stance against Others, whether 
genetically modified Japanese “windup girls” or Chinese immigrants. In 
no way does The Windup Girl come across as a conservative cry of ecofas-
cism against preservationist efforts, though. Instead the novel imagines a 
future when, due to a combination of global poverty and hunger, the pri-
vate control of biology, risen seas, geopolitical strife, intranational political 
infighting—in short, the phenomena whose seeds are germinating in the 
modern world today—the deepest ecology might regrettably turn out to be 
the most vicious.
 An ecofeminist look at The Windup Girl also produces valuable extra-
textual observations and critical commentary. The nonfictional, near-
future equivalent of the book’s AgriGen is the St. Louis, Missouri–based 
agricultural biotechnology corporation Monsanto, “the Big Brother of 
the new world agricultural order” (Robin 2). As Marie-Monique Robin 
details in her book The World According to Monsanto, by 2007 Mon-
santo legally possessed patented genetic material in the crops growing 
on about 225 million acres of farmland around the world (4). Further, 
with its 2006 acquisition of the cottonseed supplier Delta and Pine Land 
Company, Monsanto now holds the patent on the control of plant gene 
expression technology, otherwise known as Terminator technology, which 
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makes it possible to alter a plant’s genetics so it produces sterile seeds.1 
For Vandana Shiva these legal and biotechnological apparatuses, which 
are employed by AgriGen in Bacigalupi’s novel and also receive critical 
treatment in his short story “The Calorie Man,” epitomize the patriarchal 
colonization of biological regeneration. In Biopiracy Shiva replicates the 
cultural ecofeminist argument, reviewed in chapter 3 above, by assert-
ing that “The continuity between regeneration in human and nonhuman 
nature” was “the basis of all ancient worldviews” (43). The emergence of 
patriarchal dualism and its association of women with a passive nonhu-
man nature severed this continuity, leading to a devaluing of biological 
regeneration without which, Shiva argues, “there can be no sustainabil-
ity” (43). About seed technologies, Shiva continues, they “reproduce the 
old patriarchal divisions of activity/passivity, culture/nature. These dichot-
omies are then used as instruments of capitalist patriarchy to colonize the 
regeneration of plants” (45).2 Shiva’s hope is that ecofeminist analysis will 
lead to the decolonization of regeneration and the reclaiming of a “non-
patriarchal mold” (45).
 Finally, while AgriGen’s (Monsanto’s) presence in The Windup Girl 
provides a clear opportunity for an ecosocialist critique of particular 
capitalist strategies of global conquest, in this case its agricultural sec-
tor’s biotechnological, legal, and political tactics, the novel also encour-
ages two related but more general economic criticisms. The first of these 
is of capital’s tendency to turn ecological, social, and political traumas—
many of which the economic system directly or indirectly begets, often 
with state support—into economic opportunities. We have seen this issue 
foregrounded in Brunner’s novels, in The Space Merchants, in The Word 
for World Is Forest, and in the Mars trilogy, and real life has its exam-
ples, too. Referencing the most recent U.S. war with Iraq, Bill McKibben 
highlights a case in point: “In Iraq, one of the first laws adopted by the 
U.S.-led transition government in 2003 protected the patenting of plants 
and seeds, even though 97 percent of Iraqi farmers used seeds saved from 
their own crops or from local markets to grow their own food” (Deep 
193). While Iraqi farmers can still save traditional seeds, the postinvasion 
law “‘facilitate[s] the penetration of Iraqi agriculture by the likes of Mon-
santo, Syngenta, Bayer, and Dow Chemical’” (quoted in McKibben, Deep 
193). This capitalist propensity to provoke and then take advantage of 
distress is highlighted in The Windup Girl with both AgriGen’s and the 
global shipping company carlyle & sons’ involvement in fomenting the 
civil war that ultimately topples the Environment Ministry. Tellingly, at 
the very moment of the latter’s surrender, AgriGen ships arrive in Bangkok 
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to unload the corporation’s rice and soy products, as well as the team of 
AgriGen employees who will be exploiting the seedbank.
 To contextualize another one of The Windup Girl’s economic criti-
cisms we can turn to Slavoj Žižek, who counters the common myth that 
capitalism is sustained by the greed of the owner class, observing instead 
that greed is “subordinated to the impersonal striving of capital to repro-
duce and expand” (Living 132). Rather than serving his or her own self-
interest, the individual capitalist has an ethical responsibility to serve “the 
capitalist drive,” “to put everything, including the survival of humanity, 
at stake . . . simply for the sake of the reproduction of the system as an 
end-in-itself” (Living 335). While in The Windup Girl one character does 
read greed in the eyes of AgriGen’s recently arrived employees, and while 
Anderson does promise his colluders on several occasions that a new era 
of trade will change their fortunes, in its entirety the book supports Žižek’s 
assertion. The world of the novel is suffering through a post-oil “Contrac-
tion” (62) and all of the postapocalyptic repercussions of such an end to 
what Imre Szeman deems our history and our ontology: oil (Szeman 34). 
But rather than striving to reactivate the era of “Expansion” for his own 
selfish interests, Anderson does so to keep Des Moines “alive a little lon-
ger,” as he admits to himself (86). A most frightening prospect is that capi-
talism is not motivated by the greed of the owner class but by an absolute 
duty to perpetuate the reproduction of the economic mode indefinitely, 
even—or especially—in the face of overwhelming evidence that capitalism 
is unequivocally incapable of surviving forever.
 With its multifaceted environmentalist critiques, The Windup Girl is 
one of the latest works in a history of involved environmental science fic-
tion texts, a handful of which have made up the analytical emphases of the 
foregoing chapters. I do not suppose that the subgenre itself will change 
the world. Yet, if students, teachers, and scholars of (inter)disciplines such 
as ecocritical literary studies, science fiction and utopian studies, environ-
mental humanities, environmental studies, and more begin—or in some 
cases continue—to read, teach, and write about environmental science fic-
tion and the value of its cultural commentary, then we can at least expect 
that the subgenre will become firmly embedded in the canon of fiction and 
nonfiction environmental writing. It is this canon, made stronger by sci-
ence fiction’s presence, that provides the tools for thinking and building a 
new way forward.
i n t r o d u c t i o n
 1. For this definition of nonfiction environmental writing I am drawing from Mur-
phy’s Farther Afield in the Study of Nature-Oriented Literature (11).
 2. See Shklovsky, “Art as Technique.” Spiegel provides a concise discussion of Shk-
lovsky’s ostranenie in “Things Made Strange” (369–70).
 3. Osborn observes, “the impulse to dominate as well as to destroy . . . is proving 
continuously disastrous not only in the political and social sense but in the physical 
sense. . . . man’s destructiveness has turned not only upon himself but upon his own 
good earth—the wellspring of his life” (11). As a result of this destructiveness, he con-
cludes, twentieth-century humans have become for the first time in human history “a 
large-scale geological force” (29).
 4. On Carson’s apocalyptic strategy, M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline S. 
Palmer write, “In trying to extract a warning with the apocalyptic narrative . . . Carson 
was courting a number of potential difficulties” (178). These difficulties include the 
“perverse comfort” and escapism of end-times reading as well as the seeming inescap-
ability of the end times that apocalyptic texts portray, both of which, the authors argue, 
limit the rhetorical effect of “A Fable for Tomorrow” (179). Recently, though, Amy M. 
Patrick has defended Carson’s narrative choice as precautionary, arguing, “Carson did 
something important beyond writing a shocking fable: she empowered her audiences 
with knowledge to make informed decisions, by conveying scientific information about 
the environment and exposing the uncertainty in which decisions about the environment 
and human health are often made” (142).
 5. The source for this paraphrase in Istvan Csicsery-Roney, Jr., who writes, 
“Science-fictional estrangement works like scientific modeling: the familiar (that is, 
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naturalized) situation is either rationally extrapolated to reveal its hidden norms and 
premises . . . , or it is analogically displaced on to something unfamiliar in which the 
invisible (because too-familiar) elements are seen freshly as alien phenomena” (118).
 6. This definition of sustainability, forwarded by the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development in its 1987 book Our Common Future, remains the most 
widely cited definition for all movements interested in intergenerational ecological and 
social equity.
 7. Suvin wished for the retirement of sense of wonder as a definitional character-
istic of science fiction in 1979 (Metamorphoses 83), Brooks Landon deems it the “least 
rigorous of all critical concepts brought to bear on the discussion of science fiction” 
(19), and Peter Nicholls and Cornel Robu note that the concept reflects a rather adoles-
cent attention to feeling and emotion as literary criteria (1084).
c h a p t e r  o n e
 1. As for Aldo Leopold, his most famous subversion is his “land ethic,” which 
expands traditional, human-centered ethical systems to include as right or wrong our 
actions upon ecosystems. He writes against economic self-interest in the posthumously 
published A Sand County Almanac, declaring, “a land ethic changes the role of Homo 
sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it” 
(204).
 2. See Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis.”
 3. On the ideological roots of ecological crisis, see also Don D. Elgin’s The Comedy 
of the Fantastic. Elgin narrows these roots to attitudes about human separateness from 
nature. For Elgin, these attitudes grow out of Western Christianity, the movement from 
hunting and gathering culture to agricultural civilization, and the French and Industrial 
Revolutions (4–10).
 4. Writing about Nazi ideology and its “laws,” for example, philosopher Michael 
E. Zimmerman notes,
In 1939, [the German philosopher] Alfred Baeumler praised the view 
that man “must be understood as a part of Nature.” As a part of nature, 
people had to follow its laws in order to survive. For the Nazis, such 
“laws” included the necessity of racial “purity.” As is well known, the 
Nazis practiced infanticide, euthanasia, genocide, and similar practices 
to [sic] in order to purge “racial parasites,” degenerates, and others who 
posed a threat to the health of the Volk. (73)
 5. Fred Waage attributes the italicized passages in Earth Abides, “which repeatedly 
ecologize the immediate dramatic situation,” to a “Universal Narrator” (284–85). I am 
borrowing his term.
 6. The publication date for Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 1962, is frequently cited 
as the birth year of environmentalism, and by the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970, 
environmentalism was firmly established as a social and political movement.
 7. When the Duke’s son and heir to the Atreides throne, Paul, cries over the death 
of a Fremen man he killed in a ritual battle, the Fremen appreciate his gift of “moisture 
to the dead” rather than despise him in his victory (306).
 8. For Wildcat, “indigenous realism” comprises a “respect for the relationships and 
relatives that constitute the complex web of life” (9).
n o t e S  t o  c h a p t e r  t w o   129
 9. When Paul admits he has been studying the great storms of Arrakis, Hawat 
again prevents him from developing a connection to the planet, but this time scaring 
him: “‘Those storms build up across six or seven thousand kilometers of flatlands, feed 
on anything that can give them a push—coriolis force, other storms, anything that has 
an ounce of energy in it. They can blow up to seven hundred kilometers an hour, loaded 
with everything loose that’s in their way—sand, dust, everything. They can eat flesh off 
bones and etch the bones to slivers’” (28).
 10. The Fremen have mastered a style of rhythmless walking that prevents the sand-
worms from recognizing their presence in the desert. They also use “thumpers,” which 
are devices that pound the sand to imitate regular walking patterns, attracting sand-
worms and thus drawing them away from Fremen who are walking in otherwise dan-
gerous territory.
 11. On Ciceronian second nature, landscape historian John Dixon Hunt writes,
The Roman writer Cicero termed what we would call the cultural 
landscape a second nature (alteram naturam). This was a landscape of 
bridges, roads, harbors, fields—in short, all of the elements which men 
and women introduce into the physical world to make it more habitable, 
to make it serve their purposes. Cicero’s phrase “a second nature” of 
course implies a first; though he does not specify this, we may take it that 
he implies a primal nature, an unmediated world before humans invaded, 
altered, and augmented it. A world without any roads, ports, paths, ter-
raced vineyards, etc. Today we might call it the wilderness. (131–32)
 12. “Third nature” has been used to describe sixteenth-century Italian gardens, 
“worlds where the pursuits of pleasure probably outweighed the need for utility and 
accordingly where the utmost resources of human intelligence and technological skill 
were invoked to fabricate an environment where nature and art collaborated” (Hunt 
132). Social ecologist Murray Bookchin has also proposed a third nature in which “the 
human species actively participates in the differentiation and evolution of life” and real-
izes its “potential as ‘nature rendered self-conscious’” (Huston 232). My use of the des-
ignation is to be taken in all of its apocalyptic meanings, not as fully aestheticized or 
socialized nature, but as second nature in its utmost exacerbation.
c h a p t e r  t w o
 1. In their introduction to Beneath the Surface, an anthology about the philosophy 
of deep ecology, Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg define instrumental 
rationality as “the mode of thinking that makes efficiency and quantifiable results the 
goal of all human activity” (xiii). Deep ecology, on the other hand, “emphasizes alter-
native modes of thinking, such as spiritual enlightenment or artistic expression, that 
emphasize life-enhancing qualitative values” (xiii).
 2. For Devall, this “basic culture” is supported by “myths of economic growth, 
progress, belief that technology will save us from environmental problems, and human-
ism” (“Deep Ecology” 52).
 3. As Ursula K. Heise notes, “Dominant terms of the 1960s and 1970s such as 
‘overpopulation’ and ‘carrying capacity’ have receded in importance, giving way to dis-
cussions focused more centrally on issues of distributive justice, gender inequality, and 
uneven resource consumption patterns” (Sense of Place, 69).
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 4. Of these writers, biologist Paul Ehrlich is most known for his 1968 study The 
Population Bomb. As Brian Stableford notes, Ehrlich’s fears were prefigured in fiction 
with Harry Harrison’s Make Room! Make Room! (1966) and sustained by such books 
as Brunner’s The Sheep Look Up, Philip Wylie’s The End of the Dream (1972), and 
Kurt Vonnegut’s Ecodeath (1972) (138).
 5. Statement four of the deep ecology platform reads, “The flourishing of human 
life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flour-
ishing of non-human life requires a smaller human population” (Naess, “The Deep” 
68).
 6. As Barbara Drake summarizes, “What Piercy substitutes for the paired father 
and mother is a cooperative of three ‘Mothers’ for each child. They may be male or 
female. They volunteer to ‘Mother.’ . . . With the mothers, the child becomes part of a 
loose familial group, co-mothers and others” (114).
 7. The educational complement to this spirituality in Mattapoisett is its rite-of-
passage ceremony. For children to become full members of the community, they must 
spend one week in the woods by themselves in a naming ceremony. The ecotopian soci-
ety thus views wilderness as essential to human formative experience. Another example 
is less pedagogical, but does demonstrate Mattapoisett’s ecological literacy: the town’s 
community gardens follow the principles of organic gardening—“tomato plants grow-
ing with rose bushes and onions, pansies and bean plants” (122).
 8. We have already seen Dune’s assessment of the limited rhetorical and practical 
possibilities of this kind of thinking about “ecological equilibrium”—or, a nonexistent 
first nature—in a contemporary world where we can only encounter a second nature. 
In the interest of highlighting ecotopian fiction as a narrative space for deep ecological 
fantasies, I will bypass applying this critique again and instead flesh out some other 
problems with deep ecology in the next section of this chapter.
 9. We can see in these words from Naess and Snyder the potential for fueling anti-
immigration and racist sentiments. Such sentiments have unfortunately been voiced 
in ecology and environmentalism, but they are not endemic to them. See Jake Kosek’s 
“Purity and Pollution” (142–44) and Britt M. Rusert’s “Black Nature.”
 10. Wallace Stegner argues, “a place is not a place until people have been born in 
it, have grown up in it, lived in it, known it, died in it—have both experienced and 
shaped it, as individuals, families, neighborhoods, and communities, over more than 
one generation” (201). For Stegner, writing in the mid-1980s, the modern American is 
displaced—hasty, shallow, restless, rootless—seemingly as a psychological consequence 
of a cultural history that has privileged motion over settling down.
 11. The idea of Earth as mother and conceptual dualisms as patriarchal, as related in 
the previous two quotations, will be taken up in chapter 3.
 12. In Ecological Utopias, de Geus discusses several common metaphors for uto-
pian narrative, two of which are the “blueprint” and the “navigational compass” (238). 
Focusing in a late chapter more on the way we read ecotopian narratives than on the 
narratives themselves, de Geus challenges the idea of ecotopia-as-blueprint in particular, 
because if we approach ecotopias as offering completed schematics for the ideal society 
then we will fall short in locating practical methods of implementation. “In contrast to 
this blueprinting approach, ‘the utopia as the perfect building plan’ and as an ideal that 
can be achieved in reality,” de Geus writes, “I would like to propose a more modest 
model of ‘the utopia as navigational compass.’ In this model the genre of the ecological 
utopia is primarily interpreted as an instrument that serves to guide society’s general 
direction” (238).
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 13. The book’s title “is based on a belief that about the time of World War I you 
could stand the entire human race on the 147-square-mile Isle of Wight, elbow to elbow 
and face to face. In the 1960’s the figuring went that it would take the 221 square mile 
of the Isle of Man to pack us all in like sardines. By 2100, says John Brunner, you’d 
need the 640 square miles of Zanzibar to do it” (Wollheim 56).
 14. This turn away from neo-Malthusian population fears is best demonstrated 
today in ecosocialism, my focus in chapter 4. As one ecosocialist writes, not specifically 
targeting deep ecology, “While it is possible to blame ‘greed,’ rising population, or the 
inevitable desire to have more things, economic growth is first and foremost a product 
of an economic system that dominates our planet: capitalism” (Wall 8). Foster, Clark, 
and York likewise argue,
Within capitalist society, there has always been a tendency to blame any-
thing but the economic system itself for ecological overshoot. Yet if the 
developing ecological crisis has taught us anything, it is that even though 
population growth and inappropriate technologies have played impor-
tant roles in accelerating environmental degradation, the ecological rift 
we are now facing has its principle source in the economy. (377)
 15. Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front are the most well-known activist 
organizations, as Bron Taylor notes, “officially devoted to civil disobedience and sabo-
tage as means of environmental resistance” (Dark 74).
c h a p t e r  t h r e e
 1. The poststructuralist theorists who inform Armbruster’s discussion are Teresa de 
Lauretis and Donna Haraway, who both declare identity as the always-shifting product 
of “multiple axes of difference,” rather than as the static product of nature or other 
singular or ranked factors (105).
 2. On the connections between cultural ecofeminism and deep ecology, Mary 
Mellor writes, “Cultural ecofeminists and deep ecologists share a strategy of reversing 
valuations in the classic culture (man)/nature (woman) dualism: deep ecologists urge 
humans to subordinate themselves to nature (biocentrism), and cultural ecofeminists 
celebrate women’s connections to nature and many traditionally feminine characteris-
tics” (208).
 3. Even Prentice admits that (cultural) ecofeminism “reminds all people of the frag-
ile, endangered, and inextricable inter-dependence of all life—including human life—
and the planet” (9).
 4. With respect to the critical possibilities of cultural ecofeminist essentialism, 
Alaimo also warns against rationalist feminism’s “hasty dismissal” of ecofeminist argu-
ments that are labeled “essentialist” (8). She references Noël Sturgeon, who writes in 
Ecofeminist Natures, “essentialist moments in ecofeminism, given particular histori-
cal conditions, are part of creating a shifting and strategic identification of the relation 
between ‘women’ and ‘nature’ that has political purposes” (11).
 5. On King’s dialectical ecofeminism, Sandilands notes, “King’s project was to tran-
scend the ‘either/or’ assumptions inherent in the debate between rationalist-materialist 
humanism and metaphysical-feminist naturalism, to create a dialectical feminism that 
incorporates the best insights of both traditions” (18).
 6. Spinel’s moment of transformation is cited in the introduction of this book.
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 1. Though sympathetic with deep ecology’s “emphasis on the subtle interconnec-
tions and complexity of nature, its distaste for human arrogance, [and] its argument for 
the ethical importance of recognizing that humans are but one among millions of spe-
cies on earth and not the divinely (or self-) appointed masters of Creation,” ecosocialist 
scholars Foster, Clark, and York argue,
Deep ecology is based on an anti-materialist theory of causality—one 
that posits that our value system, particularly the one emerging with the 
birth of modernity and a scientific worldview, is, at base, the cause of 
environmental crisis. Rather than a discussion of the social forces that 
drive social-production, a critique of the dominant worldview—divorced 
from its social-material influences—becomes paramount. Change 
becomes a matter of adjusting values and developing the proper eco-
ethics, and from there, it is assumed, changes in the social structure will 
follow. (260–61)
For these authors, deep ecology’s philosophical idealism leads it away from what ecoso-
cialists determine to be the ultimate target of criticism: not merely values, in the end, but 
the social, material processes that drive ecosystemic degradation.
 2. On the effects of capitalist productive activity, Merchant notes,
Examples include the destruction of the environment from the uses of 
military production (such as oil spills and air pollution during the 1991 
Gulf War or the predicted nuclear winter from nuclear war); global 
warming from industrial emissions of carbon dioxide; acid rain from 
industrial uses of chlorofluorocarbons; the pollution of oceans and soils 
from the dumping of industrial wastes; and industrial extractions from 
forests and oceans for commodity production. (Radical 9–10)
 3. The challenge of adopting such criticism of capitalist ideology is also demon-
strated in William’s and Connie’s initial reactions to the radically new economic ideas of 
the respective ecotopias they experience in Ecotopia and Woman on the Edge of Time.
 4. I am reminded of the environmental writer Scott Russell Sanders—an author not 
only of nonfiction but also of the 1985 environmental science fiction novel Terrarium—
who worries in his essay “Mountain Music” that his son will deem him “deluded, per-
haps even mad” for countering the “chorus of voices telling [his son] that the universe 
was made for us, that the Earth is an inexhaustible warehouse, that consumption is the 
goal of life, that money is the road to delight” (104).
 5. It is appropriate here to reference a recent cinematic representation of capitalist 
exploitation and its real-life occurrence: James Cameron’s Avatar (2009). A Terran min-
ing company and its private military threaten the aboriginal land of the Na’vi people 
on the planet Pandora. Efforts to educate the Na’vi away from their indigenous ways 
have not produced the speedy results demanded by capitalist investment, so the min-
ing effort takes a militaristic, genocidal turn. The Na’vi succeed in their revolt against 
capitalist exploitation, but as Slavoj Žižek writes, “At the same time this film was taking 
in money all around the world . . . something strangely resembling its plot was taking 
place in the real world. The hills in the south of the Indian state of Orissa, inhabited 
by the Kondh tribe, were sold to mining companies who plan to exploit their immense 
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reserves of bauxite” (Living 394). The animistic and subsistence agriculturalist Kondh 
have appealed to Cameron for help (see Hopkins, “Indian Tribe”).
a F t e r w o r d
 1. In a letter on its company website, Monsanto reiterates its 1999 commitment 
“not to commercialize sterile seed technology in food crops” (par. 3). Beyond overtly 
not committing to abstain from commercializing this technology in nonfood crops, 
Monsanto leaves open the possibility of its eventual introduction of gene-use restriction 
by highlighting the technology’s potential benefits.
 2. The full quotation reads, “The new biotechnologies reproduce the old patriar-
chal divisions of activity/passivity, culture/nature. These dichotomies are then used as 
instruments of capitalist patriarchy to colonize the regeneration of plants and human 
beings” (emphasis added). The latter part of this quotation is also played out in The 
Windup Girl, with the novel’s title character being a genetically modified human female 
created to serve and not question her original Japanese master as an office manager and 
companion, and then forced to withstand the brutal implications of this unquestioning 
servility when abandoned in Thailand. Thus, with The Windup Girl’s dual attention 
to the biological colonization of both nonhuman nature (in seeds) and human nature 
(in women) it affords further opportunity for ecofeminist analysis, especially since the 
windup girl, Emiko, is herself sterile.
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